Impending Japan-China war has the makings of a Clancy classic

BY MARK SCHREIBER

Japanese soldiers from the 22nd Infantry Regiment of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force train in urban assault with American Soldiers from 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, 5th Brigade Oct. 17, 2008 during a bilateral exercise at Fort Lewis' Leschi Town.
On Nov. 23, China announced the creation of a newly expanded air defense identification zone (ADIZ) in the East China Sea, overlapping a large expanse of Japanese territory. 

The move has produced a visceral reaction in the Japanese vernacular media, particularly the weekly tabloids. 

Five out of nine weekly magazines that went on sale last Monday and Tuesday contained scenarios that raised the possibility of a shooting war.
One can only wonder what sort of tale American “techno-thriller” writer Tom Clancy — author of “The Hunt for Red October” (1984, involving the Soviet Union) and “Debt of Honor” (1994, involving Japan) — might have spun from the scenario that’s now unfolding in the East China Sea.
Alas, Mr. Clancy passed away of an undisclosed illness on Oct. 1, so instead the task has fallen to Japan’s gunji hyōronka (military affairs critics) or gunji jānarisuto (military affairs writers), whose phones have been ringing off the hook.
First, let’s take Flash (Dec. 17), which ran a “Simulated breakout of war over the Senkakus,” with Mamoru Sato, a former Air Self-Defense Force general, providing editorial supervision. 

Flash’s scenario has the same tense tone as a Clancy novel, including dialog. 

On a day in August 2014, a radar operator instructs patrolling F-15J pilots to “scramble north” at an altitude of 65,000 feet to intercept a suspected intruder and proceeds from there.
Sunday Mainichi (Dec. 15) ran an article headlined “Sino-Japanese war to break out in January.” 

Political reporter Takao Toshikawa tells the magazine that the key to what happens next will depend on China’s economy.
“The economic situation in China is pretty rough right now, and from the start of next year it’s expected to worsen,” says Toshikawa. 

“The real-estate boom is headed for a total collapse and the economic disparities between the costal regions and the interior continue to widen. I see no signs that the party’s Central Committee is getting matters sorted out.”
An unnamed diplomatic source offered the prediction that the Chinese might very well set off an incident “accidentally on purpose”: “I worry about the possibility they might force down a civilian airliner and hold the passengers hostage,” he suggested.
In an article described as a “worst-case simulation,” author Osamu Eya expressed concerns in Shukan Asahi Geino (Dec. 12) that oil supertankers bound for Japan might be targeted.
“Japan depends on sea transport for oil and other material resources,” said Eya. 

“If China were to target them, nothing could be worse to contemplate.”
In an air battle over the Senkakus, the Geino article continues, superiority of radar communications would be a key factor in determining the outcome. 

Japanese forces have five fixed radar stations in Kyushu and four in Okinawa. 

China would certainly target these, which would mean surrounding communities would also be vulnerable.
One question that seems to be on almost everybody’s mind is, will the U.S. military become involved?
Shukan Gendai (Dec. 14) speculated that Chinese leader Xi Jinping might issue an order for a Japanese civilian airliner to be shot down. 

As a result of this, a U.S. Navy aircraft carrier would come to Japan’s aid and send up fighters to contend with the Chinese.
“Unlike Japan, the U.S. military would immediately respond to a radar lock-on threat by shooting down the Chinese planes,” asserts military analyst Mitsuhiro Sera. 

“It would naturally regard an aircraft flying overhead as hostile. They would shoot at it even if that were to risk discrediting the Obama administration.”
“With the creation of Japan’s National Security Council on Dec. 4, Japan-U.S. solidarity meets a new era,” an unnamed diplomatic source told Shukan Gendai. 

“If a clash were to occur between the U.S. and China, it would be natural for the Self-Defense Forces to provide backup assistance. This was confirmed at the ‘two-plus-two’ meeting on Oct. 3.”
“China is bent on wresting the Senkakus away from Japan, and if Japan dispatches its Self-Defense Forces, China will respond with naval and air forces,” Saburo Takai predicts in Flash.

“In the case of an incursion by irregular forces, that would make it more difficult for the U.S. to become involved. Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs would protest through diplomatic channels, but China would attempt to present its takeover as a fait accompli."
“China fears a direct military confrontation with the U.S.,” Takai adds. 

