Japan Seeks Friends in Asia—but Not China

China needs to think twice before taking aggressive actions in the South China Sea

By Bruce Einhorn and Matthew Philips 

Prime Minister Shinzō Abe is the first Japanese premier to visit all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 

In late November, Emperor Akihito will make the first visit by a Japanese monarch to India. 

Not on either dignitary’s itinerary—China. 

And that’s no accident.
Abe, a foreign-policy hawk who’s clashed with the Chinese over the ownership of some Japanese islands, wants to shore up relations with the swath of nations forming a semicircle around China. 

Some have their own beefs, including India, which shares a disputed border with China. 

Abe will visit India next year, and in mid-December will host Asean leaders. 

It’s all part of his campaign to thwart China’s rulers, who, as he wrote in a column last December, see the South China Sea as “Lake Beijing.”

This is powerful talk. 

China is throwing its considerable weight around more in the region, and it may react aggressively.

As all sides buy more warships, missiles, and fighter jets, such confrontations could escalate. 

“Nobody has said this is surrounding China,” says Chiaki Akimoto, director of RUSI Japan, an arm of Britain’s Royal United Services Institute, a think tank. 

What Abe wants “is just a friendship network with nations around China.”
Whatever Japan’s policy is called, Abe is even pursuing it in areas within China’s sphere of influence. 

In November, he took his charm campaign to Cambodia and Laos. 

Despite a pacifist tradition dating to the end of World War II, Japan is increasing military cooperation with Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines, which have felt China’s wrath over territorial claims. 

Abe’s actions, says Tetsuo Kotani, research fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, make clear that “China needs to think twice before taking assertive actions” in the South China Sea. 

The official China Daily dismissively says Abe has been “hyping South China Sea tension to gain popularity in the region.”
One reason Abe is getting a warm welcome is that China’s defense spending hit $172 billion last year, up 64 percent from 2008, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. 

India has one Russian-made nuclear submarine and may lease a second. 

It just took delivery of its third aircraft carrier. 

It has test-fired a supersonic cruise missile that can reach Beijing.
In the same Dec. 27 column where he made his “Lake Beijing” comment, Abe wrote, “The ongoing disputes... mean that Japan’s top foreign-policy priority must be to expand the country’s strategic horizons... I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan, and the U.S. state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons from the Indian Ocean region to the western Pacific.” 

Abe also wants Japan to join the Five Power Defence Arrangements of Britain, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore.

Operation Dawn Blitz: retaking the Senkaku islands

In June, Japan and the U.S. conducted Dawn Blitz, a military exercise in California that included a mock assault on a remote island. 

Japan’s self-defense force wouldn’t have joined such an exercise five years ago, says James Brown, a military fellow at the Lowy Institute for International Policy in Sydney. 

The stress on offensive action has spread to the navy. 

“We see the commissioning of warships that in external appearance look like assault ships,” says Dean Cheng, East Asian military analyst for the Heritage Foundation. 

“These are things that Japan shied away from.” 

Abe has long backed repealing the article of the country’s constitution that renounces war forever.
As the region’s militaries get bigger, so do the risks. 

“It strikes me how much the current situation in Asia looks like a replay of the 1930s in Europe,” says Daniel Goure, a vice president with the Lexington Institute, a think tank in Arlington, Va. 

Brown warns that “there are going to be a lot more submarines, a lot more amphibious vessels, a lot more aircraft, and we haven’t gotten agreement on how everybody is going to avoid accidents. It’s a huge problem.”

