Airspace Claim Forces Obama to Flesh Out China Strategy

The United States needs to project military power in the region, build up the defensive capacities of allies, and align the countries that ring China’s coastal waters to present a united front against Beijing’s aggression.

By MARK LANDLER

President Obama and Chinese president, Xi Jinping, in Russia in September.
WASHINGTON — While foreign-policy experts and risk analysts were riveted by the nuclear talks with Iran last weekend, the next major geopolitical crisis erupted a world away, over a clump of desolate islands in the choppy waters between Japan and China.
With the United States dispatching two B-52’s to reinforce its protest over China’s attempt to control the airspace over the islands, it served as a timely reminder that President Obama wants to turn America’s gaze eastward, away from the preoccupations of the Middle East.
Mr. Obama’s shift — once known as a pivot, now re-branded as a rebalance — has always seemed more rhetorical than real. 

But when Vice President Joseph R. Biden Jr. travels to China, Japan and South Korea next week, the administration will have another chance to flesh out the policy.
“What isn’t clear to me is whether they see this as a Japan-China problem that needs to be managed or as part of a longer-term test of wills with Beijing,” said Michael J. Green, an Asia adviser in the George W. Bush administration who is now at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
If it is the latter, Mr. Green said, the United States needs to project military power in the region, build up the defensive capacities of allies like Japan and the Philippines, and align the countries that ring China’s coastal waters to present a united front against Beijing’s aggression.
The trouble, he added, is that “the administration is very worried about appearing to contain China.”
The cause of all this trouble are the flyspeck Japanese Senkaku Islands, that China, enticed that they may sit atop rich mineral reserves, now claims.
The dispute has mushroomed into a dangerous standoff between the world’s second- and third-largest economies — one that pits a conservative Japanese leader, Shinzo Abe, against a Chinese president, Xi Jinping, who is riding a nationalist tide in his country.
With so much at stake, Mr. Biden’s advisers say the dispute will intrude on every meeting he has in the region. 

That could come at a cost to an agenda that includes promoting a trans-Pacific trade deal and discussing how to deal with the nuclear threat in North Korea. 

“There’s an emerging pattern of behavior that is unsettling to China’s neighbors,” a senior administration official said on Wednesday, previewing Mr. Biden’s message. 

At the same, he added, “The vice president of the United States is not traveling to Beijing to deliver a démarche,” a diplomatic term of art for a slap on the wrist.
The delicate balancing act in Mr. Obama’s Asia policy, between cooperating with and containing China, is evident in the administration’s mixed messages over the last two weeks. 

Speaking before Beijing’s latest provocation, the national security adviser, Susan E. Rice, said the United States was seeking “a new model of major power relations.”
“That means,” she said in her maiden speech on Asia, “managing inevitable competition while forging deeper cooperation on issues where our interests converge.”
Referring to the territorial disputes between China and its neighbors — which flare up not just with Japan in the East China Sea but in the South China Sea, with the Philippines and Vietnam — Ms. Rice urged “all parties to reject coercion and aggression and to pursue their claims in accordance with international law and norms.”
To some critics, that smacked of moral equivalence: the coercion and aggression has been overwhelmingly on the part of China against its smaller neighbors. 

But on Saturday, when Beijing announced an “air defense identification zone” over a wide swath of air space above the islands, the United States jumped off the fence.
Secretary of State John Kerry immediately condemned what he called an “escalatory action” by China and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel said the United States would not alter any military operations because of it, a promise he kept this week by dispatching the unarmed bombers from Guam on a routine mission off the coast of China.
Administration officials said it was important to push back against China’s dubious assertion of jurisdiction over international air space. 

The Chinese policy requires foreign planes flying through the zone to identify themselves and file a flight plan, even if they are not flying into Chinese air space.
The symbolism of B-52’s flying, with no advance warning, through China’s zone spares Mr. Biden from having to play the tough guy. 

But experts said he needed to leave no doubt in talks with President Xi that the United States thinks the Chinese move was ill-advised.
“It will have the Chinese scrambling aircraft time after time, especially if the Japanese play games with it,” said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a China adviser during the Clinton administration.
Mr. Biden has cultivated an unusually personal relationship with Mr. Xi. 

The two traveled together in China and the United States, when Mr. Xi was vice president. 

That may make Mr. Biden more alert to the domestic political pressures the Chinese leader faces, as he embarks on risky economic reforms after a recent Communist Party congress.
“Chinese social media, official and semiofficial media are all playing up this dispute,” said Cheng Li, a senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. 

The tensions are likely to increase. 

The Chinese Navy has put its only aircraft carrier out to sea, on a course toward the South China Sea. 

In the East China Sea, an American carrier group is joining Japanese warships for long-planned naval exercises.
With so much firepower in such hotly contested waters, experts said there was a real danger of miscalculation by either side. 

Mr. Biden, who will begin his trip in Tokyo, is expected to urge Mr. Abe to show restraint as well.
The good news for all concerned, China experts said, is that Mr. Xi is much less interested in military adventurism than in overhauling China’s economy. 

“The chances of a real war are still low,” Mr. Li said. 

“But sometimes incidents will push leaders into a corner.”

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American think tank envisages blockading China with missiles

The Anti-Ship Missile systems are highly effective in destroying Chinese ships, while being very difficult to locate and destroy themselves. 

By Mick Meaney

The Rand Corporation, a US think-tank with close ties to the Pentagon, released a report this month titled “Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific”. 

The report outlines a plan for the United States and its allies to deploy Anti-Ship Missile (ASM) systems in an arc from Japan to Indonesia to block the vital waterways leading into China.
This report follows similar documents from think tanks and defence commentators which outline strategies and tactics for prosecuting a war between the world’s two largest militaries, which would inevitably engulf the entire Asian region. 

The document abandons the usual reserved language used to avoid outright mentioning war with China and instead simply declares that the authors “assumed a wartime strategic context”.
The tensions between the two nations have been inflamed by the Obama administration’s “pivot to Asia”, which has seen aggressive US military, intelligence and diplomatic activity in the region to “contain” the rise of China. 

A key element of the pivot is the military strategy known as AirSea Battle, which involves countering the Chinese ability to control the waters off its mainland by a combination of attacks on its command, naval, missile and air capabilities and a long range blockade of China’s supply routes from the Middle East and Africa by blocking the narrow straits of Malacca, Lombok and Sunda through the Indonesian archipelago.
The Rand Corporation authors set out to concretise the battle plan by recommending that the US and its allies make use of strategically positioned land-based ASMs. 

The report describes how such systems could be highly effective in destroying Chinese ships, while being very difficult to locate and destroy themselves. 

With a series of maps, it illustrates how missiles deployed on the Korean peninsula, the Ryuku Islands and Okinawa, the Philippines and in Indonesia and Malaysia would be able to stop the Chinese fleet leaving its home waters as well as preventing its ships from using the sea lanes. 

It notes that ASMs deployed in Taiwan and Japan could play a “key role” in sinking Chinese ships attempting an amphibious assault to break a blockade.
Far from being a purely hypothetical scenario, the report is another indication of the advanced state of preparations for a US war with China. 

Not only does the report envisage the possibility of such a conflict in the not too distant future, it notes that most major countries in the region are already stockpiling land-based ASM systems.
The most recent exercise carried out by the Japanese military was a rehearsal for exactly the kind of operation advocated in the Rand report. 