“A few days ago, two U.S. B-52s transited the ADIZ claimed by China, but the flights were not for any vague purpose. I suppose the Chinese tracked the flights on their radar, but the B-52s have electronic detection functions that can identify radar frequencies, wavelength and source of the signals. These flights are able to lay bare China’s air defense systems. It really hits home to the Chinese that they can’t project their military power.”

Which side, wonders Shukan Gendai, will respond to a provocation by pulling the trigger? 

The game of chicken between two great superpowers is about to begin.

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Julie Bishop stands firm in diplomatic spat with China

‘‘Australia should never be afraid to stand by our values and our views.’’ -- Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop

By Philip Wen 

'We stand by our view': Julie Bishop in Beijing.
Beijing -- Foreign Affairs Minister Julie Bishop has held firm in the face of an unconventionally strong protest from Beijing over the federal government’s position on China’s newly-declared air defence zone in the East China Sea, insisting Australia ‘‘should never be afraid to stand by our values and our views’’.
In another flashpoint in the simmering diplomatic spat between the two countries, the Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi sidestepped convention by launching into a stern rebuke of Ms Bishop in front of international and Chinese media before a formal closed-door meeting on Friday.
‘‘I have to point out that what Australia has said and done with regard to China’s establishment of the air defence identification zone in the East China Sea has jeopardised bilateral mutual trust and affected the sound growth of bilateral relations,’’ Mr Wang said, in introductory comments usually reserved for polite exchanges of pleasantries. 

‘‘This is not what we desire to see.’’
While appearing surprised by the unusually direct and public nature of Mr Wang’s comments, Ms Bishop responded firmly.
‘‘I must take issue with you on the matter of the East China Sea. We stand by our view,’’ she said, before reporters were ushered out of the room.
Speaking to reporters on Saturday, Ms Bishop rejected suggestions that foreign policy was not a strong suit of the Abbott government, with relations with Jakarta also strained over a spying scandal.
She said the government held a ‘‘credible’’ position with respect to China’s air defence zone which was motivated by the importance with which it viewed peace and stability in the region.
‘‘Australia has its own national interest, its view, its position, and we should never be afraid to stand by our values and our views,’’ Ms Bishop said.
She denied the disagreement over the East China Sea had overshadowed the first annual foreign and strategic dialogue between the two countries, pointing out a wide range of issues were canvassed in a ‘‘robust’’ discussion that lasted nearly four hours, deep into Friday night.
Beyond the East China Sea, tensions in North Korea and Syria, the economic and investment relationship between Australia and China, as well as the New Colombo plan which will help boost the numbers of Australian undergraduate students studying in China, were all discussed, she said.
Ms Bishop said she also raised ‘‘specific instances’’ of human rights concerns and Australian consular matters, without providing details. 

Among the publicly-known Australians to be jailed in China include former Rio Tinto executive Stern Hu and entrepreneurs Matthew Ng and Charlotte Chou, who is awaiting the result of an appeal.
She said Chinese Vice-President Li Yuanchao expressed a desire to conclude a free trade agreement ‘‘in the very near future’’, in a separate meeting earlier on Friday.
The foreign and strategic dialogue is part of the newly-expanded bilateral strategic architecture set up by the former Gillard government in April.
China’s move to establish the air defence zone in the East China Sea last month is seen as a strategic move to bolster its claim over a group of Japanese islands – known as Senkaku.
China has threatened to use military force to enforce the zone, contributing to heightened tensions in the region, with the United States, Japan and Korea ignoring China’s demands and continuing to fly military aircraft through the zone without notification.
An escalating series of diplomatic gestures between Canberra and Beijing have strained relations since last week after Australia took the rare step of calling in China’s ambassador to demand an explanation.

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Debate on Air Zones Continues in South Korea

By Alastair Gale

South Korea continued to debate its response to China’s move to include an area of ocean disputed by the two nations in its own new air-defense identification zone.

On Thursday, South Korea said it would consider extending its own air-defense zone to respond to China’s move after Beijing refused a demand from Seoul to redraw its new zone.
Since then, the issue has been on the agenda at a series of high-level meetings in Korea’s capital as the government considers how to proceed.
In addition to inflaming its dispute with China, officials are aware the move could also worsen already-fraught ties with Japan. 

The air-defense identification zones of South Korea and Japan share a border and any move to extend the Korean zone would almost certainly overlap with Japanese interests.

