Vietnam’s Confucius Institute Distraction

The controversy in Vietnam over China’s establishment of a Confucius Institute is misplaced, argues one blogger.

By Huynh Thuc Vy

China's propaganda tool and fifth column

When Vietnamese Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung, meeting with his Chinese counterpart Li Keqiang, announced the decision to establish the first Confucius Institute, at Hanoi University, Vietnam, the news stirred considerable controversy among Vietnamese intellectuals.
Any move by the Vietnam’s communist government that smacks of dependency on China is likely to prompt protest. 

However, setting up a Confucius Institute, with its overtones of cultural hegemony, may only be distracting the Vietnamese public from more substantial concerns.
Confucius Institutes are educational and cultural institutions run by the Chinese government. They operate with the following objectives: encourage Chinese language learning, popularize Confucianism, and promote cultural exchange between China and other countries.

These three objectives actually serve one larger goal: building China’s “soft power.” 

Despite the controversy, it is not the institutes themselves that are the concern, nor even China’s soft power initiatives in general. 

Rather, the bigger worry is the hard power that China has demonstrated to a passive Vietnamese government in recent decades. 

Soft power should be considered in that context.
Take language learning – in this case, Chinese – for young Vietnamese. In fact, this should be encouraged. 

With tens of thousands of Chinese now living in Vietnam and comprehensive relations between the two communist countries lasting many years, Chinese language skills means jobs for Vietnamese. 

There is a natural incentive to learn the language, with or without a Confucius Institute.
Promoting Confucianism? Vietnam already has it. 

With 2,000 years of Confucianism in Vietnam, there seems little to gain by promoting it. 

Indeed, Vietnam continues to grapple with some of the less positive repercussions of the philosophy, such as an inert mindset. 

What it ought to be doing now is introducing the democratic thinking and creative culture of the West, just as Japan did starting from the late 19th century. 

That aside, there seems little to worry about in two governments trying to pour more Confucian water into a glass that is already full.
As for bilateral cultural exchange, given Vietnam’s political dependence on China, this too has already been taking place for some time, and has been mostly a one-way street for China. 

The concern here is not so much education and culture, but the broader political, economic and social dependence of Vietnam on China. 

The West doesn’t worry about Chinese soft power, because although a behemoth, China is known to have critical issues to deal with at home. 

But Vietnam’s government has left the doors wide open for China to impose whatever it sees fit. 

A Confucius Institute is just one more small brush stroke in a large picture that has been ugly for a long time.
Let’s review some of the practical upshots of Chin’s involvement in Vietnam. 

For instance, China and Hong Kong were given 50-year leases over nearly 200,000 hectares of upstream forests belonging to ten border provinces. 

More than 90% of projects involving electricity, mining, oil, metals or chemicals in Vietnam are run by China through the engineering, procurement and construction contracts. 

Tens of thousands of Chinese manual laborers have entered Vietnam, displacing local workers.
Vietnam has also become an importer of outdated technologies, low-quality products and poisonous chemicals from China. 

The Paracel and Spratly islands are in Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone but are now under Chinese control. 

Chinese magazines, movies, cultural and political documents flood the Vietnam market.
In the presence of all this, what is one Confucius Institute? 

And a Vietnamese government already so dependent on its comrades in China on the ideology-based comrades from PRC to the extent it can offer only a feeble protest when its own fishermen are shot at by Chinese would hardly complain about a Confucius Institute anyway.
No, the controversy surrounding the establishment of a the Confucius Institute really only serves to distract public opinion from scandals, such as newborn babies dying after being injected with low quality vaccines, the eviction of farmers to free land for developers, and the continued abuses of human rights by security forces.
The Vietnamese government has been adapt at distracting the public for its advantage. 

The establishment of Confucius Institute is very likely another example.