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Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea

Of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the South China Sea – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III and Amruta Karambelkar

Among the claimants and littoral states of the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal in expressing their alarm and concern over growing Chinese assertiveness in this strategic and resource-rich regional commons.
Because of their power asymmetry vis-à-vis China, which has the most extensive claims to the SCS, Manila and Hanoi have been supporters of the U.S. pivot to Asia, to balance against Beijing’s growing maritime power projection, while also using diplomatic outreach to cultivate as many supporters as possible.
The Philippines has been bolstering its defense and maritime law enforcement with the help of the U.S. and Japan.
Vietnam is meanwhile relying on its traditional partners – India and Russia – as additional cushions against possible excesses of China’s rise to power in the region.
Both countries are also seeking support from ASEAN.
The SCS dispute took a notable turn when Philippines went to UN arbitration to challenge China’s nine-dashed line.
The claimants had to that point sought to manage the dispute through regional mechanisms and bilateral talks. Not surprisingly, then, Manila’s move has irked Beijing, which has been insistent on not internationalizing the dispute.
While it may be premature to assess Manila’s strategy at this stage, it is interesting to examine the factors that led to parallels, as well as variances, in the strategies taken by Manila and Hanoi via-à-vis China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS.
Vietnam’s strategies are shaped by its history, economy and geographical proximity with China.
Vietnam’s economy is highly reliant on its trade and investments with China and this dependency limits Vietnam’s actions.
Yet of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the SCS – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988.
Hence, Hanoi has many axes to grind against China in the SCS.
Both countries have also contested offshore blocks each has awarded to foreign energy players and have traded accusations of arrests and harassment of their fishermen.
However, alongside these clashes are positive milestones such as the demarcation of their common land boundary, establishment of a joint fishing zone in Tonkin Gulf and more recently the creation of a fishery hotline that could greatly aid in mitigating “incidents” at sea arising from overlapping fishing grounds.
As two socialist countries with a history of competition and cooperation (they were Cold War and Vietnam War allies), many channels, official and semi-official, including Party-to-Party talks, have served as platforms to ensure that tensions are kept at manageable levels and not allowed to affect other aspects of bilateral relations, notably trade and investment.
In fact, just recently, the two countries signed 12 agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, infrastructure, energy and maritime affairs, and set up a working group to look into joint exploration in SCS.
This status quo would seem to be an achievement of Chinese diplomacy, mitigating conflict with Vietnam at a time when Beijing is embroiled in another dispute with the Philippines, likewise over the SCS.
When it comes to Vietnam, China would seem to have employed the right strategy at the right time.
Bilateral relations therefore appear unhindered despite the territorial and maritime disputes, giving Vietnam little motivation to do what the Philippines has done, and challenge Beijing’s claims before an international body.
Of course, Vietnam has continued to raise the SCS in ASEAN forums.
It is also trying to improve relations with the U.S., and is consulting with the Philippines on mutual concerns. Although Vietnam has shown some support for Manila’s move to arbitrate, this backing is unlikely to graduate to a united Hanoi-Manila front versus Beijing.
Again, Hanoi is constrained in its options for dealing with Beijing, and cannot afford a bold stand, save for fiery rhetoric.
It will continue to express its dissatisfaction with China through the likes of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which serves as an international outlet given the participation of extra regional powers.
Meanwhile, like other ASEAN countries, and especially those with SCS claims, Vietnam will watch closely the outcome of Manila’s arbitration bid and may reshape its strategies accordingly.
Given Manila’s legal challenge, it can be argued that the Chinese leadership may be more willing to compromise with Hanoi just to isolate Manila and prevent the creation of a united front against Beijing’s sweeping SCS claims.
The Philippines’ SCS strategy, meanwhile, is motivated by a perceived Chinese westward push at its expense.
Despite long administering the largest features in the Spratlys, Manila’s military capabilities are limited.
The occupation of Mischief Reef came about two years after the removal of the U.S. bases, and marked the point at which the much talked-about “China threat” became a reality.
Since then, Beijing has intensified its fortifications and naval presence in the area.
As a militarily disadvantaged state, Manila’s fallback rested on its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S..
But warming Sino-U.S. relations, especially on the economic front, may put limits on what Manila can expect from its traditional ally.
The fear that a Sino-U.S. understanding on the SCS, wherein Washington tacitly acquiesces to Beijing consolidating its position in the semi-enclosed sea, may also become an emerging consideration, making it imperative for the Philippines to diversify its security partners to give it more room for independent action. Nonetheless, the U.S. remains important to the Philippines for trade and security, despite the ups and downs in relations.
Manila closed the U.S. bases in Subic and Clark in 1991 but allowed U.S. forces to come back in 1999 through the Visiting Forces Agreement, and has since been a major ally in the war against terrorism.
Manila is a natural partner in Washington’s rebalancing strategy.
The Philippines is also strengthening ties with Japan, which has its own disputes with China, in the East China Sea.
 This power web can help the Philippines absorb retaliatory measures from China, and as such may have emboldened Manila to take a stand against Beijing.
It might therefore be said that power arrangements and alignments dictate the strategies of Vietnam and the Philippines.
Moreover, in contrast to Vietnam, the Philippines does not have a large trade and investment dependency with China, as the U.S. and Japan are still its primary primary trade and aid partners.
True, Sino-Philippine economic ties have been growing, and certainly the Philippines felt the effects of China’s decision to curb banana imports and block tourism.
However, the comparatively low level of economic engagement means that Chinese economic sanctions are not enough to make Manila bend, at least for now.
For instance, the Philippines has been able to offset the loss of the Chinese market for its bananas by exporting to the U.S.
Nevertheless, the rise of China and relative decline of the U.S. will continue to cast a long shadow over the SCS.
Although some ASEAN countries have welcomed the U.S. rebalancing, most have developed deep economic ties with China over the years.
The SCS thus has the potential to become a divisive issue within the regional grouping.
This creates the impression among some Philippine leaders that ASEAN may no longer be a reliable or effective forum for engaging China on the SCS issue.
Countries that have traditional and unresolved disputes with China, like Japan and India, may extend some support to smaller SCS claimants, but their commitment when push comes to shove remains to be seen.
The SCS has strategic, security, economic and political importance for both the Philippines and Vietnam. Both countries see their claimed SCS areas as vital elements of national security, important trade channels, traditional fishing grounds and a source of indigenous offshore energy resources, not to mention as integral components of their territory.
However, particular historical, economic and politico-security considerations have prompted the two countries to develop divergent SCS strategies, especially in terms of dealing with China.