It involved 34,000 soldiers, six warships and 350 aircraft and centred on the rapid deployment of the Japanese Type-88 ASMs onto islands off Okinawa.

Based on the Japanese Type-80 Air-to-Ship Missile, various anti-ship systems including Type-88 SSM (Surface-to-Ship Missile), Type-90 SSM (Ship-to-Ship Missile), Type-91 and 93 ASMs (Air-to-Ship Missile) have been developed. These systems comprise the Japanese anti-ship missile family and are deployed in the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self Defense Forces.

The country identified by Rand as most crucial for a successful land-based ASM strategy is Indonesia. 

The Malacca, Lombok and Sunda waterways all pass through or near the Indonesian archipelago.
The Rand report reviews the political stance of the Indonesian government. 

It notes that it has strengthened its military relations with China in recent years and describes its “reluctance” to allow US soldiers or missiles to be deployed on its islands. 

“In a strategic context short of a direct conflict involving these countries and China, [i.e. war] such assent [to place missiles] may be difficult to attain because it would pose significant risks for the countries that agreed to cooperate,” it states.
It is clear that the authors view the Indonesian government’s potential opposition to a US-China war being fought within its territory as a major stumbling block to their plans. 

Similar concerns were also raised in the recently released report from the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) titled “Gateway to the Indo-Pacific: Australian Defense Strategy and the Future of the Australia-US Alliance”.
CSBA stated that Australian troops could be deployed to Indonesia and Malaysia to blockade the Malacca, Lombok and Sunda straits with land-based anti-ship and anti-air missiles. 

It raised concerns, however, that the Australian military might not be granted permission from Jakarta to operate on its territory. 

In a similar vein to the Rand report, it stated that “due to Indonesia’s history of non-alignment and continued attachment to neutrality, this could probably only occur [the granting of permission] if Chinese actions were perceived as directly impinging upon Indonesia’s sovereignty”.
The strategic importance of Indonesia in the war planning of the US and its allies point to the motives behind the rampant spying in the country that has been exposed by Edward Snowden, the ex-National Security Agency (NSA) whistleblower. 

Snowden‘s leaks revealed that in 2009, Australian intelligence agencies were monitoring the phone communications of President Susilo Bamgbang Yudhoyono, his wife, and other senior political figures. 

Other leaks exposed that the Australian embassies in Indonesia, across South East Asia and in China effectively function as NSA listening posts.
The US-directed spying operations are an integral part of war preparations, intended to gather military and strategic information, but also, in the case of Indonesia, vital clues as to the political stance of the government. 

The US has demonstrated once before its complete ruthlessness in ensuring a compliant regime in Indonesia—the 1965-66 coup that installed the military junta headed by General Suharto who carried out the slaughter of half a million members of the Indonesian Communist Party, workers and peasants.

Link: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/TR1300/TR1321/RAND_TR1321.pdf

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The Pivot Starts Now

In the wake of Typhoon Haiyan, the United States has gained some ground at China's expense.
BY PATRICK M. CRONIN

Typhoon Haiyan struck the Philippines on Nov. 8, killing thousands, affecting millions, and leaving hundreds of thousands of Filipinos desperate for help. 

A natural disaster of that magnitude requires a massive relief effort, and the United States took the lead: dispatching the aircraft carrier USS George Washington, distributing food and water, and maneuvering rescuers and supplies to remote areas. 

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) pledged more than $22 million in assistance.
U.S. allies soon followed. 

Japan offered $30 million in emergency relief, along with roughly 1,000 soldiers to help deliver the aid, on top of ongoing assistance programs, such as $20 million through the Asian Development Bank. 

Australia pledged $10 million, South Korea $5 million, and when Britain's carrier the HMS Illustrious arrives on Nov. 24, it will begin delivering some $30 million in relief supplies. 

But China, the region's rising power, is noteworthy for its stinginess. 

Beijing originally pledged $100,000, increasing that to a still-paltry $1.6 million on Nov. 14.
Since former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced the rebalance to Asia in late 2011, many in the region have doubted America's ability to sustain the level of its operations in the Pacific. 

In October, for example, President Barack Obama's absence from two prominent Asian meetings due to the crisis in Washington over the government shutdown allowed Beijing to steal the spotlight. 

But when it comes to global crises, including natural disasters, it is still the United States -- even war wary, reputationally challenged, fiscally indebted, and politically gridlocked -- that takes the leading role. 

The response to Haiyan could be a turning point for the United States in Asia: an opportunity to re-up the pivot, and to pour cold water on the narrative of a dominant China.
That's not to say China isn't trying to play a more assertive role in the region. 

Since taking office in November 2012, Chinese President Xi Jinping has focused on maintaining order and economic growth at home while reducing external conflicts that could impede China's rise. 

Xi and his colleagues envision their country eventually supplanting the United States as the world's largest economy and sharing -- at a minimum -- responsibility for the Asia-Pacific region. 

China is emphasizing its periphery, particularly mainland Southeast Asia; in October, Xi announced plans to create and fund an "Asian infrastructure bank."
But China still fails at building soft power in the region. 

In early November, Chinese scholars and even officials emphasized to my colleagues the tiered levels of Chinese friends and partners. 

Countries that support China diplomatically or bring wealth to China, they said, are given preferential treatment -- almost like international relations as one big fundraising tribute. 

Because tensions are high with Japan over disputed islands in the East China Sea, and with the Philippines over disputed territory in the South China Sea, Beijing withholds cooperation and support from those two nations, instead doling out rewards to those countries most willing to work closely with China. 

Although this approach sometimes mutes regional criticism, it tends to fail at persuading neighbors that a more potent China will look after their interests.
And this is where the U.S. rebalancing, or "pivot" to Asia comes in. 

The region has generally viewed the pivot in military terms, as a reassurance of U.S. presence in Asia, and as a counterweight to Chinese pressure and coercion. 

But as the distribution of world power continues to shift from West to East, the United States can also use the pivot to help build an inclusive, rules-based order in Asia. 

An open trading regime must be part of that. 

But to foster China's potential as a force for good, the United States and its allies need to integrate China into this order.
Instituting a common response to humanitarian disasters is a good place for China and the United States to start. 

Holding back assistance to neighbors because they defend their core national interests against a more powerful neighbor who occupies a disputed area -- as China does with the Scarborough Shoal in the South China Sea -- goes against international norms. 

If the United States can protect universal rights such as freedom of the seas and promote more effective regional security cooperation, it will continue to be a great power that is welcome throughout the region.
China appears eager to cooperate with the United States on disaster relief. 

The two sides have shared detailed lessons learned in responding to domestic disasters, including Hurricane Katrina in 2005 and the 2008 Sichuan earthquake that killed roughly 87,000 people. 

In June, the two countries cooperated with an Asian-wide humanitarian assistance and military medicine exercise, allowing China to showcase its photogenic military hospital ship, dubbed the "The Peace Ark." 

Unfortunately, that ship remains docked in a Chinese port. 

Adding to the irony, on Nov. 12, Chinese and U.S. troops participated in a joint humanitarian aid and disaster relief exercise in Hawaii, the exact time the Philippines needed urgent support.

China under Xi wants a "new type of great power relationship" with the United States -- an invitation to further push China to cooperate on disaster relief.
This pays dividends for the United States domestically, as well. 