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Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea

Of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the South China Sea – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III and Amruta Karambelkar

Among the claimants and littoral states of the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal in expressing their alarm and concern over growing Chinese assertiveness in this strategic and resource-rich regional commons.
Because of their power asymmetry vis-à-vis China, which has the most extensive claims to the SCS, Manila and Hanoi have been supporters of the U.S. pivot to Asia, to balance against Beijing’s growing maritime power projection, while also using diplomatic outreach to cultivate as many supporters as possible.
The Philippines has been bolstering its defense and maritime law enforcement with the help of the U.S. and Japan.
Vietnam is meanwhile relying on its traditional partners – India and Russia – as additional cushions against possible excesses of China’s rise to power in the region.
Both countries are also seeking support from ASEAN.
The SCS dispute took a notable turn when Philippines went to UN arbitration to challenge China’s nine-dashed line.
The claimants had to that point sought to manage the dispute through regional mechanisms and bilateral talks. Not surprisingly, then, Manila’s move has irked Beijing, which has been insistent on not internationalizing the dispute.
While it may be premature to assess Manila’s strategy at this stage, it is interesting to examine the factors that led to parallels, as well as variances, in the strategies taken by Manila and Hanoi via-à-vis China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS.
Vietnam’s strategies are shaped by its history, economy and geographical proximity with China.
Vietnam’s economy is highly reliant on its trade and investments with China and this dependency limits Vietnam’s actions.
Yet of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the SCS – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988.
Hence, Hanoi has many axes to grind against China in the SCS.
Both countries have also contested offshore blocks each has awarded to foreign energy players and have traded accusations of arrests and harassment of their fishermen.
However, alongside these clashes are positive milestones such as the demarcation of their common land boundary, establishment of a joint fishing zone in Tonkin Gulf and more recently the creation of a fishery hotline that could greatly aid in mitigating “incidents” at sea arising from overlapping fishing grounds.
As two socialist countries with a history of competition and cooperation (they were Cold War and Vietnam War allies), many channels, official and semi-official, including Party-to-Party talks, have served as platforms to ensure that tensions are kept at manageable levels and not allowed to affect other aspects of bilateral relations, notably trade and investment.
In fact, just recently, the two countries signed 12 agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, infrastructure, energy and maritime affairs, and set up a working group to look into joint exploration in SCS.
This status quo would seem to be an achievement of Chinese diplomacy, mitigating conflict with Vietnam at a time when Beijing is embroiled in another dispute with the Philippines, likewise over the SCS.
When it comes to Vietnam, China would seem to have employed the right strategy at the right time.
Bilateral relations therefore appear unhindered despite the territorial and maritime disputes, giving Vietnam little motivation to do what the Philippines has done, and challenge Beijing’s claims before an international body.
Of course, Vietnam has continued to raise the SCS in ASEAN forums.
It is also trying to improve relations with the U.S., and is consulting with the Philippines on mutual concerns. Although Vietnam has shown some support for Manila’s move to arbitrate, this backing is unlikely to graduate to a united Hanoi-Manila front versus Beijing.
Again, Hanoi is constrained in its options for dealing with Beijing, and cannot afford a bold stand, save for fiery rhetoric.
It will continue to express its dissatisfaction with China through the likes of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which serves as an international outlet given the participation of extra regional powers.
Meanwhile, like other ASEAN countries, and especially those with SCS claims, Vietnam will watch closely the outcome of Manila’s arbitration bid and may reshape its strategies accordingly.
Given Manila’s legal challenge, it can be argued that the Chinese leadership may be more willing to compromise with Hanoi just to isolate Manila and prevent the creation of a united front against Beijing’s sweeping SCS claims.
The Philippines’ SCS strategy, meanwhile, is motivated by a perceived Chinese westward push at its expense.
Despite long administering the largest features in the Spratlys, Manila’s military capabilities are limited.
The occupation of Mischief Reef came about two years after the removal of the U.S. bases, and marked the point at which the much talked-about “China threat” became a reality.
Since then, Beijing has intensified its fortifications and naval presence in the area.
As a militarily disadvantaged state, Manila’s fallback rested on its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S..
But warming Sino-U.S. relations, especially on the economic front, may put limits on what Manila can expect from its traditional ally.
The fear that a Sino-U.S. understanding on the SCS, wherein Washington tacitly acquiesces to Beijing consolidating its position in the semi-enclosed sea, may also become an emerging consideration, making it imperative for the Philippines to diversify its security partners to give it more room for independent action. Nonetheless, the U.S. remains important to the Philippines for trade and security, despite the ups and downs in relations.
Manila closed the U.S. bases in Subic and Clark in 1991 but allowed U.S. forces to come back in 1999 through the Visiting Forces Agreement, and has since been a major ally in the war against terrorism.
Manila is a natural partner in Washington’s rebalancing strategy.
The Philippines is also strengthening ties with Japan, which has its own disputes with China, in the East China Sea.
 This power web can help the Philippines absorb retaliatory measures from China, and as such may have emboldened Manila to take a stand against Beijing.
It might therefore be said that power arrangements and alignments dictate the strategies of Vietnam and the Philippines.
Moreover, in contrast to Vietnam, the Philippines does not have a large trade and investment dependency with China, as the U.S. and Japan are still its primary primary trade and aid partners.
True, Sino-Philippine economic ties have been growing, and certainly the Philippines felt the effects of China’s decision to curb banana imports and block tourism.
However, the comparatively low level of economic engagement means that Chinese economic sanctions are not enough to make Manila bend, at least for now.
For instance, the Philippines has been able to offset the loss of the Chinese market for its bananas by exporting to the U.S.
Nevertheless, the rise of China and relative decline of the U.S. will continue to cast a long shadow over the SCS.
Although some ASEAN countries have welcomed the U.S. rebalancing, most have developed deep economic ties with China over the years.
The SCS thus has the potential to become a divisive issue within the regional grouping.
This creates the impression among some Philippine leaders that ASEAN may no longer be a reliable or effective forum for engaging China on the SCS issue.
Countries that have traditional and unresolved disputes with China, like Japan and India, may extend some support to smaller SCS claimants, but their commitment when push comes to shove remains to be seen.
The SCS has strategic, security, economic and political importance for both the Philippines and Vietnam. Both countries see their claimed SCS areas as vital elements of national security, important trade channels, traditional fishing grounds and a source of indigenous offshore energy resources, not to mention as integral components of their territory.
However, particular historical, economic and politico-security considerations have prompted the two countries to develop divergent SCS strategies, especially in terms of dealing with China.