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India Rebukes Beijing on South China Sea

By Zachary Keck

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh appeared to side with ASEAN and rebuke China on the South China Sea dispute during the East Asian Summit in Brunei this week.
The sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea predictably commanded much attention during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation and East Asia Summits this past week.
During his otherwise conciliatory speech at the latter event, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang forcefully made the case for China’s long-standing preference of trying to resolve the disputes bilaterally with only the parties directly involved.
“Territorial and maritime disputes between countries in this region should be resolved by the countries concerned through friendly consultation,” Li said during the speech, according to state-run media outlets in China.
Speaking shortly after Li at the same forum, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh seemed to directly refute China’s position, although with some diplomatic subtlety.
“A stable maritime environment is essential to realize our collective regional aspirations,” Singh said according to an official transcript of the speech.
“We welcome the collective commitment by the concerned countries to abide by and implement the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and to work towards the adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea on the basis of consensus. We also welcome the establishment of the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum for developing maritime norms that would reinforce existing international law relating to maritime security.”
When asked by an Indonesian newspaper how rivalries in Asian powers could best be managed, Singh continued advocating the use of multilateral institutions to solve disputes.
“Regional forums can play a useful role in this process,” Singh said in response. 

“We, therefore, see immense value in the East Asia Summit, ASEAN Regional Forum, ADMM+ and other cooperative mechanisms in the region.”
India has periodically inserted itself into the South China Sea dispute in the past on the side of ASEAN countries, much to China's displeasure. 

Notably, after Chinese fishing vessels sought to disrupt India’s joint oil and gas exploration with Vietnam in disputed parts of the South China Sea last year, Indian Navy Chief Admiral D.K Joshi said that Delhi was prepared to send naval ships into the South China Sea to protect the country’s interests.
Speaking of the South China Sea in December of last year, Joshi said: “Not that we expect to be in those waters very frequently, but when the requirement is there for situations where the country's interests are involved, for example ONGC Videsh, we will be required to go there and we are prepared for that.”
India has also dismissed Chinese criticism of its willingness to engage in joint oil and gas explorations with Vietnam in waters that China also claims. 