U.S. leadership in helping those in desperate need around the world is a forceful riposte to declinists, who ignore America's enduring and exceptional global role. 

Bipartisan support for U.S. humanitarian efforts is a hopeful instance of policymakers pulling together to achieve greatness.
Obama is seeking more than $4.1 billion for the fiscal year 2014 for humanitarian assistance. 

Humanitarian aid should not be used as a political tool, but that doesn't deny the reputational advantages of doing good and the hits from sitting idle during a crisis. 

It's a lesson China is learning right now.

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Off China's coast, U.S. carrier displays teeth behind the pivot

By Greg Torode

A U.S. Navy personnel works in the control room of the U.S. Navy aircraft carrier USS George Washington, during a tour of the ship in the South China Sea November 7, 2013.

ABOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON, South China Sea -- While cuts in Pentagon budgets and political gridlock in Washington have cast doubt on the sustainability of a U.S. "pivot" back to Asia, its military realities are all too clear from the flight deck of the USS George Washington aircraft carrier.
F-18 Super Hornet jet fighters roar from its decks with chest-thumping velocity less than 300 km (185 miles) from the Chinese coast -- a symbol of U.S. naval dominance in Asia that Chinese analysts fear could contain Beijing's rising power for decades.
Yet just 30 km (19 miles) away is a lone Chinese naval frigate, well within the protective screen of U.S. ships and aircraft that protect the carrier across a vast swathe of the disputed South China Sea.
The officers of the Washington are hosting People's Liberation Army officers on-board as part of efforts to engage a Chinese military wary of being contained by U.S. forces across Asia.
The frigate has not been invited.
The Washington strike group commander, Rear Admiral Mark Montgomery, stretches his arm to the left horizon where the frigate is obscured by haze and acknowledges such encounters by the rival powers are now more common.
"You can definitely see the Chinese navy is modernizing and expanding," he said.
"It would be a natural conclusion they would be operating in the vicinity of us."
Montgomery said routine communication with Chinese naval ships was "professional" and that the U.S. navy was determined to aid the long-troubled relationship with "transparency and openness".
"I don't have any issues with them operating in the vicinity of our ships," he said.
The Washington strike group -- that often includes destroyers, cruisers and a fast-attack submarine backed by up to 90 aircraft -- protects the only one of 10 carriers deployed permanently outside the continental United States.
Based in Yokosuka, Japan, the Washington is the most visible sign of an increased U.S. naval presence across Asia that has been steadily growing for the last five years -- a key element in the controversial U.S. "pivot".
On Friday, it is due to arrive in the financial hub of Hong Kong after months across the region running joint exercises, maneuvers and training.
While U.S. military brass attempt to ease China's fears that the United States is determined to hem China in, as it re-engages the region, its old allies and newer friends are wanting reassurances the United States is going to stay around.
Last month, U.S. President Barack Obama said China had probably taken advantage of his absence from two summits in Asia which he could not attend because of the partial U.S. government shutdown and fiscal debate.

COMBAT READINESS
The presence of the strike group in the South China Sea appears geared to addressing the core of U.S. engagement in the region.
The overlapping claims of China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia in the oil- and gas-rich sea is emerging as a regional flashpoint.
The United States has said it is neutral in the dispute -- centered on China's controversial historic claim of waters deep in the maritime heart of Southeast Asia -- but is determined to preserve peace and ensure that sea-lanes vital for the world economy are not hindered.
Even as it grapples with budget cuts, over the next few years the United States will significantly expand joint exercises, live-firing tests and anti-submarine drills in the region, in part to cope with advancing Chinese weaponry, according to the Stars and Stripes, the U.S. military newspaper.
And on board the George Washington, officers and crew say combat readiness is being maintained through costly flight schedules that see 100 sorties routinely flown from the ship on most days.
Chinese officials and commentators often bristle at the U.S. efforts.
Despite years of double-digit increases in defense spending by China, it lags far behind the United States in terms of firepower.
Chinese pilots are still testing landings aboard the Liaoning, a Soviet-era ship that has been re-tooled as China's first aircraft carrier.
China's first domestically built carriers are not expected to be completed before 2020, according to military analysts, even as its shipyards produce new nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers and other heavily armed surface ships faster than any other nation.
Its expanding fleet has started routinely exercising far beyond China's coastal waters, moving beyond the so-called first island chain that has long effectively contained China's navy and into open ocean east of Japan.
Both Asian and Western analysts, however, believe China's navy would struggle for some years to sustain protracted battles far from its shores.
Assessing the situation from the bridge, high above the flight deck, Montgomery insists his navy is committed, both in terms of operational capabilities and engagement.
Put simply, he says: "There are more ships involved here."

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U.S. looks to Asian nations to build militaries as bulwark to China

AP

Military muscle: A Ground Self-Defense Force member launches a hand-held anti-tank rocket during an annual live-fire exercises at the Higashi Fuji range in Gotemba, Shizuoka Prefecture, in August
WASHINGTON – U.S. lawmakers voiced bipartisan support Tuesday for the Obama administration’s strategic pivot to Asia but stressed the need for partner nations to strengthen their military capabilities and contribute more to their own defense.
Members of the House Armed Services Committee plan to step up scrutiny of U.S. military policy in the fast-growing region, where despite budget pressure, Washington wants to increase its presence as it draws down forces in Afghanistan.
Lawmakers said they plan a wide-ranging examination of U.S. force deployments and how to optimize security relationships. 

They plan a series of five hearings between now and early 2014, mostly focused on the growing military power of China. 

Topics will include its capabilities in space, the modernization of its navy and air force, and maritime disputes.
Congress does not set U.S. policy but it can influence it and controls the purse strings. 

The lawmakers said part of the committee’s intent is to explain to the rest of Congress and the American public about the strategic importance of the U.S. remaining engaged in the Asia-Pacific, where it has been the dominant force since World War II. 

Some in Asia, however, are voicing doubts about Washington’s staying power in the region as it grapples with political divisions at home and crises in the Mideast.
“The biggest thing for us is presence. If we have presence there it’s the greatest stability you can have in that region,” said Republican Rep. Randy Forbes, one of six lawmakers briefing reporters on the upcoming hearings.
Democratic Rep. Adam Smith said the committee would look at how the U.S. can guarantee its alliance commitments with nations like South Korea and Japan, while building on its many other relationships in the region.
“One of the keys to making this work is partner capacity,” he said, citing as an example U.S. counterinsurgency support for Philippine forces fighting Islamic rebels. 

“What other options are out there to build capacity in forces so it doesn’t all fall on us?”
Republican committee Chairman Howard “Buck” McKeon supported a more active role for Japan’s military in response to assertive behavior by China.

Japan has the region’s second strongest military after China but it remains constrained by its pacifist Constitution.
“It’s incumbent upon us to do all we can to build up and strengthen our partners so they can bring more to the table when they are needed,” McKeon said.

Democratic Rep. Colleen Hanabusa said the U.S. needs to be more mindful of historical conflicts between its allies like South Korea and Japan, and recognize that Washington won’t be able to solve them.
“They have got to, on their own, decide that this is either a conflict they can park on the side for a little or resolve. We are not going to be able to resolve history,” she said.

