By Geoff Dyer in Washington
Two weeks ago, few people had ever heard of an “air defence identification zone”, the Cold War-era set of air regulations that China has decided to put in place across a large stretch of the East China Sea.
But the obscure rules have become the latest flashpoint in the region’s unresolved historical disputes.
By the end of the week, Joe Biden's Air Force Two will probably have passed twice through what has suddenly become the world’s most controversial airspace.
The air rules are part of a broader pattern: the steady procession of Chinese pressure tactics to push its claims on Japanese Senkaku islands.
Since around 2008 – and especially over the past year – China has been sending ships to patrol the seas around the islands.
The air defence zone extends its claim to the skies above.
The long-term Chinese agenda is to exert greater control over the East China Sea and South China Sea and in the process to ease the once-dominant US Navy out of large stretches of the western Pacific.
The long-term Chinese agenda is to exert greater control over the East China Sea and South China Sea and in the process to ease the once-dominant US Navy out of large stretches of the western Pacific.
China is attempting what aspiring great powers often do: to prevent another country from dominating its own region.
China’s latest move does appear to be driving something of a wedge between Japan and the US.
China’s latest move does appear to be driving something of a wedge between Japan and the US.
Tokyo was heartened when two US B-52 bombers flew across the air zone, calling China’s bluff.
But to its immense displeasure, Washington has told commercial US airlines to abide by the rules.
Japan sees the pressure from China as a hot, immediate challenge: for the US, it is a more distant concern, a piece on a geopolitical chessboard.
Tokyo will always worry that Washington does not quite have its back.
Yet the Chinese tactics are also too clever by half.
Yet the Chinese tactics are also too clever by half.
Given Japan’s significant navy, China cannot just simply assert control over the Senkaku – as it was able to do last year with the Scarborough Shoal, an area in the South China Sea which is also disputed by the Philippines.
If Japan and the US maintain a firm and disciplined position and avoid obvious provocations, the status quo is likely to hold for some time.
Even if China were to muscle control of the Senkaku from Japan, the downsides would outweigh any potential gains.
Even if China were to muscle control of the Senkaku from Japan, the downsides would outweigh any potential gains.
The uninhabited islands have become a symbol of competing nationalism and of a great power tug-of-war, but they are of little strategic value and would be difficult to defend.
The diplomatic fallout in the region would be immense.
The diplomatic fallout in the region would be immense.
Beijing would like to isolate Japan in Asia, scaring off other nations with warnings about its second world war revisionism.
But such a move would end up engineering strong regional support for Japan.
Even South Korea, the one country that shares Beijing’s reservations of the Japanese government, has been outraged by the Chinese air zone.
Most of all, Beijing would secure the enmity of the second-biggest economy in the region for generations. China, whose own economy depends on an open trading system, seems to think that its tough approach will eventually oblige Japan to respect its designs for the region.
Most of all, Beijing would secure the enmity of the second-biggest economy in the region for generations. China, whose own economy depends on an open trading system, seems to think that its tough approach will eventually oblige Japan to respect its designs for the region.
But the likely result is one of two very different options: either a substantial beefing-up of the US-Japan alliance or a major shift in Japan towards greater defence muscle, including even the possibility of a nuclear bomb.
Beijing warns constantly about the revival of Japanese militarism, which is still a long way off. Yet it is creating the conditions for its revival.
All of this raises questions about what sort of endgame China really has in mind.
In a recent speech in Beijing, Paul Keating, former Australian prime minister, laid out the dilemma China faces.
“There can be no stable and peaceful order in Asia unless Japan is, and feels itself to be, secure,” he said.
If Beijing really wants to shape the next century in Asia at the expense of the US, it will need friends and allies to advance its priorities and to push its agenda.
If Beijing really wants to shape the next century in Asia at the expense of the US, it will need friends and allies to advance its priorities and to push its agenda.
Instead, if it steps up efforts to coerce its neighbours, China is setting itself up to be a very lonely great power.
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