A picture made available by the South Korean Navy shows a South Korean destroyer patrolling in waters around Ieodo. 

South Korean media reported that Seoul is considering extensions of its ADIZ to the south, east and west, primarily to cover an area of ocean around a submerged rock that is claimed by China but administered by South Korea. 

The rock has a Korean-built marine research station on it and the two nations claim exclusive economic rights to the area.
South Korea’s defense ministry, foreign ministry and presidential office all declined to comment on the discussions.
A decision from Seoul on the matter had been expected early this week. 

But local media report that it is likely to be delayed until later in the week and may come during or after a visit from U.S. Vice President Joe Biden. 

Officials say a move to extend South Korea’s air-defense zone isn’t a given, but Seoul feels pressured to respond forcefully because of the long-running dispute with China over the area of ocean around the submerged rock and concerns the new Chinese air-defense zone would worsen South Korea’s position in future talks.
“An expansion isn’t the only option that serves national interest. Resolving, moderating and managing conflict is also a part of a national gain in a forward-looking perspective,” Defense Ministry spokesman Col. Wi Yong-seop said last week.
South Korea has refused to recognize the new Chinese zone and has instructed the nation’s airlines not to file flight plans to Chinese authorities when entering the zone.

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China pulls out of UN process over territorial dispute with Philippines

“There is a price to be paid for branding yourself an international outlaw – a state that does not comply with the rules.” -- Paul Reichler
By Paul Lewis in Washington

Fallout over China’s territorial claims has become the dominant issue for Joe Biden. 

China is taking the highly unusual step of refusing to participate in a United Nations arbitration process over a territorial conflict with the Philippines, one of five countries challenging Beijing’s claims of ownership over the oil-rich South China Sea.
The legal dispute underscores the tough geopolitical approach China is adopting in the Pacific region. 

It has adopted an aggressive approach toward neighbours over a 2,000-mile stretch that also includes the East China Sea, over which it recently declared the air defence identification zone that has inflamed tensions with Japan and South Korea.
China sent its only aircraft carrier to the disputed waters off the coast of the Philippines for the first time last week, in a move Manila said raised tensions. 

China’s military said the carrier Liaoning will conduct drills in the area, accompanied by two destroyers and two frigates.
Dealing with the fallout over China’s territorial claims has become the dominant issue for the US vice-president, Joe Biden, who is currently touring the Asia Pacific region.
Biden arrived in South Korea on Thursday after high-level bilateral meetings in China and Japan that were dominated by the issue of the air defence zone.
The Philippines will submit its formal case to the UN arbitration tribunal of judges, which has agreed to hear the case at The Hague, in March. 

A preview of their arguments were outlined this week in Washington by Paul Reichler, an expert attorney at Foley Hoag LLP hired by Manila to handle the case.
He said China’s blank refusal to participate in the tribunal process, a move it revealed to the Philippines by way of diplomatic letter in February, marked the first time a state had ever refused to take part in an inter-state arbitration under the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.
Under the convention, the panel of senior international judges is still required to issue a ruling in the case, despite China’s non-cooperation, although Reichler conceded there were no way of enforcing any ruling.
But he added: “There is a price to be paid for branding yourself an international outlaw – a state that does not comply with the rules.” 

China declined an opportunity to comment on the case.
The dispute concerns China’s declaration of the so-called nine-dash line, which claims jurisdiction over nearly all of the mineral-rich South China Sea, overlapping with large segments of territory claimed by the Philippines as well as of Vietnam, Malaysia and Brunei.
In parts, China’s declared jurisdiction, which enables it to exploit lucrative fishing waters and potential oil and gas reserves, stretch more than 800 miles from its mainland coast. 

It also comes to within 30 miles of the coast of the Philippines.
Under the convention, states have a right to an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf within 200 miles of their coast. 

Disputes over the South China Sea are not unlike those over the Japanese Senkaku islands which are dominating Biden’s visits to Japan, China and South Korea this week.
Although the ad-hoc tribunal formed to deal with the case cannot rule on the sovereignty of the islands claimed by both China and the Philippines, it can provide rulings about the nature of rock formations, with implications for any territorial claims under the convention. 

Some of the disputed territories are barely visible at high tide, while others are fully submerged even at low tide.
In a bid to strengthen its claims, China has constructed concrete installations on some underwater formations, complete with basketballs and helipads. 