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US 'pivot' to Asia gaining strength

By Martin Abbugao

A US fighter jet lands on the USS George Washington aircraft carrier in the South China Sea on October 24, 2013

A US navy crew member looks through a telescope on the USS George Washington aircraft carrier in the South China Sea on October 24, 2013 

ABOARD THE USS GEORGE WASHINGTON — The United States has significantly increased its warships and aircraft deployed in Asia despite Washington's budget woes, adding punch to its "pivot" to the region, a senior naval commander said.
Rear Admiral Mark C. Montgomery, commander of an aircraft carrier strike group homeported in Yokosuka, Japan, said the expanded military presence would have a calming effect on simmering tensions and territorial disputes in the region.
"The strategic rebalancing has resulted in an extremely higher number of surface combatants, cruisers and destroyers that support the strike group," Montgomery told AFP in an interview on Wednesday aboard the aircraft carrier USS George Washington in the South China Sea.
"What we've seen is an increase in surface combatant presence here in the Western Pacific... so these ships are spread throughout those areas," he said, in the interview at the flag bridge of the nuclear-powered supercarrier as fighter jets took off and landed on the deck as part of drills.
"Having more ships gives us more presence. It allows us to have a greater force."
Montgomery said US defence budget cuts and the recent 16-day partial US government shutdown have not affected his command.
The shutdown forced President Barack Obama to skip two Asian summits this month, triggering concerns about the extent of US commitment to the region as China becomes more assertive.
"Operations and maintenance decisions have not affected us. The strategic rebalance is continuing in earnest," the admiral said.
"We have sufficient funds for our operations... there is in fact a strategic rebalancing in place that has resulted in more ships and aircraft being out here."
Last year, then US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta said in Singapore that the Pentagon would shift 60 percent of US naval assets to the Pacific region by 2020 as part of an Asian "pivot" announced by Washington.
Montgomery, a 25-year veteran in the US Navy, said ships and planes from San Diego, California and Pearl Harbor in Hawaii are being deployed to Asia for up to eight months as part of the rebalancing.
"That gives me a lot more flexibility, a lot more presence," he said.

US presence has 'calming effect' 
Montgomery commands Carrier Strike Group Five from the the nuclear-powered George Washington, which was in international waters in the South China Sea on Wednesday when journalists and other visitors were flown in from Singapore.
A carrier strike group packs a powerful punch as it comprises an aircraft carrier, backed by at least one guided missile cruiser, a destroyer, a supply ship and a fast attack submarine.
It is a key element in the US strategy of projecting its military power across the world.
The George Washington heads the US Navy's largest carrier strike group and the only one homeported outside the US.

It operates in three theatres, including the waters off the Korean Peninsula where tensions between North and South Korea are simmering.
It also operates in the sea off Japan where Tokyo and Beijing are locked in a territorial dispute, and in the South China Sea, where China and four Southeast Asian states as well as Taiwan have overlapping claims over territories.
Montgomery's carrier strike group held military exercises with South Korea and Japan off the Korean peninsula this month, sparking a sharp rebuke from Pyongyang which denounced the drills as a "serious military provocation" and an "attack on our efforts for peace".
This week the group was cruising the South China Sea while holding smaller military exercises with the Malaysian navy and air force and later in the month with its Singaporean allies.
"I'm an element of any contingency response. I think a carrier strike group is always a critical element of it," Montgomery said, when asked about the role of his command in any military conflict in the region.
China claims almost all of the waters in the South China Sea, including those approaching the shores of smaller countries like the Philippines, a former US colony with which Washington has a mutual defence treaty.
Manila, which is the most vocal in criticising China's alleged aggressive moves in the sea, and Washington are in talks over a deal that will expand US military presence in the Philippines, which evicted fixed US military bases in the early 1990s.
Montgomery said the increased US military presence in the region is a stabilising factor.
"Presence always has an assuring and calming effect," he said.
"I think the fact that we're here (now) says a lot whether or not we will be here if there was a crisis."

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Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea

Of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the South China Sea – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III and Amruta Karambelkar

Among the claimants and littoral states of the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal in expressing their alarm and concern over growing Chinese assertiveness in this strategic and resource-rich regional commons.
Because of their power asymmetry vis-à-vis China, which has the most extensive claims to the SCS, Manila and Hanoi have been supporters of the U.S. pivot to Asia, to balance against Beijing’s growing maritime power projection, while also using diplomatic outreach to cultivate as many supporters as possible.
The Philippines has been bolstering its defense and maritime law enforcement with the help of the U.S. and Japan.
Vietnam is meanwhile relying on its traditional partners – India and Russia – as additional cushions against possible excesses of China’s rise to power in the region.
Both countries are also seeking support from ASEAN.
The SCS dispute took a notable turn when Philippines went to UN arbitration to challenge China’s nine-dashed line.
The claimants had to that point sought to manage the dispute through regional mechanisms and bilateral talks. Not surprisingly, then, Manila’s move has irked Beijing, which has been insistent on not internationalizing the dispute.
While it may be premature to assess Manila’s strategy at this stage, it is interesting to examine the factors that led to parallels, as well as variances, in the strategies taken by Manila and Hanoi via-à-vis China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS.
Vietnam’s strategies are shaped by its history, economy and geographical proximity with China.
Vietnam’s economy is highly reliant on its trade and investments with China and this dependency limits Vietnam’s actions.
Yet of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the SCS – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988.
Hence, Hanoi has many axes to grind against China in the SCS.
Both countries have also contested offshore blocks each has awarded to foreign energy players and have traded accusations of arrests and harassment of their fishermen.
However, alongside these clashes are positive milestones such as the demarcation of their common land boundary, establishment of a joint fishing zone in Tonkin Gulf and more recently the creation of a fishery hotline that could greatly aid in mitigating “incidents” at sea arising from overlapping fishing grounds.
As two socialist countries with a history of competition and cooperation (they were Cold War and Vietnam War allies), many channels, official and semi-official, including Party-to-Party talks, have served as platforms to ensure that tensions are kept at manageable levels and not allowed to affect other aspects of bilateral relations, notably trade and investment.
In fact, just recently, the two countries signed 12 agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, infrastructure, energy and maritime affairs, and set up a working group to look into joint exploration in SCS.
This status quo would seem to be an achievement of Chinese diplomacy, mitigating conflict with Vietnam at a time when Beijing is embroiled in another dispute with the Philippines, likewise over the SCS.
When it comes to Vietnam, China would seem to have employed the right strategy at the right time.
Bilateral relations therefore appear unhindered despite the territorial and maritime disputes, giving Vietnam little motivation to do what the Philippines has done, and challenge Beijing’s claims before an international body.
Of course, Vietnam has continued to raise the SCS in ASEAN forums.
It is also trying to improve relations with the U.S., and is consulting with the Philippines on mutual concerns. Although Vietnam has shown some support for Manila’s move to arbitrate, this backing is unlikely to graduate to a united Hanoi-Manila front versus Beijing.
Again, Hanoi is constrained in its options for dealing with Beijing, and cannot afford a bold stand, save for fiery rhetoric.
It will continue to express its dissatisfaction with China through the likes of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which serves as an international outlet given the participation of extra regional powers.
Meanwhile, like other ASEAN countries, and especially those with SCS claims, Vietnam will watch closely the outcome of Manila’s arbitration bid and may reshape its strategies accordingly.
Given Manila’s legal challenge, it can be argued that the Chinese leadership may be more willing to compromise with Hanoi just to isolate Manila and prevent the creation of a united front against Beijing’s sweeping SCS claims.
The Philippines’ SCS strategy, meanwhile, is motivated by a perceived Chinese westward push at its expense.
Despite long administering the largest features in the Spratlys, Manila’s military capabilities are limited.
The occupation of Mischief Reef came about two years after the removal of the U.S. bases, and marked the point at which the much talked-about “China threat” became a reality.
Since then, Beijing has intensified its fortifications and naval presence in the area.
As a militarily disadvantaged state, Manila’s fallback rested on its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S..
But warming Sino-U.S. relations, especially on the economic front, may put limits on what Manila can expect from its traditional ally.
The fear that a Sino-U.S. understanding on the SCS, wherein Washington tacitly acquiesces to Beijing consolidating its position in the semi-enclosed sea, may also become an emerging consideration, making it imperative for the Philippines to diversify its security partners to give it more room for independent action. Nonetheless, the U.S. remains important to the Philippines for trade and security, despite the ups and downs in relations.
Manila closed the U.S. bases in Subic and Clark in 1991 but allowed U.S. forces to come back in 1999 through the Visiting Forces Agreement, and has since been a major ally in the war against terrorism.
Manila is a natural partner in Washington’s rebalancing strategy.
The Philippines is also strengthening ties with Japan, which has its own disputes with China, in the East China Sea.
 This power web can help the Philippines absorb retaliatory measures from China, and as such may have emboldened Manila to take a stand against Beijing.
It might therefore be said that power arrangements and alignments dictate the strategies of Vietnam and the Philippines.
Moreover, in contrast to Vietnam, the Philippines does not have a large trade and investment dependency with China, as the U.S. and Japan are still its primary primary trade and aid partners.
True, Sino-Philippine economic ties have been growing, and certainly the Philippines felt the effects of China’s decision to curb banana imports and block tourism.
However, the comparatively low level of economic engagement means that Chinese economic sanctions are not enough to make Manila bend, at least for now.
For instance, the Philippines has been able to offset the loss of the Chinese market for its bananas by exporting to the U.S.
Nevertheless, the rise of China and relative decline of the U.S. will continue to cast a long shadow over the SCS.
Although some ASEAN countries have welcomed the U.S. rebalancing, most have developed deep economic ties with China over the years.
The SCS thus has the potential to become a divisive issue within the regional grouping.
This creates the impression among some Philippine leaders that ASEAN may no longer be a reliable or effective forum for engaging China on the SCS issue.
Countries that have traditional and unresolved disputes with China, like Japan and India, may extend some support to smaller SCS claimants, but their commitment when push comes to shove remains to be seen.
The SCS has strategic, security, economic and political importance for both the Philippines and Vietnam. Both countries see their claimed SCS areas as vital elements of national security, important trade channels, traditional fishing grounds and a source of indigenous offshore energy resources, not to mention as integral components of their territory.
However, particular historical, economic and politico-security considerations have prompted the two countries to develop divergent SCS strategies, especially in terms of dealing with China.