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Relations with South-East Asia: Being there

With the superpower otherwise engaged, China makes hay in South-East Asia

The Economist

HUNDREDS of thousands lined the streets of Vietnam’s capital on October 13th as Li Keqiang, China’s prime minister, arrived for a three-day visit. 

They were not there for him, though. 

It was a state funeral for Vo Nguyen Giap, a legendary general, second only to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam’s pantheon of national heroes. 

Indeed, many Vietnamese found the timing of Mr Li’s arrival rather offensive and thought that he should have postponed it to avoid intruding on their grief. 

“Disrespectful” and “arrogant” were two adjectives used. 

“Typical” was another.
Unperturbed, Mr Li (pictured above, left) was able to portray his meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Tan Dung (above, right), as a “breakthrough”. 

It capped a fortnight of high-level Chinese diplomacy in South-East Asia, intended to repair ties frayed in recent years by China’s extensive and disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Xi Jinping, China’s president and leader of the Communist Party, visited Indonesia, Malaysia and the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC). 

Mr Li attended a summit in Brunei with leaders of the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and went on to Thailand. 

That Barack Obama was due at both APEC and ASEAN, but withdrew because of the budget stand-off in Washington, gave the Chinese leaders’ tours even more prominence.
Vietnam is the ASEAN country where suspicion of China is strongest. 

After centuries of animosity and a brief, bloody war in 1979, a territorial dispute still simmers, the most extensive of the four China has with ASEAN members in the South China Sea (the others being Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines). 

Not only do both China and Vietnam claim the Spratly Islands to the south, but Vietnam regards itself as having been illegitimately evicted from the Paracel islands to the north, when China seized them in 1974 from the dying regime of the former South Vietnam. 