“A state cannot transform an underwater feature into an island by building on top of it,” Reichler said at a seminar organised by the Center for Strategic and International Studies.
In simple terms, the judges will in part be asked to determine when a rock can be defined as an island. 

If a rock protruding from the sea cannot sustain human life or economic activity, for example, the associated rights in surrounding waters are, under the convention, dramatically reduced, regardless of which state claims ownership.
Reichler also showed one slideshow of an island that, at high-tide, consisted of rocks that only just protruded out of the water. 

“It is barely big enough to support the Filipino flag,” he said.

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How to Answer China's Aggression

A freshly aggressive tone from Beijing greets Joe Biden on his week-long trip to Asia.
By JOHN BOLTON

China's declaration on Nov. 23 of an air-defense identification zone over the Japanese Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea transformed Vice President Joe Biden's Asia trip this week. 

Mr. Biden's main objective in meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Abe on Tuesday was to assure him that America opposes China's belligerent, unilateral action in asserting the defense zone. 

Of course, if Mr. Abe really wants to know how the Obama administration treats close American allies, he can always call Bibi Netanyahu.
Although Mr. Biden publicly criticized the defense-zone announcement, he did not expressly reject it. Moreover, the administration earlier advised U.S. commercial airlines to notify China of flights into the zone, whereas Japan and South Korea told their airlines not to make such notifications. 

At the very best, these are mixed, and therefore dangerous, signals.
Beijing's new zone over the Senkaku islands, along with the government's broader territorial claims, is indicative of a much larger problem for the United States. 

For too long, American business and political leaders have accepted the notion that China is engaged in a "peaceful rise" to become a "responsible stakeholder" in world affairs, which we should placidly allow to happen. 

Instead of fantasizing about what China might become, it is far more sensible to consider what America's strategy should be under a range of possible scenarios. 

The rosy "peaceful rise" theory ignores countless other possibilities, particularly its polar opposite.

Chinese Vice President Li Yuanchao, right, and U.S Vice President Joe Biden in Beijing on Wednesday.Associated Press

The People's Liberation Army remains the dominant force within the Communist Party, and the party remains the dominant political (and major economic) force in China. 

That explains Beijing's sustained increases in military budgets; its expanding nuclear and ballistic-missile arsenals; its unmatched cyberwarfare program; its construction of a blue-water navy; and its anti-satellite, anti-access and area-denial weapons systems. 

These aren't the marks of a "peaceful rise," especially combined with Beijing's aggressive territorial claims.
America urgently needs strategic thinking about China's radically different alternative futures. 

Simply ignoring the bad news won't work. 

Here are three building blocks for a more realistic U.S. strategy on China.

First, since China's principal theater of action for decades will be Asia, that must also be the focus of America's response. 

China's territorial claims, and now the air-defense zone, provide Washington with an enormous opportunity to maintain and expand its influence along China's periphery, from India to Japan. 

Whether we have the wit to exploit this opportunity remains to be seen.
Ideally, the U.S. would benefit from something akin to an alliance system among our friends and allies, currently a far-fetched goal given, for example, tensions between South Korea and Japan. 

Contemporary Japanese-Chinese disputes are mirrored in Seoul-Tokyo arguments over seemingly useless islands and reefs, reflecting even deeper historical grievances and animosities. 

Nonetheless, America alone can provide the support necessary to resist Chinese hegemonism, which essentially all Asian governments recognize. 

They would welcome a stronger, more visible, Washington role, even if they won't necessarily say so expressly in today's uncertain and dangerous environment.
Taiwan has an interesting potential role. 

Although its territorial claims mirror Beijing's, Taipei could gain substantial support for its unique status from its Asian neighbors, thereby reducing its international isolation, by distancing itself from China's current assertive posture. 

For example, Taiwan could say publicly that it does not recognize Beijing's defense-zone declaration, and that it wants to confer with Japan, South Korea and others to align their responses. 

So doing would serve notice that Taiwan won't accept being declared part of China's next power projection.

Second, China's military growth demonstrates persuasively why the U.S. can no longer countenance massive military-budget cuts. 

We need superior Pacific Ocean air and naval power to counter Chinese aggressiveness, but we also need capabilities in the Middle East, the North Atlantic and elsewhere against other potential threats.
Beijing doesn't have to match America's military capabilities world-wide to equal the U.S. off China's shores. Accordingly, allies who pulled their weight in meeting common-defense needs would certainly help. 