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China strides, US shrinks in Asia

By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING -- Who remembers Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederacy, the Southern states that fought the Northern states lead by president Abraham Lincoln during the American Civil War? 

Barack Obama, really and symbolically black, looks like the true vindication and completion of that war, which broke and then united the United States and turned an assembly of fairly autonomous states into a nation.
The civil war was fought symbolically as well as for the freedom of the black slaves -- and thus for the freedom of every man in the US and in the world -- adding a new dimension to the American identity that greatly helped the country to become great globally. 

Lincoln brought the country to war and marked this new identity, attained through victory in a very bitter conflict. 

Had Lincoln been defeated, he would have become a footnote in history.
In a way, seen from afar, Obama, who Spielberg's homonymous movie suggests is Lincoln's anointed successor, is facing a similar challenge. 

He must create a new American identity by fighting his internal enemies, in this case the Republicans, almost as Lincoln fought the Confederates. 

As freeing the slaves was the purpose 150 years ago, now the goal is to establish a mindset of greater solidarity in order to care for the less fortunate. 

This can be a new dimension of the American identity. 

Here the battle over health care is both real and symbolic.
In a nutshell, Obama believes that providing a basic health care for everyone, even those who have nothing, is a basic human right and overrides all other concerns. 

The Republicans argue, simply put, "We can't afford it", and thus it should be put to rest either for now or forever. 

Some of them, the Tea Party people go even further by fighting massive interventions in social affairs, and thus they challenge the principles moving Obama and his supporters.
This is in a way similar to the debate over freedom for the slaves. 

The Northerners wanted freedom for the slaves, overriding all concerns about what that freedom could mean for Southern society; Southerners wanted conversely to keep their society, which would be disrupted by freeing the slaves.
Here, there are many other considerations. 

In both cases, there is an effort to make the presidency stronger before the other powers of the state. 

There is idealism in the face of a conservative realism -- and there are certainly many other elements, but to make it simple, allow me to focus on just these.
What is starkly different about these two historical moments is the international context. 

There was no globalization 150 years ago, and America was indeed pretty isolated. 

Therefore it could fight an internal war without affecting or being too affected by the international situation. Europe was the absolute center of the world: England was expanding its reach from its Indian powerhouse, France was dreaming of a Napoleonic return, Russia and Austria were tottering and harking back to a world that was no more, Prussia was on the rise, and Italy had just been born. 

China was collapsing in the midst of an earth-shattering primitive civil war, pitching pseudo-Christian Taiping rebels against Manchu imperial forces. 

Nobody cared or was too interested in meddling much with an arcane civil war in America.
Now, things are totally different, and it is not only America's future but also the future of the international order at stake.
Last week, Obama, locked in his fight with the Republican Party, canceled a much-anticipated trip to Asia. This is the region to which he had announced he would "pivoted" his foreign policy, trying to contain the regional growth of China. 

At the same time, Obama's competitor, Chinese President Xi Jinping, took center stage. 

He triumphed in Malaysia and Indonesia by promising China's neighbors expanded trade and investment.
In move typical of the game the Chinese call weiqi and the Japanese go, with America supporting Vietnam and the Philippines to surround China, Xi decided to support Indonesia and Malaysia to surround Vietnam and the Philippines. 

Moreover, if the US, constrained by growing budget difficulties and by an impending financial crisis that could lead to a default on the US debt, is apparently willing to leave Asia now, will it leave again in a few months or years? 

Conversely, despite all its internal problems, China has a tradition of not going back on its international commitments, and despite possible domestic economic difficulties, it will not go back on its word to increase regional commerce.
Moreover, China is not simply moving eastward, to the sea. 

Beijing has grand plans and deep pockets to create a huge continental railway network that would link Asia to the European economic powerhouses, bypassing all sea routes. 

There are talks with Kazakhstan to build a new line that would boost transport and communication in the country and restart a new version of the old Silk Road. 

Talks are occurring with Thailand to build a line going through Laos or Myanmar, and there are projects to extend the Tibetan railway through India. 

Meanwhile, another railway could stretch from India to Vietnam via Myanmar and Thailand. 

In other words, a cobweb of railways pivoting around China could be built in the coming decades, transforming the economic and political dynamic of the region.
This could objectively decrease China's focus on the eastern and southern seas, which is currently causing tension with Japan and the Philippines. 