Confrontations over fishing and oil and gas exploration are frequent.
Yet in June, during a visit to China by Vietnam’s president, Truong Tan Sang, the two countries signed a new “strategic partnership”. 

China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner—not even counting a flourishing illegal trade over the border—as it is for ASEAN as a whole. 

Mr Li’s breakthrough was to go further in parking the territorial dispute so that it does not get in the way of other business. 

He even agreed to a “maritime co-operation” work group.
In China, this helped smother unpleasant memories of 2010, when, at a meeting in Hanoi, Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state at the time, waded into the South China Sea dispute, declaring an American “national interest” in it. 

China blames American interference for emboldening Vietnam and the Philippines to stand up to it over the sea. 

Now China Daily, an official newspaper, has quoted a Chinese analyst: “Hanoi has already realised that it is unrealistic to count on Washington to give public support to its claims on some islands.”
That analysis is a stretch. 

But Mr Li’s tour, like Mr Xi’s, was a reminder of how big a regional power China has become, and of how absent Mr Obama was. 

Everywhere they displayed their economic clout. 

In Thailand, for example, Mr Li delighted the government by offering help in two areas of self-inflicted economic harm, by agreeing to buy more rice and rubber. 

Mr Xi had already floated the idea of a Chinese-led “Asian infrastructure bank” to help meet one of the region’s most pressing needs. 

In Brunei, Mr Li had earlier proposed a new treaty with ASEAN, to realise his vision of a “diamond decade” in its relations with China.

Not that alluring
If this was a charm offensive, however, one ASEAN country still gets the offence without the charm. 

China is incensed that the Philippines is challenging its ill-explained, expansive claim in the South China Sea at the international tribunal of the United Nations’ law of the sea. 

It suits China to try to isolate the Philippines. 

Vietnamese scholars, however, say their government is fully aware of this—and has not ruled out joining the Philippines’ legal action.
A few weeks of diplomatic activity have not changed the fundamental reality—that South-East Asia looks to China as its main trading partner and America as the prime guarantor of its security. 

They have, however, heightened a perception that power in the region is shifting. 

A commentary in the Jakarta Post, an English-language newspaper in Indonesia, argued bluntly that “it is China, not the United States, who is the leader of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.” 

Pointing to Mr Obama’s no-show and the government shutdown, it concluded that his “much touted ‘pivot’ to Asia feels more like a pirouette with an overemphasis on military engagement.”
The Chinese press is happy to foster the impression of a power shift, taking the argument beyond South-East Asia.

Its official news agency, Xinhua, published a commentary calling for a “de-Americanised world”.

It argued that, with the possibility of a sovereign default by the superpower, “such alarming days when the destinies of others are in the hands of a hypocritical nation have to be terminated.”
That notion attracts some sympathy in South-East Asia but few would want an American-led international order to give way to one dominated by China. 

Some Vietnamese officials thought the criticism of the timing of Mr Li’s visit to Hanoi was unfair. 

After all, he was there in time to offer condolences at a time of national grief. 

But it is not just in Vietnam that many are prepared to think the worst of Chinese motives.

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Vietnam Vows to Boost Political Ties With China in Visit

By Bloomberg News

Li Keqiang, China's premier, right, and Nguyen Tan Dung, Vietnam's prime minster, review the guards of honour during a welcoming ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Hanoi on Oct. 13, 2013

Vietnam pledged to boost “political trust” with China during Premier Li Keqiang’s visit, as the two Communist countries focus on building economic ties and calming territorial tensions.
Li, who arrived in Vietnam Oct. 13, and Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung pledged to cooperate in all fields, including growth and trade, according to a posting on the Vietnam government’s website, even as they remain in dispute over waters in the South China Sea rich in fish, gas and oil.
The two signed a memorandum of understanding for a cross-border economic cooperation zone and agreed to open trade promotion offices, the posting said, as the countries aim to boost two-way trade to $60 billion by 2015. 