Most of Europe may be beyond redemption, but Japan is poised to resume a normal nation's full self-defense role, something Washington should welcome.

Third, the U.S. and its allies should press China to join a vigorous campaign to counter the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction by North Korea, Iran and others. 

Pyongyang's nuclear and ballistic-missile capabilities have fueled enormous concern in East Asia. 

While China has the heft to bring North Korea to heel, Beijing's persistent failure to do so signals that it is not as interested in solving the problem as its rhetoric indicates.
No wonder, therefore, that Tokyo and Seoul look to their own military capabilities, including missile defense, to protect themselves against Pyongyang and Beijing's growing nuclear arsenal as well. 

Nor has China's interest in Iran's oil reserves helped in containing Tehran's nuclear program.
Japan and Israel both live in the real world of threats and dangers, not in the Obama bubble where national-security issues rarely intrude on his efforts to reshape American society. 

But China's air-defense zone move has pierced the bubble, and Joe Biden's Asia trip could tell us if President Obama now gets it.

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A South China Sea ADIZ: China’s Next Move

American betrayal: Washington not only gave de facto approval of the East China Sea ADIZ, but also suggested that future Chinese moves would not be met with strong resistance. 
By Harry Kazianis

I hate making predictions. 

Truthfully, I am the type of person who likes to go to casinos for the latest sporting events or concerts and would never throw my money away in a slot machine or on the blackjack table. 

However, I can guarantee Vegas would lose its shirt on this bet, an easy wager to make: Look for China in the next year to eighteen months to declare an ADIZ over the South China Sea — in fact, Beijing’s ambassador to the Philippines appears to have alluded to such a move. 

Heck, I will even take it a step further and bet the wife and dog on this one: Beijing will create such a zone in the Yellow Sea as well at some point in the near future.

Why am I making such a prediction? 

Two recent factors come into play that in my view give China the rationale along with the ample cover they need to make such a move.
First, Washington appears to have given Beijing the green light to go forward — albeit unintentionally it seems.
Various reports based off a Kyodo news agency article have suggested a senior official traveling with Vice President Joseph Biden to Asia explained that “Washington is also asking China not to set up an air defense zone in the South China Sea, where Beijing is locked in territorial rows with Southeast Asian nations, without first consulting countries concerned.”
So let me see if I have this correct: It would be OK if China crafted an ADIZ in the South China Sea as long as it tells its neighbors in some fashion, in advance? 

Considering Beijing has already made a veiled reference that it could set up additional ADIZ in the future, the timing of such a comment was ill advised at best.
Honestly, I am hoping the official was misunderstood or misspoke because if accurate, Beijing could use such wording to openly declare such a new ADIZ in the South China Sea — an area with sovereignty disputes involving multiple claimants. 

In fact, Beijing has already gone so far to claim 80 percent of the area, effectively taking control of Scarborough Shoal last summer, which is well within the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Philippines and is pressing its claims now on Second Thomas Shoal. 

China has also deployed its new aircraft carrier to the region in what could be seen as a show of force (although, let’s be frank, the carrier won’t be operational for sometime, however, the point is still made).
Second, when America’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) gave guidance that U.S. domestic carriers should inform Beijing of their flight plans, Washington not only gave de facto approval of the East China Sea ADIZ, but also suggested that future moves would not be met with strong resistance. 

Yet, any move that gives this ADIZ declaration on China’s part any legitimacy will certainly be used by Beijing as a sign of acceptance. 

If we got away with it once, why not try the same move again and again?
As I explained in a piece for the Washington Times recently, creating an ADIZ, an area that is essentially an early-warning buffer zone for possible intrusions into a nation’s airspace, is not aggressive. 

It is the arc of Chinese actions dating back to 2006 onward that should worry the international community. Looked upon as a whole, the trend is truly concerning. 

No one is saying Beijing does not have the right as a great power and possible someday a superpower to shape the international stage in a way that is friendly to its own national interest. 

It is the optics of how it is going about doing it that frightens its neighbors. 

For all of China’s worries about being contained by the U.S. “pivot” to Asia, China is doing a great job of aligning its neighbors against its actions — effectively containing itself and giving credence to the growing narrative as Asia’s new regional bully. 