So far, the only difficulty in this grand plan is that too much power was given to the often inefficient and corrupt railway companies. 

If Beijing decides to take on a more central and strategic role, things could move faster and more efficiently.
Certainly, China's momentum is not without risks.
India has plunged into a deep economic crisis that has in a few months sunk its gross domestic product by about 25% through a devaluation of its currency. 

This is buoying the fortunes of the nationalist party (BJP) and its leader Narendra Modi, known for his anti-Chinese stances. 

The crisis could bring Modi to power or simply make his anti-Chinese positions more popular. 

India could then decide to tighten its security and military collaboration with Japan and Vietnam, with the backing of Russia, which is concerned about Chinese inland expansion in Central Asia and Chinese economic and demographic pressure on Siberia.
These are future scenarios to which China can respond in many articulated ways. 

The issue is that in all of these scenarios America will be absent unless it makes itself present, as it has no geographical proximity to the region. 

Here, the US's partial withdrawal from Afghanistan is already an important sign of a greater withdrawal from an important outpost, which could be crucial for the idea of an Asia pivoting around China.
Here the question goes back to Obama. 

In contrast to Lincoln, Obama has to fight on internal and external fronts, both equally important for the political and economic survival of his nation. 

The US can dismiss its many blunders in the Middle East, as the region is becoming strategically less relevant with the growing exploitation of American shale gas, but it can't do so with Asia.
As the present and future powerhouse of global growth, the region is vital for American long-term interests, and even a momentary American absence, like that of last week, sends a signal to the region to brace for a Plan B: what if America is not in the area? 

This absence, contrary to some Chinese analysts' predictions, may increase regional tensions. 

Some countries might more or less meekly yield to China's rise, but others, with a different history -- like India, Japan, Vietnam, or Russia -- could hasten preparations to oppose Beijing's ambitions. 

They could feel that without America's presence in the region, they are left to their own devices and with their history of decisive hostility to China.
In a way, then, Obama could win or lose everything. 

If he wins the "war" with the Republicans, he will have renewed energy domestically to go back to Asia with a clearer mandate and a new mission. 

If he fails, he will be some kind of lame duck until the end of his presidency, and thus he will be weaker in Asia, pushing everybody there toward a Plan B. 

In fact, even if an Asian country were to hope for a return of America to the region after a defeated Obama's term ends, nobody could bank on it. 

Nobody knows who Obama's successor will be, and what that person will be thinking in three, four years, while Asian affairs will have rapidly evolved.
Therefore, most of the US continuity in Asia hinges on Obama's victory over the Republicans.

If he wins now at home, he could be a true heir of Lincoln renewing American energies; if he loses, he could become a second and perhaps even lesser Jefferson Davis -- then the US will have to find somebody else who could truly re-launch the country.

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As Obama's Asia 'pivot' falters, China steps into the gap

The image of a dysfunctional, distracted Washington adds to perceptions that powerful China has in some ways outflanked the U.S. pivot. For countries not closely allied with the U.S., Obama's no-show will reinforce their policy of bandwagoning with China.

By Stuart Grudgings

Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak (front, L) walks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (front, R) during the Malaysia China Economic Summit in Kuala Lumpur October 4, 2013.

KUALA LUMPUR -- When then U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared two years ago "We are back to stay" as a power in Asia, the most dramatic symbol of the policy shift was the planned deployment of 2,500 U.S. Marines in northern Australia, primed to respond to any regional conflict.
At this point in time, however, there is not a single U.S. Marine in the tropical northern city of Darwin, according to the Australian defence ministry. 

Two hundred Marines just finished their six-month tour and will not be replaced until next year, when 1,150 Marines are due to arrive.
The original goal of stationing 2,500 Marines there by 2017 remains in place, but the lack of a U.S. presence there two years after the policy was announced underlines questions about Washington's commitment to the strategic "pivot" to Asia.
President Barack Obama's cancellation of a trip this week to four Asian nations and two regional summits due to the U.S. government shutdown has raised further doubts over a policy aimed at re-invigorating U.S. military and economic influence in the fast-growing region, while balancing a rising China.
While U.S. and Asian diplomats downplayed the impact of Obama's no-show, the image of a dysfunctional, distracted Washington adds to perceptions that China has in some ways outflanked the U.S. pivot.
"It's symptomatic of the concern in Asia over the sustainability of the American commitment," said Carl Baker, director of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Hawaii.
As embarrassed U.S. officials announced the cancellations last week, Chinese President Xi Jinping was in Indonesia announcing a raft of deals worth about $30 billion and then in Malaysia to announce a "comprehensive strategic partnership", including an upgrade in military ties.
He was en route to this week's Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Bali and the East Asia Summit in Brunei, where Obama will no longer be able to press his signature trade pact or use personal diplomacy to support allies concerned at China's assertive maritime expansion.
Since 2011, China has consolidated its position as the largest trade partner with most Asian countries and its direct investments in the region are surging, albeit from a much lower base than Europe, Japan and the United States. 

Smaller countries such as Laos and Cambodia have been drawn so strongly into China's economic orbit that they have been called "client states" of Beijing, supporting its stance in regional disputes.
Leveraging its commercial ties, China is also expanding its diplomatic, political and military influence more broadly in the region, though its efforts are handicapped by lingering maritime tensions with Japan, the Philippines and several other nations.
"For countries not closely allied with the U.S., Obama's no-show will reinforce their policy of bandwagoning with China," wrote Carl Thayer, emeritus professor at the Australian Defence Force Academy in Canberra.

"BLUE-WATER" EXPANSION
China, for instance, has been the biggest trade partner of the 10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since 2009, and its direct investments are surging, bringing with them increased economic and diplomatic influence.
Chinese companies invested $4.42 billion in Southeast Asia in 2012, up 52 percent on the previous year, according to Chinese state media citing the China-ASEAN Business Council. 

Investments into neighbouring Vietnam rocketed 147 percent.
China is demonstrating that it can deploy forces far beyond its coastal waters on patrols where they conduct complex battle exercises, according to Japanese and Western naval experts. 

Chinese shipyards are turning out new nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, missile-armed patrol boats and surface ships at a higher rate than any other country.
Operating from increasingly modern ports, including a new naval base in the south of Hainan island, its warships are patrolling more regularly, in bigger numbers and further from the mainland in what is the most sweeping shift in Asia's maritime power balance since the demise of the Soviet navy.
China's military diplomacy with Southeast Asia is rapidly evolving as it takes steps to promote what Beijing describes as its "peaceful rise".
The Chinese navy's hospital ship Peace Ark recently treated hundreds of patients on a swing last month through Myanmar, Cambodia and Indonesia -- its first such mission across Southeast Asia. 

Its naval vessels returning from regular international anti-piracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden have made calls in Southeast Asian ports, including Singapore and Vietnam.
Still, analysts and diplomats say Beijing has a long way to go to catch up with not just the long-dominant United States, but other regional military powers such as Australia, Japan and Russia.
"China has come late to the party," said Richard Bitzinger, a military analyst at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.

NOT A PATCHY PIVOT
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore, one of Washington's most key allies in the region, said it was disappointing Obama would not be visiting Asia.
"Obviously we prefer a U.S. government which is working to one which is not. And we prefer a U.S. President who is able to travel to fulfil his international duties to one who is preoccupied with his domestic preoccupations," Lee said after arriving in Bali.
"It is a very great disappointment to us President Obama is unable to visit."
U.S. officials dismissed the notion that Obama's no-show would imply any weakening of the U.S. commitment to the region.