Dung also accepted an invitation to visit China.
Li’s visit, the first since China’s leadership change, “has great significance in boosting and strengthening political trust and comprehensive strategic partnership between the two countries,” the Vietnam government said on its website. 

“Since the relationship was normalized in 1991, friendship and cooperation between Vietnam and China has developed fast, deeply and widely in all fields.”
A race for resources in the South China Sea, and a broader push for influence in the region, has the bigger powers looking to shore up relationships with smaller countries, with Chinese President Xi Jinping visiting Indonesia and Malaysia earlier this month. 

Dung warned at a forum in Singapore in late May that miscalculations over territorial spats in the waters could disrupt “huge” trade flows and have global consequences.

‘Peaceful Measures’
“The two sides need to keep the situation in control and patiently resolve disputes using peaceful measures,” said Vietnam President Truong Tan Sang at a meeting with Li, according to a posting on the government’s website yesterday. 

The two nations need measures that “are acceptable for both and don’t affect each country’s stance,” he said.
Li also met with Vietnam Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong and National Assembly Chairman Nguyen Sinh Hung yesterday.
Two-way trade between Vietnam and China was $41.2 billion in 2012, according to a separate posting Oct. 13 on the Vietnam government’s website. 

Vietnam’s exports to China were valued at $12.4 billion and imports at $28.8 billion last year, it said, while in the first 8 months of this year two-way trade was $31.8 billion.
The leaders agreed to establish a working group to explore joint sea projects, according to the posting, which did not elaborate on the location of possible development. 

The Philippines and Vietnam have rejected China’s map of the sea, first published in the 1940s, as a basis for joint exploration of oil and gas.
The talks between China and Vietnam will help “maintain sound, sustainable development of bilateral relations conducive to peace and regional stability,” Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying said at a briefing in Beijing yesterday. 

The new joint working group on maritime development is “an important breakthrough,” Hua said.
In March, China fired on a Vietnamese fishing vessel, sparking a protest from the government, and it has used patrol ships to disrupt hydrocarbon surveys by the Philippines and Vietnam. 

China pledged last week to avoid escalating tensions while it works with Southeast Asian nations on a code of conduct for the waters, reflecting the softer tone it has adopted in recent months.

‘Making Attempts’
“The overall bilateral relationship has gotten worse in the past three years, mainly due to the increasing tensions in the South China Sea,” said Le Hong Hiep, a lecturer at Vietnam National University in Ho Chi Minh City. 

“The leaders have been making attempts to minimize the negative impacts of the disputes on the overall relationship,” Hiep said in an e-mail.
The two countries will make use of a newly created hot-line to defuse territorial spats, according to the posting.
Speaking at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum meeting in Bali last week, Xi said “the Asia-Pacific is a big family and China is a member of this family.” 

“China cannot develop in isolation from the Asia-Pacific, while the Asia-Pacific cannot prosper without China,” Xi said.

Power Plant
Vietnam and China will expand financial and monetary cooperation, encourage financial institutions on both sides to support trade and investment projects and enhance both nations’ ability to prevent financial and monetary risks, according to the Vietnamese government.
China Southern Power Grid, in partnership with Vietnam National Coal-Minerals Industries and China Power International, is to receive an investment certificate to build a $2 billion power plant located in the central province of Binh Thuan during Li’s visit, the Vietnam Investment Review reported yesterday, citing an unidentified official with the Ministry of Industry and Trade.

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Japan, Vietnam to tighten maritime relations amid China threat

Kyodo

Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang (L) and Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe shake hands prior to their talks on Indonesia's Bali Island on Oct. 7, 2013, before the start of the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.
Japan and Vietnam agreed Monday to promote maritime security cooperation between the two countries, apparently in response to increasingly assertive naval activities by China.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and Vietnamese President Truong Tan Sang met on the sidelines of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum summit in Bali, Indonesia. 

