A father and daughter check their mobile phone in front of a poster of Deng Xiaoping in the southern Chinese city of Shenzhen in Guangdong Province in 2008.
China’s Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, wants the late Deng Xiaoping’s magic.
China’s Communist Party leader, Xi Jinping, wants the late Deng Xiaoping’s magic.
Mr. Xi will lay out proposals for economic rejuvenation at a leadership conference that started Saturday, and state-run media have likened the event to a historic meeting in 1978 when, they say, Mr. Deng began an era of market “reform and opening up.”
But anyone looking for inspiration and instruction from Mr. Deng should beware: the conventional account of the 1978 meeting is a compound of selective memories, and a deceptive guide to how China’s steps to economic transformation really happened.
“To put a halo on this meeting as a conference of reform and opening up is to concoct a myth,” Bao Tong, a former aide to ousted party secretary Zhao Ziyang, a central figure in the tumult of the 1980s, said in an interview with a Chinese researcher published in 2008.
The party’s widely repeated version of history depicts Mr. Deng as seizing control at the Third Plenum, or meeting, of the 11th Central Committee in late 1978.
But anyone looking for inspiration and instruction from Mr. Deng should beware: the conventional account of the 1978 meeting is a compound of selective memories, and a deceptive guide to how China’s steps to economic transformation really happened.
“To put a halo on this meeting as a conference of reform and opening up is to concoct a myth,” Bao Tong, a former aide to ousted party secretary Zhao Ziyang, a central figure in the tumult of the 1980s, said in an interview with a Chinese researcher published in 2008.
The party’s widely repeated version of history depicts Mr. Deng as seizing control at the Third Plenum, or meeting, of the 11th Central Committee in late 1978.
Inspired by Mr. Deng, the accounts suggest, the officials started China on market reforms, jettisoned the ideological debris of Mao Zedong’s era, and sidelined the old-guard party secretary, Hua Guofeng, who had defended Mao, resisted economic change, and stood in the way of rehabilitating officials purged by Mao.
Since that time, Third Plenums of successive Central Committees have held a special place in China’s political calendar.
Since that time, Third Plenums of successive Central Committees have held a special place in China’s political calendar.
They come every five years or so, and are when leaders lay down their priorities.
The first such plenum in a leader’s tenure is especially important, as this meeting is for Mr. Xi.
And party propaganda has invited flattering comparisons with the famous conference of 1978.
But scholars who have studied that time using interviews, documents and memoirs offer an account of change that is more halting and less clear-cut.
But scholars who have studied that time using interviews, documents and memoirs offer an account of change that is more halting and less clear-cut.
Mr. Deng emerges less a masterly visionary and more a canny politician, reacting to events and shifting his views step by step.
“The official view of the Third Plenum, too often echoed in foreign studies, exaggerates the meeting,” said Frederick Teiwes, an emeritus professor of government at the University of Sydney, and Warren Sun, a historian at Monash University in Australia, in emailed remarks they prepared together.
“The official view of the Third Plenum, too often echoed in foreign studies, exaggerates the meeting,” said Frederick Teiwes, an emeritus professor of government at the University of Sydney, and Warren Sun, a historian at Monash University in Australia, in emailed remarks they prepared together.
They are writing a book about that era.
“It ignores Hua’s achievements in moving the country away from Maoist orthodoxies and refocusing on the economy, underplays initial reform efforts before the Plenum, and oversimplifies a complex process that saw Deng emerge as paramount leader over the next two years,” the professors wrote.
The word “market” did not appear in the official communiqué from the 1978 meeting; the word “reform” appeared twice.
“It ignores Hua’s achievements in moving the country away from Maoist orthodoxies and refocusing on the economy, underplays initial reform efforts before the Plenum, and oversimplifies a complex process that saw Deng emerge as paramount leader over the next two years,” the professors wrote.
The word “market” did not appear in the official communiqué from the 1978 meeting; the word “reform” appeared twice.
Only some six years later did the slogan “reform and opening up” become widely used, Professors Teiwes and Sun said.
The drama in 1978 was played out at a work conference that preceded the formal Central Committee meeting; the two gatherings together are usually called the Third Plenum of that year.
The drama in 1978 was played out at a work conference that preceded the formal Central Committee meeting; the two gatherings together are usually called the Third Plenum of that year.