Just last week, Secretary of Defence Chuck Hagel and Secretary of State John Kerry were in South Korea and Japan to reaffirm the U.S. military commitment to the two key allies, and Kerry will fill in for Obama at the two Asian summits.
"The bottom line is that the United States of America is not going to change one iota the fundamental direction of the policy under this president," Kerry said on Saturday.
"I think everybody in the region understands. Everybody sees this (the cancellation of the visit) as a moment in politics -- an unfortunate moment -- but they see it for what it is."
The United States has ramped up military funding and assistance to its close ally the Philippines, expanded military exercises with other nations and increased regional port visits.
From only 50 ship visits in 2010, nearly 90 ships have visited the Philippines since January this year alone.
Washington has stationed surveillance planes there and promised up to $30 million in support for building and operating coastal radar stations, all aimed at improving its ally's ability to counter China's naval encroachment in the disputed South China Sea that has alarmed several Asian nations.
But talks to establish a framework agreement on a regular rotational U.S. military presence in the Philippines have yet to bear fruit, and are unlikely to have been helped by Obama's cancellation of his planned visit to Manila.
For the Darwin deployment, a U.S. Senate Committee said in April that it would cost $1.6 billion to build lodgings for the Marines, but the Australian government last month called for only a first-stage A$12 million ($11.3 million) tender to construct new quarters at existing Australian barracks for around 350 marines.
The economic leg of the pivot, negotiations for the U.S.-led Trans-Pacific Partnership, has grown to 12 nations. 

But the complex three-year-old talks, which seek unprecedented access to domestic markets, are facing resistance in many countries and are unlikely to completed soon.
A final deal would have to be approved by the U.S. Congress, raising the prospect of domestic politics again obstructing Asia ties.
"Even if the administration could push through some agreement on the TPP, it's very unlikely there is going to be legislative success getting that through based on the acrimony that exists," said the CSIS's Baker.
"...On the commercial side (of the pivot), there seems to be more rhetoric than action."

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Obama Absence Gives China Opening

Barack Obama's decision to skip the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings and the East Asian Summit next week is a blow to America's image in Asia

By JAMES HOOKWAY, NATASHA BRERETON-FUKUI and PETER NICHOLAS

President Barack Obama's decision to skip a series of Asia and Pacific summits to tackle the partial government shutdown in Washington strips the U.S. of some of its recent diplomatic momentum in the region and could leave the door open for China to expand its influence.
China and the U.S. have competing visions for the future of the Pacific Rim, ranging from trade and security to resolving deep-seated territorial disputes in the resource-rich waters of the South China Sea.
America's rebalancing, or pivot, of its foreign policy away from the Middle East and Afghanistan toward East Asia was in part a way to ensure that the U.S. isn't locked out of new trade pacts in the region.
It also was meant to ensure that smaller Asian nations can profit from what U.S. officials have described as a healthier, more equitable relationship with China.
Mr. Obama's decision to skip the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meetings in Bali, Indonesia, and the East Asian Summit in Brunei next week "is a blow to America's image in Asia, where symbolism is everything," said Ian Storey, senior fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore.
"It projects the image that America is politically dysfunctional and fiscally irresponsible, and not as committed to Asia as the Obama administration would have us believe," he said.
State Department spokeswoman Marie Harf said that while Secretary of State John Kerry "will ably represent the United States at all of the stops on this trip, this completely avoidable shutdown is setting back our ability to create jobs through promotion of U.S. exports and to advance U.S. leadership and interests in the largest emerging region in the world."
China, in contrast, has launched a full-court press in the region ahead of the meetings.
President Xi Jinping met with Indonesia's president Wednesday and addressed the country's parliament while signing a $15 billion currency swap agreement that could lend some support to Indonesia's wilting rupiah.

An Indonesian vegetable vendor passes a giant banner for APEC in Nusa Dua on Indonesia's resort island of Bali earlier this week.

Mr. Xi traveled to Malaysia on Thursday to meet with Prime Minister Najib Razak and sign commercial agreements amid signs that China's economy is beginning to regain some momentum.
Mr. Obama earlier postponed scheduled trips to Malaysia and the Philippines that were to have followed his summit appearances.
The president's advisers were split on whether to proceed with the rest of the Asia trip. 

Though the White House has said they scuttled the trip because of logistical challenges created by the shutdown, there were other considerations in play, according to people familiar with the decision.
A trio of Mr. Obama's former top aides, David Axelrod, David Plouffe and Robert Gibbs, privately advised the White House that the president should proceed with the trip, according to a person familiar with the matter.
They told former colleagues in the West Wing that it was important for the president to carry on with his official duties and not let the trip become a casualty of the government shutdown. 

But current staffers rejected the advice.
Politically, the trip posed two risks for the president. 

He would have been out of the country as the shutdown entered its second week and as lawmakers scrambled to break the impasse.
And pictures coming back to Washington of the president in sun-splashed Bali, at a moment when hundreds of thousands of federal workers are on furlough, might have proved embarrassing.
But Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said the cancellation "reinforces the concern in the Asia-Pacific region that the talk about a pivot or rebalancing is mostly talk."
"Other than the secretary of defense, no other senior U.S. official seems to be making a habit of visiting Asia," he said.

"So look, there's concern."
Speaking at a news briefing this week with Mr. Najib, Mr. Xi said China was looking forward to elevating its relationship with Malaysia and to promoting more cooperation across the region.
Chinese television covered Mr. Xi's tour extensively, frequently airing images of his glamorous wife, Peng Liyuan. 

"China and (Southeast Asian) countries are linked by the same mountains and rivers and live alongside each other like members in one big family," Mr. Xi said in written answers to questions from reporters in Indonesia and Malaysia, according to a transcript released by China's news agency, Xinhua.
"China appears prosperous and full of self-confidence. As America struggles to resolve its severe political and economic problems, China will have the floor in Bali and Brunei," Mr. Storey said.

Mr. Obama's planned spin around Asia was hotly anticipated. 

The Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in Bali in particular was billed as an opportunity to observe how much personal chemistry Mr. Obama and Mr. Xi actually developed in June during their informal summit in California.
Mr. Obama's cancellation is a loss of momentum for a U.S.-China relationship that had been moving in "positive directions", said Linda Jakobson, director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy's East Asia Program in Sydney, Australia.
The U.S. "pivot" to Asia, launched in 2011, already has had some successes. 

It helped open up debate over how to resolve territorial disputes in the South China Sea, which is claimed in whole or in part by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei and Malaysia.
To Beijing's chagrin, Washington has pushed for a multilateral process to resolve the conflict, which China would prefer discuss from a position of strength with individual countries. 

The U.S. also has notably expanded military ties with the two countries most frequently at loggerheads with China over the waters, Vietnam and the Philippines.
Washington's move to eliminate many of its economic sanctions against Myanmar as the former military state continues its transition to democracy has helped open up the country to outside investment and reduce its economic dependence on China, analysts say.
The Obama administration's efforts to push forward the proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership trade pact, which involves the U.S. and 11 other countries including Japan, Australia and Chile, were also expected to be a major point of discussion.
The U.S. now ships more exports to the Asia and Pacific region than it does to the European Union or Canada, and hopes that a new trade pact providing more access to Asian markets can be wrapped up by the end of the year. 