Delhi has to walk a fine line in the South China Sea, lest it provoke Beijing into increasing pressure on India’s Navy closer to home in the Indian Ocean.
Following the regional conferences this week, Indonesia President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono met with Singh in Jakarta on Friday where the two sides pledged to expand their strategic cooperation. 

In addition to attending APEC this week, Singh was also given a state visit by Indonesia.
Later this month Singh is expected to travel to China and Russia.

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Worries Over China's Ambitions Mark Southeast Asian Meeting

Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines urged their Asian allies to push for the rule of law in resolving territorial disputes with China at a regional summit in Brunei.
By TOKO SEKIGUCHI And ABHRAJIT GANGOPADHYAY

Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, left, chatted with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry on the way to an Asean dinner Wednesday in Bandar Seri Begawan.

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei—Japan, the U.S. and the Philippines urged their Asian allies to push for the rule of law in resolving territorial disputes with China at a regional summit here Wednesday, underscoring the extent to which security issues can still overshadow broader economic and trade relations in the region.
Security quickly came to the fore at the gathering of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations annual summit and meetings with Asia-Pacific powers, following a separate international gathering on economic and trade issues in Indonesia earlier this week involving many of the same countries. 

China's growing commercial and naval power in recent years has unnerved many smaller countries in Asia, and has also prompted the U.S. on several occasions over the past few years to urge all nations in the region to ensure the free navigation of shipping through the South China Sea, one of the world's busiest shipping lanes.
Worries over China's longer-term ambitions were again on the minds of many of the delegates at the two-day Asean and East Asia Summit meetings, which will also include leaders and officials from Russia and Australia, and U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry. 

Mr. Kerry is attempting to ease concerns sparked by the partial government shutdown in Washington that caused President Barack Obama to scrap his plans to attend the summits.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe encouraged Southeast Asian leaders to present a united front in negotiating territorial rights in the South China Sea, which are claimed in whole or in part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei, and where relations between Beijing and the Philippines in particular have grown increasingly testy in recent months.
"We're very concerned about changes in the status quo brought on by force in the South China Sea," Mr. Abe said, reiterating what he had separately told Vietnamese and Indonesian leaders earlier in the week when they met on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting.
Vietnam previously has complained about Chinese fishing vessels interfering with oil exploration in its waters, while the Philippines is angered by a growing Chinese presence at Scarborough Shoal off the coast of its main island Luzon, and which Manila claims is within part of its territory. 

Its president, Benigno Aquino III, also pressed the idea of establishing firm guidelines on how to resolve the competing claims over the South China Sea, known as the Code of Conduct, and the Philippines earlier this year filed a case with the United Nations challenging the legality of China's claims.
Describing the expanse of water as "this sea known by many names"—a nod to the sometimes rancorous arguments on what to call it—Mr. Aquino said that "our development as a region cannot be realized in an international environment where the rule of law does not exist."
The U.S.'s Mr. Kerry, meanwhile, speaking in a meeting with Asean, agreed. 

"A finalized Code of Conduct, in which all parties abide by a common set of rules and standards, is something that will benefit the entire Asia-Pacific community of nations—and beyond," he said.
China's Premier Li Keqiang said during Asean-China talks that the two sides shouldn't let the South China Sea issue get in the way of the broader relationship between Beijing and the Southeast Asian trade bloc, but it also subtly reminded other countries that in its view, the dispute is a matter for the contestants alone.
Security analysts such as Ian Storey at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, though, have suggested that the tensions between Japan and China could prove a potentially more destabilizing flashpoint than the South China Sea.
Political ties between Asia's two largest economies have been strained for over a year since Japan nationalized the Senkaku Islands and maintains they have always been Japanese territory. 

The Chinese contest their ownership and continue to send patrol boats to area waters despite Japan's repeated protests. 