Bad move Beijing.

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If China's Airspace Grab Turns Violent, Here's How the Dogfight Could Go Down

By Kyle Mizokami

Last week China announced a new air defense identification zone over the East China Sea, basically insisting it's in charge of the airspace over the Japanese Senkaku Islands.
Japan and the United States said they would not recognize the ID zone and promptly sent in warplanes to underscore the point.

U.S. B-52 bombers flew over the Senkakus, practically inviting a Chinese intervention.
Two days later, the Chinese air force flew J-11 and Su-30 fighters and a KJ-2000 radar plane into the zone.
With tensions mounting, I decided to see what might happen if the maneuvers escalated into actual combat. In my scenario, played out in the ultra-realistic computer game Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations (C:MANO), Beijing decides to teach Tokyo a lesson -- and opens fire on the Japanese planes. 

When three of the world's most high-tech air arms meet in simulated battle, the results might surprise you.

Chinese J-11 fighters. 

China plans to ambush one of Japan's air patrols -- a P-3C Orion maritime surveillance aircraft and an accompanying pair of F-15J Eagle fighters -- as it makes its daily flight through the Ryukyu and Senkaku islands, hundreds of miles south of mainland Japan.
The southernmost islands in Japan's archipelago, the sparsely populated Ryukyus and Senkakus are also the closest to China. 

Japan has limited options in defending them. 

The daily flight is in many ways just a reassurance to the local population.
If the attack on the Orion is successful and the opportunity presents itself, the Chinese could also shoot down an E-2C Hawkeye airborne early-warning aircraft orbiting southwest of Okinawa. 

The destruction of four planes and the deaths of as many as 21 aircrew members would be a great loss for Japan.
The Chinese air force plans to send up three groups of planes. 

The first, with four J-11B fighters, will try to take out Japan's F-15 escorts, leaving the Orion patrol plane defenseless.
The second Chinese group, composed of four J-10 multi-role fighters, will then dart in and shoot down the Orion -- and potentially also the Hawkeye.
Providing radar coverage and command and control will be the third group, with a KJ-2000 airborne early-warning aircraft flanked by fighter escorts. 

The early-warning group will stay out of the battle zone, instead holding off the coast of China.
All the Chinese fighters will be fully armed, with the J-11Bs carrying four PL-12 long-range radar-homing missiles plus four PL-9 short-range infrared-homing missiles. 

The J-10s will carry two of each munition.

Air Self-Defense Force F-15J fighters.

Self-defense forces
The Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) has recently begun fighter escorts of patrols in the area, protecting the daily Maritime Self Defense Force P-3 flight with a pair of F-15s.
A separate pair of F-15s is patrolling directly over the inhabited Ryukyus. 

The fighters are part of 204 Hikotai, a squadron based in Okinawa.
The F-15s, not expecting air-to-air combat, are carrying a light weapons load of just two AAM-4 long-range radar missiles plus two AAM-3 short-range IR missiles.
A pair of U.S. Air Force F-22 Raptor stealth fighters on temporary rotation in Okinawa are conducting maneuvers southeast of the island. 

Due to the increased tensions, the F-22s are armed with six AMRAAM long-range missiles and two Sidewinder short-range missiles.
Thanks to the close relationship between the JASDF and the U.S. Air Force, the Raptors can come to the aid of the Japanese, if necessary.
Despite careful planning, the Chinese air force has a less complete picture of the battle space than it thinks. The Chinese are not aware of the second pair of F-15Js or the Raptor flight.

JASDF units begin to track unknown contacts. Yellow icons are China, Blue are Japan and United States. C:MANO screen grab. Ambush!

It's another tense day over the East China Sea as the Japanese P-3 lumbers toward the Senkakus, 50 miles to the west. 

Two miles distant at the Orion's eight o'clock are its two F-15 escorts.
The plan is to fly west, overfly the Senkaku Islands of Uotsuri and Kuba, and then return to Okinawa. 

The F-15s have their sensors off, with radar coverage provided by the E-2 radar plane orbiting west of Okinawa.
The Hawkeye picks up several unknown radar contacts in the distance: eight bogies in three identifiable groups, the closest of which is 120 miles from the Orion.
A Chinese Type 1474 radar signal is coming from one contact, which signals analysts deduce as emanating from a J-11B fighter. 