China so far isn't involved in those discussions and is working to expand its own free-trade pact in the region that doesn't include the U.S.
Speaking before the White House canceled Mr. Obama's trip, U.S. Trade Representative Michael Froman said in an interview in Bali that the coming TPP discussions would help assess the progress of the trade talks, and that a deal by the end of this year "is ambitious but doable."
Yoshihide Suga, Japan's chief government spokesman, said that government officials attending pre-summit talks agreed to keep up the momentum for wrapping up the trade deal this year. 

Mr. Suga also expressed Japan's hope that the impasse in Washington will be resolved "as soon as possible so that the domestic problem doesn't impact diplomacy."
Scholars in China, however, described Mr. Obama as a victim of domestic politics and said they weren't reading much significance into the White House decision to skip the summits.
"The absence is just a technical problem" and won't have a lasting impact on U.S. influence in Asia, said He Maochun, an international relations specialist at Tsinghua University. 

"China's influence in the Pacific Rim is increasing, but remains very limited."
Still, the fallout from the government shutdown is reviving doubts about the U.S.'s standing in Asia, said Dewi Fortuna Anwar, who heads Indonesian Vice President Boediono's political affairs team.
"There are jokes going around now," she said. 

"'Why did Mr. Obama cancel his trip? Maybe because he can't pay his fuel and hotel bills.' It's not a funny joke."
Ernest Bower at the Center for Strategic International Studies in Washington noted that China increased its influence across Asia while the U.S. was preoccupied with the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and adopted a much more assertive posture on its territorial claims during the low point of the global financial crisis.
U.S. allies will "have little choice to pursue some level of hedging behavior as the U.S. signals that its political system does not allow for consistent top level engagement in the region,'' Mr. Bower said.

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Another Shutdown Victim: U.S. Efforts to Offset China

In the struggle for influence in the region, a dysfunctional Washington plays to the advantage of Beijing

By MARK LANDLER

President Obama canceled part of a visit to Asia, and may be forced to send Secretary of State John Kerry for the rest of it.

WASHINGTON — Debate over the federal government shutdown has tended to focus on those it hurts: veterans, tourists barred from the Lincoln Memorial and Yellowstone National Park, and giant-panda enthusiasts deprived of their publicly funded panda cam.
But the shutdown has already produced at least one winner: China.
By forcing President Obama to cancel a visit next week to Malaysia and the Philippines, the impasse with House Republicans is spoiling Mr. Obama’s show of support for two Southeast Asian countries that have long labored under the shadow of China. 

And it is undermining his broader effort to put Asia at the heart of American foreign policy.
Mr. Obama’s planned itinerary for next week — a mix of summit meetings and good-will visits — was carefully molded to reinforce the message to China that the United States is once again a central player in the region. 

But the president’s Asian pivot keeps getting pulled back by two forces that have haunted his presidency: strife in the Middle East and strife with Capitol Hill.
For now, the White House is clinging to the two remaining stops on Mr. Obama’s tour: a Pacific Rim economic summit meeting in Indonesia, at which he hopes to meet with President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia, and the East Asia Summit, in the sultanate of Brunei, where he is scheduled to meet the new prime minister of China, Li Keqiang.
With little sign of a compromise that would reopen the government by this weekend, however, Mr. Obama may be forced to scrap those visits, too, sending Secretary of State John Kerry as his understudy. 

It would be the third time he has been forced to sacrifice an Asia trip because of domestic issues — he postponed a visit in March 2010 because of the battle over the health care overhaul, and delayed it again four months later because of the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
“Diplomatically, it’s very harmful,” said Kenneth G. Lieberthal, a top China adviser during the Clinton administration. 

“I’m sure there are some in China who say, insofar as the U.S. pivot has China as its bull’s-eye, this prevents them from hitting that bull’s-eye.”
Jeffrey A. Bader, who was Mr. Obama’s senior adviser on China until 2011, said the White House’s attempt to salvage the two meetings, even amid the chaos of the shutdown, was an important sign that it remained committed to the region. 

But he added, “The mayhem that compelled the decision sends an unfortunate signal to those countries that the U.S. is far away, and that the U.S. political system is dysfunctional.”
While Mr. Obama’s plans are in flux, President Xi Jinping of China has embarked on a tour of Southeast Asia that will take him to Indonesia and Malaysia.
China, with its expansionist impulses, is a clear beneficiary of a distracted United States. 

It has clashed with Malaysia and the Philippines over claims to rocky outposts in the South China Sea, which the three countries border. 

On previous visits, Mr. Obama said the United States wanted to resolve these disputes peacefully and keep sea lanes open.
The president has invested in the Philippines and Malaysia for different reasons.
The Philippines is a treaty ally of the United States, and the administration has tried to shore up its Asian alliances, in part as a counterweight to the muscular role of China.
Malaysia went through a strained period with the United States in the 1990s under a xenophobic leader, Mahathir Mohamad. 

But relations have thawed under a new leader, Najib Razak, and Malaysia is a member of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, a nascent regional trade bloc that is the economic pillar of Mr. Obama’s Asia strategy.
The administration wants to wrap up negotiations on a trade deal by the end of this year, a goal few analysts believe it can achieve. 

That may be even more elusive if Mr. Obama cannot personally offer his public backing at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, on the Indonesian island of Bali.
Critics have long charged that the “pivot” is more talk than reality — a fledgling trade deal and the deployment of 2,500 Marines to the Australian outback, rather than a genuine shift of resources. Administration officials say that contention is unfair, noting that in addition to the trade talks and alliance building, Mr. Obama spent hours one on one with Mr. Xi in Southern California in June.
Still, the turmoil in Syria has reinforced the reality that the Middle East is likely to remain a preoccupation for Mr. Obama. 

In his speech at the United Nations last week, he mentioned Asia in a single line, noting that it could serve as an economic example.
While the president may be no less committed to the region, there is a reduction of Asia expertise on his senior team. 

Mr. Kerry has made the Middle East, and particularly peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, his top priority, in contrast to his predecessor, Hillary Rodham Clinton, whose first trip in the post was to Asia, and who led the drive to open diplomatic ties to Myanmar.
Susan E. Rice, the national security adviser, has by necessity focused less on Asia than her predecessor, Tom Donilon, while Treasury Secretary Jacob J. Lew has far less experience in the region than his predecessor, Timothy F. Geithner. 

Administration officials counter that Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker and the United States trade representative, Michael B. Froman, are both heavily involved in Asia.
But among top officials, only Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, whose history in Asia dates to his combat service in Vietnam, seems eager to put the rebalancing at the top of his agenda. 

Mr. Hagel, a former Republican senator, has been harshly critical of his fellow Republicans in the budget fight, telling reporters traveling with him to Japan and South Korea this week that “if this continues, we will have a country that is ungovernable.”
An ungovernable America is not something that the Chinese want either, given the economic interdependence of the two countries. 

But in the diplomatic struggle for influence in the region, a dysfunctional Washington plays to the short-term advantage of Beijing, especially with China having weathered its own domestic political upheavals.
“And,” added a senior administration official with bitter humor, “they still have a panda cam.”

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