The Japanese government acquired the islands from private Japanese owners during the country's previous administration.
During his nine months in office, Mr. Abe has yet to sit down with his Chinese counterpart, while in China, consumer boycotts have occasionally been launched against Japanese products.
In addition, Mr. Abe, while characterizing the relationship as "one of the most important" for Japan—China is Japan's biggest trading partner—and insisting he's open to dialogue, hasn't toned down his criticism against China's growing military might.

"We have an immediate neighbor whose military expenditure is at least twice as large as Japan's and second only to the U.S. defense budget. The country has increased its military expenditure, hardly transparently, by more than 10% a year" over the past two decades, Mr. Abe said in thinly veiled reference to China during a speech at the Hudson Institute in New York last month.

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Kerry, in Asia, Urges Focus on Law in China Disputes

By JANE PERLEZ
From left, Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung of Vietnam; Secretary of State John Kerry; the sultan of Brunei, Hassanal Bolkiah; and President Thein Sein of Myanmar, in Brunei.

BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN, Brunei — Secretary of State John Kerry encouraged Southeast Asian leaders on Wednesday in their efforts to resolve maritime disputes with China based on international legal principles, rather than by making individual deals as China would prefer.
Mr. Kerry arrived in Brunei to substitute for President Obama at the annual meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, or Asean, and the broader East Asia Summit meeting of 18 countries on Thursday. Mr. Obama canceled his appearances because of the government shutdown in Washington.
“A finalized code of conduct, in which all abide by a common set of rules and standards, is something that will benefit the entire Asia-Pacific community of nations — and beyond,” Mr. Kerry told the leaders.
Mr. Kerry was referring to the recent stepped-up efforts by the Asean countries to persuade a resistant China to agree to a legally binding code of conduct that would govern the peaceful resolution of disputes.
In particular, Mr. Kerry was throwing American support behind the Philippines, a treaty ally of Washington, in a legal case it brought this year against China over the Scarborough Shoal, a reef about 120 miles off the Philippine coast that China claims.
China has excoriated the Philippines for initiating the arbitration case, which is now before a panel under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
China has refused to recognize the challenge, and in a show of anger, some senior Chinese officials have declined to meet their Filipino counterparts and China has refused to invite the Philippines to certain meetings.
“The United States has been very happy to see Asean’s efforts to push forward on the negotiations toward a code of conduct,” Mr. Kerry said.
In a direct criticism of China, a senior State Department official told reporters traveling with Mr. Kerry that the “Chinese consistently indicate their view that ‘difficult issues’ that might fall outside the comfort zone of any member need not be discussed” at Asean meetings.
“That is not a view that is held by the United States, or, I believe, many if not most of the East Asia Summit member states,” the official said. 

China has serious territorial and maritime disputes with Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam.
The shipping lanes in the South China Sea are estimated to carry more than half the world’s trade, and substantial deposits of oil and gas lie in the seabed.
On the sidelines of the Asean meeting, Mr. Kerry met for 75 minutes with the Chinese prime minister, Li Keqiang, and discussed Syria, North Korea economic issues and the South China Sea, a State Department official said.
At the start of the session, Mr. Li referred to China as still a developing country, something Chinese officials do frequently.

Mr. Kerry suggested that the description was not quite accurate.

“We think you are a little more developed than you may want to say,” Mr. Kerry said.
Echoing Mr. Kerry’s theme, the president of the Philippines, Benigno S. Aquino III, made an impassioned argument to the Asean leaders that the rule of law should decide the territorial disputes in the South China Sea.
“Our development as a region cannot be realized in an international environment where the rule of law does not exist,” Mr. Aquino said. 

“The challenge that confronts one is a challenge that confronts all.”
China claims the waters and the islands of the South China Sea within the so-called nine-dash line, a boundary that was drawn by China in the 1940s but is not recognized by any other country.

The line covers 80 percent of the South China Sea.
To counter China, Mr. Aquino said the Philippines had adopted a two-track approach that was “both peaceful and rules-based.”
First, he said, the Philippines was advocating the expeditious adoption of a code of conduct. 