Three more contacts are close to the radar source, meaning a possible total of four J-11Bs.
The defenseless Orion immediately turns around and heads for home at full speed. 

But the big propeller-driven plane can make only 400 miles per hour -- too slow to outrun J-11s. 

The F-15s will have to cover the Orion's withdrawal until it reaches a safe distance.
The two Japanese fighters turn on their radars and accelerate, heading straight toward the potentially hostile contacts.
With both sides racing toward each other at a combined 1,000 miles per hour, the gap closes pretty quickly. At 56 miles, the closest unknown air group is positively identified as J-11Bs.
At 22 miles, alarms go off in the F-15s' cockpits. Missile launches from the opposing warplanes! 

The Japanese are under attack.
The F-15s swiftly counterattack. 

Each Japanese fighter has just two AAM-4 missiles. 

To maximize their chances of downing a Chinese fighter, the F-15 pilots would want to target only two J-11s with two missiles apiece. 

But right now it's more important to the Japanese to break up the enemy attack and buy the Orion some time.
They launch one missile at each inbound J-11 and then turn to retreat.
Firing back, the Chinese manage to launch only 10 of their 16 PL-12 missiles before the inbound Japanese missiles force them to take evasive action. 

The Chinese fighters are unable to fire the last third of their long-range missiles and are soon bobbing and weaving all over the sky to avoid getting shot down.

Still, chances of survival are slim for the F-15s. 

Despite being an inferior missile, the Chinese PL-12s have the advantage of numbers. 

The F-15s take evasive action of their own, activating electronic countermeasures to distract the missiles and bursting clouds of radar-defeating chaff.
Each Chinese missile has a low probability of intercept, but there are 10 of them -- and all it takes is one hit. A minute apart, both F-15s wink off radar screens.
In the meantime, the four Japanese AAM-4s down one J-11, leaving three still flying. 

The three remaining J-11s, followed by four J-10s, roar through the sudden tear in the Japanese air defenses.

Minutes after firing their volley of long-range missiles, the second flight of F-15Js has turned away, following behind the P-3C Orion. C:MANO screen grab. Counterattack

Seconds after the Chinese fighters have been identified, the second pair of F-15s flying near Miyako island turn north to assist their squadron mates. 

Lighting their afterburners, the F-15s raced toward the battle at the speed of sound.
The Eagles turn on their radars to get the Chinese jets' attention and hopefully lure some of them away. 

It doesn't work. 

The F-15 pilots watch as their comrades disappear from radar.
As the Chinese J-11s chase down the Orion, the surviving F-15s focus their attack, assigning two AAM-4 missiles per J-11, starting with the lead plane. 

Two Chinese jets go down in flames.
Out of missiles, the second flight of F-15s turns for home. 

They could in theory press the attack with shorter-range IR missiles, but they're still outnumbered two to five. The odds are not good for the Japanese.
Plus, they know something that the Chinese don't. 

The moment the Orion turned to escape, the two American F-22s on a training mission east of Okinawa went on a war footing and headed toward the raging air battle at around 1,000 miles per hour.
The Chinese are on a collision course with the deadliest fighters ever made.

F-22 Raptors. 

Despite the Eagles' best efforts, the Orion is still in danger. 

At maximum speed, the patrol plane is still slower than the Chinese fighters racing to catch up with it.
But American and Japanese commanders believe the F-22s will tip the battle in their favor. 

Each Raptor carries six AMRAAM missiles, meaning the Americans have 12 missiles to destroy five Chinese fighters.
The F-22 pilots target two AMRAAMs at each enemy jet. 

In doing so, they switch on their AN/APG-77 radars -- a potentially unnecessary and dangerous move. Active radar helps you target the enemy, but it also betrays your position.
Incredibly, all six of the AMRAAMs in the first U.S. volley miss their targets. Two of the four missiles in the second volley hit, leaving the Chinese with three fighters. 

The Americans quickly retarget the Chinese with their last two AMRAAMs and a J-10 fighter goes down in flames.
Now the Chinese are down to two fighters. 

The American and Japanese commanders believe they have won the battle. 

Then something even more incredible happens: one of the stealthy F-22s explodes.
The allied officers are stunned by this sudden turn of events. They believed in the superiority -- the invincibility -- of the Raptor. 

So when the Chinese fired PL-12s at the F-22s, they didn't think too much of it. 