The assembled officials were supposed to discuss economic policy, but some began to urge leaders to confront the aftermath of Mao’s era and politically rehabilitate officials who were purged by him.
Neither Mr. Deng nor Mr. Hua instigated this shift.
Neither Mr. Deng nor Mr. Hua instigated this shift.
They had agreed beforehand that the meeting should focus on improving the economy, and Mr. Deng was abroad when the demands for rehabilitation burst out in the meeting sessions.
“In reality, the meeting slipped out of control,” Mr. Bao, the former party aide, said in his 2008 interview. “Both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were taken by surprise.”
After he returned from abroad, Mr. Deng supported rehabilitating fallen cadres, but set limits and did not want to damage Mao’s standing, said Han Gang, a historian at East China Normal University in Shanghai who is writing a study of that period.
“In reality, the meeting slipped out of control,” Mr. Bao, the former party aide, said in his 2008 interview. “Both Hua Guofeng and Deng Xiaoping were taken by surprise.”
After he returned from abroad, Mr. Deng supported rehabilitating fallen cadres, but set limits and did not want to damage Mao’s standing, said Han Gang, a historian at East China Normal University in Shanghai who is writing a study of that period.
“He wanted to focus on the future, and didn’t want to dwell on the details of the past,” Mr. Han said.
The 1978 meeting endorsed adjustments in state planning to rejuvenate the economy, but changes were already underway.
The 1978 meeting endorsed adjustments in state planning to rejuvenate the economy, but changes were already underway.
Mr. Hua has been depicted in earlier official accounts as a hapless defender of Maoist orthodoxy.
But he recognized the need for change, although he faced damaging criticism for adjusting too slowly to shifting ideological winds, said Professors Teiwes and Sun.
On the other hand, Mr. Deng gradually embraced the idea of market-driven economic growth, rather than adjustments within a state plan, Professor Han said.
On the other hand, Mr. Deng gradually embraced the idea of market-driven economic growth, rather than adjustments within a state plan, Professor Han said.
Before the Third Plenum, Mr. Deng and Mr. Hua shared similar views on the need to speed up economic growth and import more technology.
“The shift occurred incrementally,” Professor Han said.
“It wasn’t as if suddenly at the Third Plenum he was seized by inspiration to reform,” he said of Mr. Deng. “To date market economic reform thinking to that meeting is too early.”
In fact, a document provisionally endorsed by the 1978 meeting explicitly opposed the “household responsibility system,” which became the watershed change that freed farmers from the grip of communes. That change allocated land to farmers and allowed them to contract production, so they could keep any surplus to eat or to sell.
Mr. Deng and other leaders took years to come around to clearly supporting the policy; effectively ending the communes, an emblem of Mao’s socialism, did not come easily.
“The shift occurred incrementally,” Professor Han said.
“It wasn’t as if suddenly at the Third Plenum he was seized by inspiration to reform,” he said of Mr. Deng. “To date market economic reform thinking to that meeting is too early.”
In fact, a document provisionally endorsed by the 1978 meeting explicitly opposed the “household responsibility system,” which became the watershed change that freed farmers from the grip of communes. That change allocated land to farmers and allowed them to contract production, so they could keep any surplus to eat or to sell.
Mr. Deng and other leaders took years to come around to clearly supporting the policy; effectively ending the communes, an emblem of Mao’s socialism, did not come easily.
Decisive momentum for the household policy came only in 1981, Professors Teiwes and Sun said.
The 1978 meeting marked Mr. Deng’s growing pre-eminence in the leadership, although he never formally took the formal title of party chief.
The 1978 meeting marked Mr. Deng’s growing pre-eminence in the leadership, although he never formally took the formal title of party chief.
Mr. Hua was effectively removed from office in late 1980, when impatience and dissatisfaction with him came to a head.
The lessons from the 1978 meeting and Mr. Deng’s “groping” journey towards embracing market-driven reforms should discourage heady expectations for Mr. Xi’s own Third Plenum, Professor Han said.
“Many people have a mindset of expectations that they put on a high-level decision-making meeting or a document,” he said.
The lessons from the 1978 meeting and Mr. Deng’s “groping” journey towards embracing market-driven reforms should discourage heady expectations for Mr. Xi’s own Third Plenum, Professor Han said.
“Many people have a mindset of expectations that they put on a high-level decision-making meeting or a document,” he said.
“But in reality in China making a sudden major change is very difficult. It takes time.”
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