Second, the Philippines would continue to pursue the arbitration.

“Both tracks are legally binding and both are anchored in international law,” Mr. Aquino said.
Last month, under pressure from Asean countries, China called a meeting in the city of Suzhou to begin discussions on the code of conduct.
The Chinese agreed at the meeting to consultations on the code of conduct, but stopped short of agreeing to negotiations. 

A statement by the Foreign Ministry after the Suzhou meeting said that the code should be developed “gradually.”
China has criticized the United States for unreasonable involvement in the South China Sea, saying the United States is not a party to the disputes. 

Last month, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Zhenmin said the intrusion of countries outside the region complicated the issue.

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To Isolate Philippines, China Woos ASEAN

By Carl Thayer

Maritime security in the South China Sea is being shaped by two overlapping and potentially crosscutting developments. 

The first development is the emergence of new tensions between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal dating from late August. 

The second development is the initiation of official consultations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mid-September.

New Tensions
Ever since the eruption of tensions between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 Beijing has pursued “wedge politics” in an attempt to isolate Manila from other ASEAN states. 

For example, China’s new Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly omitted the Philippines from the itinerary of his two trips to the region this year.
In August China and the Philippines became involved in a diplomatic altercation over President Aquino’s attendance at the Tenth China-ASEAN- Expo in Nanning (3-6 September). 

The Philippines had been designated the “country of honor” and official host for this event. 

It was past practice for the host country to be represented by its head of government. 

On 28 August, immediately after President Aquino indicated his intention to attend the Expo China requested that he visit “at a more conducive time.” 

According to Philippine sources, China demanded the Philippines withdraw its arbitration case as a condition for Aquino’s visit. 

This was unacceptable and President Aquino declined to attend.
In the midst of these ructions, new tensions in China-Philippine relations erupted when Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin on September 3 released three aerial photographs of Scarborough Shoal taken on August 31. 

These photographs were taken at low tide and showed what the Philippines claimed were thirty concrete blocks, a concrete platform, two vertical posts and a white buoy lying in Scarborough Shoal. 

Three Chinese Coast Guard ships were also photographed on station in the area.
Gazmin speculated that the concrete blocks “could be a prelude to construction” and were a violation of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). 

Gazmin also stated he was unsure when the blocks were delivered. 

Philippine sources speculated that the blocks could be used to tether Chinese fishing vessels. 

An anonymous Philippine official was quoted as stating, “the concrete pillars and blocks… appeared to have been dropped from an aircraft.”
A day after Gazmin’s testimony, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto del Rosario argued that China had plans to occupy disputed reefs in the South China Sea before the formal conclusion of a COC, and stated that Chinese activity “places the region in jeopardy in terms of peace and stability.” 

Del Rosario concluded that “we intend to file a diplomatic protest” with China.
On September 4, the Philippines Department of National Defense announced that new aerial photographs taken two days earlier revealed a total of 75 concrete blocks in a two-hectare area of Scarborough Shoal. The blocks were estimated at just over half a meter in length, width and height.
Official Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei responded to Philippine accusations by claiming they were “not in accordance with the facts” and that Scarborough Shoal was China’s “inherent territory.”
On September 10, Philippines Navy Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano raised the rhetorical stakes by noting that government discussions were underway about how to respond to China, including whether or not to remove the blocks. 

Speaking at a Foreign Ministry press conference the following day, Hong Lei restated China’s “undisputed sovereignty” over “Scarborough Shoal and the neighboring sea.”
China released its own photos reportedly taken some time during the second week of September clearly showing rocks and coral jutting from the sea at low tide. 

Chinese sources claimed this was the same area of Scarborough Shoal depicted in photographs taken by the Philippines Air Force. 

As a direct result of this controversy the Philippines recalled its ambassador to China for consultations.

China-ASEAN Consultations
Shortly after the formal installation of Xi Jinping as president and Wang Yi as the new foreign minister back in March, China signaled a subtle change in its relations with Southeast Asia. 