They also shared the goal of encouraging more Japanese companies to invest in Vietnam for the country's economic development.
Japan "has been concerned about (unilateral attempts) to change the status quo by force," Abe told Sang, according to one of the officials, apparently referring to China's naval activities that have led to its territorial rows with other Asian countries, including Japan and Vietnam, in the East and South China Sea.
Sang agreed with Abe, saying that such disputes must be resolved in accordance with international law, the official added.
On the economy, Abe said Japan will further cooperate with Vietnam in improving the business environment in the country and promote additional investment by Japanese firms. 

He also promised Japan's support in developing human resources in Vietnam.
Abe asked Sang to keep pressing North Korea to help resolve the issue of that country's past abductions of Japanese citizens, which has prevented Tokyo and Pyongyang from normalizing relations.
Sang said Vietnam, which has diplomatic ties with the North, understands Japan's position, the officials said.

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Net Freedoms Worsening in China, Vietnam

By Rachel Vandenbrink

Netizens at an Internet cafe in China's Zhejiang province, Nov. 2, 2012.

Amid a global decline in Internet freedom, activists are increasingly pushing back against repressive Web controls, according to a new study released Thursday that highlighted deteriorating trends in China and Vietnam, Asia’s worst online oppressors.
Citizen activism online has seen a “significant uptick” worldwide over the past year as activists become more effective at raising awareness of emerging threats and forestalling repressive measures, U.S.-based watchdog Freedom House said in its annual “Freedom on the Net” survey.
In nearly a dozen countries, “negative” laws were deterred as a result of civic mobilization and pressure by activists, lawyers, the business sector, reform-minded politicians, and the international community, the study showed.
In a few countries, it said, civic activists were able to form coalitions and proactively lobby governments to pass laws that protect Internet freedom or amend previously restrictive legislation.
But at the same time, broad surveillance measures, new laws controlling web content, and more arrests of social media users have driven a worldwide decline in Internet freedom, it warned.
“While blocking and filtering remain the preferred methods of censorship in many countries, governments are increasingly looking at who is saying what online, and finding ways to punish them,” the project’s director Sanja Kelly said.
The report, which identifies key trends in 60 countries, evaluated each nation based on barriers to access, limits on content, and violations of user rights.
In Asia, Vietnam and China suffered further downgrades in the survey compared to their 2012 scores, while Myanmar, on the back of reforms being implemented by reformist president Thein Sein, saw the highest jump out of all the countries examined.
The report warned of a “worsening cycle of repression” in Vietnam, where authorities have introduced new restrictive measures and the number of bloggers detained for posting content critical of the government has increased “dramatically” over the past two years.

China 'leading the way'
China, along with Cuba and Iran, received some of the lowest scores for the second year in a row in the survey, which does not include North Korea, noted for its repressive measures on freedom as a whole.
“As in previous years, China led the way in expanding and adapting elaborate technological apparatus for systemic Internet censorship, while further increasing offline arrests,” the report said.
China has been particularly successful in harnessing the private sector to further its censorship goals, with private companies hiring whole divisions to monitor and delete millions of online comments each year, it said.
Under the most elaborate system of Internet content control in the world, Tibetans and Uyghurs are “particularly vulnerable” to surveillance and prosecution, it said.
But at the same time, growing Net access has provided users with new tools to challenge policy, and online exposés of corruption have “forced authorities to acknowledge the problem” and in some cases punish the perpetrators.

Increasing sophistication in Vietnam
In Vietnam, content filtering systems in the country are becoming increasingly sophisticated and officials have adopted new measures to manipulate content, this year admitting for the first time to paying online commentators to support the authorities in online discussions.
Despite the stricter controls, citizen journalism has emerged as important source of news for many Vietnamese, the report said.
But the newly introduced Decree 72, which compels international Internet companies to comply with government censorship and surveillance, “bodes ill” for Vietnam’s web users in the coming years.

'Significant steps' in Myanmar
The report praised “significant steps” toward lifting Internet censorship taken by Myanmar amid recent political reforms, but warned that draft laws currently under revision could intensify the content restrictions that are in existing laws.
An unforeseen consequence of the expansion of Internet use as Myanmar emerges from decades under military rule has been the expression of simmering ethnic distrust unleashed on social media, which has “cast a shadow” over the newly open Internet landscape.
Those who have undergone decades of information control and minority communities who fear further marginalization remain cautious of speaking out online, the report warned.