The following month, at the 19th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultation, the Chinese side announced its willingness to commence discussions with ASEAN on a COC later in the year.
Two explanations account for China’s demarche. 

First, Chinese leaders reportedly viewed past policy on the South China Sea as counterproductive. They sought to insulate China-ASEAN relations from territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 

Second, China faced a more unified ASEAN. 

In 2013, Brunei assumed the ASEAN Chair and gave priority to initiating discussions with China on a COC. Thailand, as ASEAN’s country coordinator for dialogue relations with China, and Indonesia both began to play more proactive roles.
China responded by dispatching Foreign Minister Wang Yi on two trips to Southeast Asia to sound out his counterparts and to make preparations for the ASEAN-China Summit in October. 

Wang’s first visit in late April/early May included Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei; during the second visit in August he took in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
At a press conference in early August, Wang Yi was careful to note that China and ASEAN had only “agreed to hold consultations on moving forward the process on the ‘Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC)’ under the framework of implementing the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)….’” 

Wang also noted in a pointed reference to the Philippines that, “some parties” held “different ideas…on how to promote the process of COC.”
Significantly, Wang Yi highlighted four reasons for why the COC consultations would be a prolonged process. 

First, he stated that the expectations of unnamed parties for a “quick fix” were “neither realistic nor serious.” Second, Wang noted that no country or countries could impose their will and that consultations would proceed only on the basis of consensus. 

Third, he recalled that in the past outside interference had caused China-ASEAN talks on a COC to bog down. 

Fourth, he cautioned that consultations could only proceed “step-by-step.”
China and ASEAN held their first round of formal consultations on the COC in Suzhou, China from September 14-15. 

This meeting drew up a work plan on the DOC for 2013-14, approved an expert group to assist in developing the COC, and agreed to meet in Thailand in early 2014. 

Immediately after the meeting the China Daily reported, “Manila once again tried to disrupt China-ASEAN consultations. Before the Suzhou meetings, the Philippines again started a war of words with China. It fabricated a story that China had laid some concrete blocks on Huangyan Islands…”

Despite this promising start, it is clear that some major procedural differences will have to be overcome. China insists that consultations on the COC can only take place under the framework of the DOC. 

The 2002 DOC listed five areas for cooperation. 

Only four joint working groups have been set and so far not one project has been approved or funded. ASEAN prefers that the DOC and COC discussions be separated with each proceeding on its own track. Some in ASEAN argue that the COC should be implemented piecemeal, that is, as soon as agreement is reached on one measure it should be implemented immediately.

Moving Forward
The 2002 ASEAN-China DOC calls for the parties “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability” and to refrain from occupying “presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” 

The Philippine-China dispute over “blocks or rocks” at Scarborough Shoal is an illustration that positive diplomatic progress on a COC could be set back at any time by any party failing to exercise restraint. 

This applies equally to the Philippines and China.
Nearly a month has passed since the Philippines first raised allegations about new activities at Scarborough Shoal, yet no further information has been forthcoming. 

It is incumbent on the Philippines to provide further details to substantiate its accusations that China violated the 2002 DOC by placing concrete blocks in Scarborough Shoal as a prelude to construction.
The Philippines’ allegations raise more questions than answers. 

Is there any better imagery to determine if the blocks are not rocks, as the Chinese claim? 

Why hasn’t this imagery been released? 

When were the blocks placed in Scarborough Shoal? 

If, as some analysts argue, the blocks form a haphazard pattern, what is the basis for the conclusion that they are foundations for future construction?
China has been disingenuous in its dismissal of claims made by the Philippines. 

For example, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei responded to a question on this issue by stating, “what the Philippine side said is not true.”
This phrasing makes it unclear whether he was denying that China had placed the blocks there in the first place, or denying accusations that China planned construction activities in Scarborough Shoal, or both.
One regional security analyst, for example, has speculated that the concrete blocks were used as ballast by Chinese fishermen and discarded once they reached the fishing grounds at Scarborough Shoal. 

If this is the case, dumping concrete blocks would be an environmental not a security matter. 

China, which has physical control over Scarborough Shoal, should invite the world’s media and marine experts to visit Scarborough Shoal and make their own independent determination.

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A Code of Conduct for the South China Sea?

By Deep Pal

A series of high-level ASEAN meetings culminated in Suzhou, China on September 15, when senior officials from the forum for the first time met to formally discuss the possibility of a code of conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. 

According to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the meeting ended positively, with an agreement to seek “gradual progress and consensus through consultations,” though no deadlines or details about the joint working group that will carry out the task were made available.
It is likely that the development is an attempt by Beijing to woo ASEAN once again, given the skepticism among member countries towards China in recent years. 

Most media reports from ASEAN countries reflect the national disbelief that China is indeed keen on creating a COC in a timely manner. 

Singapore-based Channel News Asia, for example, reported on the meeting under the headline "Beijing open to code of conduct in South China Sea, but not now," suggesting that China still seemed more comfortable bringing up the issue bilaterally than in multinational forums. 

The sole exception was the Thai media, which claimed that the ball had been set rolling for a speedy resolution and quickly suggested that as the coordinator of China-ASEAN relations, Thailand is the only nation poised to act as a “tough broker” – more so because of its non-claimant nature in the dispute. 

Even the Chinese state-owned media – the People’s Daily – bracketed the COC issue with past violations of the 2002 Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC), suggesting that a new, binding code would be meaningless if earlier agreements were not upheld.
It seems China might have agreed in principle to a COC, but it is not ready to make the adjustments necessary to draw up a functioning document. 

It has successfully managed to coerce and arm-twist its neighbors in the region by virtue of its vastly larger size and stronger military, seen as recently in March 2013 when it held amphibious landing exercises to “defend the South China Sea” near the Spratly Islands, barely 50 miles off the coast of Malaysia. 

Its claim to most of the South China Sea through the nine-dashed line, which seems to have been expanded to a ten-dash-line in the latest maps, is also unlikely to stand scrutiny if a COC came into force. 

Close-ups of the front and back of the new SinoMaps Press map showing China’s ten-dash line in the South China Sea.
China’s South China Sea ‘inset’ map showing the previous nine-dash line.

For China, therefore, Xi Jinping’s July exhortation to a Politburo study session suggesting that resolving maritime territorial disputes did not mean abandoning "core national interests" still holds paramount.
Yet it is not just China that wants to go slow on the COC. 

If a code of conduct is finalized, all major claimants in the region will either have to justify or retract from projects of strategic and economic interest to them including, but not limited to, the U.S. rebalance to Asia. Vietnam’s offshore exploration projects with countries like Russia and India, for example, while within its EEZ, have faced constant objections from China that has claimed these areas as its own. 

It is unlikely that China will allow the COC to proceed as long as these projects continue. 

The COC may also affect the budding U.S.-Vietnam military cooperation as well as other military relationships like the recent Indian $100-million credit line to Vietnam for patrol boats for the same disputed waters. 

Similarly, the Philippines, which is set to welcome back U.S. Navy vessels after two decades and is expecting its first visit from U.S. President Barack Obama next month, is unlikely to agree to give up its recent diplomatic gains. 

Singapore too, has enjoyed long security ties with the U.S. which are slated for an upgrade with plans to berth American littoral combat ships there as part of the rebalance. 

Malaysia’s recent claim that it is less worried than other claimants are about Chinese patrol boats in the disputed waters shows that the constituents of ASEAN are not as united on keeping China in check as previously believed. 

It is also unclear how proceedings at the UN Arbitral Tribunal in the Hague, which the Philippines has approached, will affect the COC.
Given the current political dynamics of Southeast Asia, it is unlikely that any country labors under the belief that the South China Sea issue can be resolved with a code of conduct. 

For most it is another way of keeping China in check. 

The road to the COC, therefore, is likely to be a circuitous one, balancing China’s great power aspirations on the one hand, and the interests of smaller countries in accruing economic and security benefits from the region on the other.

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