Cambodia's 'tide may be turning'
In Cambodia, which was included in the survey for the first time, a trend toward “digital democracy” is in danger of being reversed, the report warned.
Although new media and a growing generation of young people using social media has transformed the information landscape in Cambodia, the “tide may be turning,” the report said.
Since 2011 Cambodian authorities have blocked at least three Cambodian blogs known for politically sensitive content, and netizens fear a new draft cybercrime law could extend restrictions on traditional media online.

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Abe Shunned by China Gets Warmer Welcome Southeast Asia

By Isabel Reynolds and Kyoko Shimodoi

Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, gestures during a news conference at the prime minister's official residence in Tokyo on Oct. 1, 2013.

Shinzo Abe, Japan's prime minister, left, prepares to shake hands with Benigno Aquino, Philippines' president, in front of a map of Mindanao island, after reading their joint statements at Malacanang Palace in Manila on July 27, 2013.

Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, beset by festering ties with China that have barred a bilateral summit since he took office, is overseeing an unprecedented expansion in ties with Southeast Asia as a counterbalance.
Abe, who heads to Indonesia next week for a gathering of Asia-Pacific leaders, has already visited Southeast Asia three times since taking office in December. 

His administration is building on Japan’s economic links with the region by developing security relationships, offering coast-guard vessels to the Philippines, conducting counter-terrorism exercises with Indonesia and considering the provision of ships for Vietnam.
The broadening relationship comes two generations after Abe’s grandfather, Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, reopened ties with the region following the turmoil of World War II.

The initiative provides China with an incentive to dial back its aggression in pressing maritime-jurisdiction claims in the region.

“Japan’s power is being eclipsed by China’s and it needs friends and allies beyond just the U.S.,” said Michael Green, who served on the National Security Council and is senior vice president for Asia at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington. 

“The new element with Abe is that he is now prepared to help them on the defense side” in Southeast Asia, rather than focus just on economic ties.

Abe’s efforts to broaden the interpretation of Japan’s constitution -- which bans an official military and has until now been regarded as barring defense of an ally -- raise the possibility of further security links with Southeast Asia. 

Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party is discussing the adoption of so-called collective defense, though no deadline has been set for a decision.
“If we say we can’t expand our military, we can’t carry out collective self-defense and will only act behind the scenes, then we can’t gain the respect of other Asian countries or have a proper relationship with them,” said LDP lawmaker Hiroshi Imazu, a former deputy defense chief who serves on the parliamentary security committee.
“We caused trouble for them in the war, but now we are saying we will make the international contributions appropriate for a major economy.”

APEC Summit
The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum leaders’ meeting in Bali next week gives Abe the chance to meet his counterparts from across Southeast Asia. 

He pledged in July to help provide 10 coast guard vessels to the Philippines, one of the countries at odds with China over waters in the South China Sea rich with oil, gas and fish. 

Japan is discussing a similar arrangement with Vietnam, Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera told reporters during a visit to Hanoi in mid September.
Philippine Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin has said he’d be happy to see Japanese involvement in Philippine military bases and last December Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario told the Financial Times the Philippines would “welcome” a rearmed Japan as a “significant balancing factor” in the region.
“I think it is very helpful for the Japanese to be out,” Admiral Samuel Locklear, Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, told reporters in Seoul on Oct. 1. 

“They are in many ways a great power. They’re a very credible military defense capability. They understand the region through all aspects of economics and culture”, he added.

Japan’s Foreign Ministry held its first-ever seminar on building marine security last month, involving Indonesia, Thailand and Myanmar, as well as the Philippines and Malaysia.

Containing China
Japanese Marine Self-Defense Forces ships paid their first ever visit to Myanmar this week. 

Indonesia has agreed to increased military cooperation, state news agency Antara reported on Feb. 2, and Japan sent maritime personnel to give the Indonesian Navy a seminar on marine meteorology in February.
The moves by Japan have drawn concern in Beijing. 

Abe’s policies amount to a “plot to contain China,” the official Xinhua news agency said in June.
“It is in our interest to get allies lined up against China,” said Clarita Carlos, a political science professor at the University of the Philippines, who has studied Philippine politics for 50 years.

“The enemy of your enemy is your friend.”

Code of Conduct
The Philippines, whose defense budget was about $3 billion for the 2012 fiscal year, compared with China’s $166 billion, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, asked the United Nations in January to rule on its dispute with China. 

Beijing took effective control of the Scarborough Shoal, a fertile fishing ground, a year after a standoff between ships from the two countries.
China has agreed to talks on developing a code of conduct for ships operating in the South China Sea, while making advances to Cambodia and Vietnam. 

Premier Li Keqiang called for better ties during a meeting with Vietnam’s Prime Minister Nguyen Tan Dung on Sept. 2, Xinhua reported. 

President Xi Jinping is visiting Indonesia and Malaysia this week while Li plans to attend the Association of Southeast Asian Nations meeting and then make officials visits to Brunei, Thailand and Vietnam later this month.
Xi today signed a new pact aimed at increasing bilateral trade with Malaysia to $160 billion by 2017, and arranged to exchange army and navy personnel.
Last year the Asean countries failed to release a final communique from their summit for the first time, after a split over the maritime conflicts with China.

‘Same Situation’
In some places Japan is breaking new ground. 

Onodera told reporters on Sept. 17 he was the first non-Vietnamese defense official to see military areas of the Cam Ranh naval base during his visit earlier in the month. 

Vietnam took part in a submarine rescue training exercise in Japan at the end of September, he said. 

Vietnam’s relations with China have at times been strained by the countries’ competing claims to the Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands.
“In a sense, Japan and Vietnam are in the same situation, one in the East China Sea and one in the South China Sea,” Onodera said on Sept. 17.
Japan is mired in its own dispute with China after it bought three uninhabited islets coveted by China in the East China Sea last year, triggering violent demonstrations and damaging trade ties between Asia’s two largest economies. 

Since then, Chinese and Japanese patrol boats and aircraft have tailed one another around Japan's Senkaku islands.

Scarborough Shoal
“The strategy is if China were to place pressure on Japan in the East China Sea, Japan can try to defuse it by putting pressure on China in the South China Sea, by backing up Vietnam and the Philippines,” said Dr Lam Peng Er of the East Asian Institute at the National University of Singapore, who has written a book about Japan’s ties with the region.
China last month denied starting to build a structure on the Scarborough Shoal. 

The Philippines protested in June what it called the “massive presence of Chinese military and paramilitary ships” around territory it claims. 

In March China fired on a Vietnamese fishing vessel, sparking a protest from the government, and it has used patrol ships to disrupt hydrocarbon surveys by the Philippines and Vietnam.
The rocky relationship with China is reflected in a redirection of Japanese funds. 

Direct investment in Asean countries roughly quadrupled in the first six months of this year to 998.6 billion yen ($10.2 billion), more than twice the 470.1 billion yen that went to China. 

Japan’s big banks such as Mitsubishi UFJ are seeking new markets by investing in Vietnamese counterparts, while Japan agreed in May to give Myanmar 51 billion yen in development loans and about 2 billion yen in grants.

Japan’s Image
Japan’s image in Southeast Asia is more favorable than in China. 

A Pew survey including about 9,400 people in eight Asia-Pacific countries in March and April found Japan was viewed positively by about 80 percent of respondents in Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, compared with only 4 percent in China.
Seventy-eight percent of respondents to the survey in China said Japan had not sufficiently apologized for its war actions, compared with 47 percent in the Philippines.
“There’s a lot to be gained for the Japanese in doing this kind of thing,” said Daniel Sneider, associate director for research at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University in California. 

“I think Abe is very happy to go around Southeast Asia in a very visible way.”

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