The Raptors would beat them. 

Heck, the non-stealthy Eagles had beaten most of the missiles fired at them.
What they should have stopped to consider is that the Chinese fighters had been able to detect the stealth planes, probably because the Americans had unwisely activated their own radars. 

While Chinese missiles are decidedly inferior, Beijing's Russian-designed sensors are pretty good.
And though Chinese missiles have a low kill probability, the J-10s and J-11s hurled at least a dozen of them at a single Raptor. 

One got through.

P-3C Orion. 

The Chinese ambush of the Orion fails. The patrol plane gets away. 

For the allies, everything -- including losing three expensive fighters and possibly their pilots -- is secondary to defending the P-3 and its 12 crew members.

Six out of eight Chinese fighters have been shot down.
For Beijing, poor intelligence is to blame. 

Chinese commanders were not even aware that the United States and Japan had an extra four F-15s and F-22s in the battle zone.
Still, the Chinese have managed to shoot down the first two F-15s lost in air-to-air combat since the Eagle entered service in the 1970s. 

And they killed an F-22 -- the best and priciest fighter ever made.
So what does my simulation of the battle mean for the current situation in the East China Sea? 

Simply put, China has a chance of pulling off an aerial ambush. 

If my scenario is realistic. If the game's modeling is accurate. If the Chinese are little lucky and if U.S. and Japanese commanders make mistakes. And if the first volley of AMRAAMs misses.
To be sure, those are a lot of ifs.
I approached building the scenario with some trepidation. I asked myself just how the Chinese would go about taking down a Japanese plane.

The Japan Air Self-Defense Force is better-trained than the Chinese air force and at least as well armed. 

To have a chance of winning, Beijing would have to overwhelm its enemies with sheer numbers. 

Hence the order of battle I devised -- one that favors the Chinese.
In my defense, China probably can muster more numerous forces in any sudden Pacific showdown.
The United States and Japan rely on just two air bases -- Naha and Kadena, both in Okinawa -- to provide fighter cover for the Senkaku Islands. 

Against that, China has a large number of bases -- and is building more. That's the advantage of waging war in your backyard.

But numbers aren't everything. 

The United States and Japan count on their technological advantage compensating for the smaller sizes of their forces. 

They're not necessarily wrong to do so.
The F-22s' presence in my scenario made all the difference. Flying at 1,000 miles per hour, the Raptors arrived in the nick of time. 

The Chinese didn't know they were there until the Americans unwisely turned on their radars.
This scenario is not meant to exaggerate or glamorize the possibility of armed conflict in the East China Sea. The chances are remote that a shooting war will break out. 

That said, for years tensions have steadily escalated between China, Japan, and the United States.
Although just a simulation, my skirmish over the Senkakus has brought up some interesting points worth considering. 

The relative advantages of both sides make for a compelling argument for either side that it just might be successful.
This is not enough to prevent conflict. 

And if the United States and Japan really want to deter an increasingly aggressive China, they're going to have to figure out how to bring more airplanes to the fight.

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China's ADIZ undermines regional stability

By Bonnie S Glaser

China established an "East China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)" effective as of 10 am on November 23. 

China's Ministry of National Defense also announced Aircraft Identification Rules for the ADIZ, which include a warning that "defensive emergency measures" would be adopted to respond to aircraft that refuse to follow the instructions.
The zone overlaps the existing ADIZ of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan. China's ADIZ also covers the Japanese Senkaku Islands.

One day following the announcement, China conducted two aerial patrols over the area; its aircraft were intercepted by Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) fighter jets.
All nations have the right to establish reasonable conditions of entry into their territory. 

An ADIZ is a declaration of a perimeter within which unidentified aircraft can be intercepted and prevented from illegally proceeding to enter national airspace. 

It serves essentially as a national defense boundary for aerial incursions. 

There are no international rules or laws that determine the size of an ADIZ. 

Over 20 nations have an ADIZ, including the United States, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan in the West Pacific. 

ADIZs typically are much more extensive then a country's territorial airspace.
Why did China establish an ADIZ? 

China's PLA spokesman claimed that its action is "a necessary measure taken by China in exercising its self-defense right," and that "it is not directed against any specific country or target." 

However, the decision to declare an East China Sea ADIZ is likely aimed at strengthening Beijing's claim over the Japanese islands in the East China Sea. 

This move follows on China's September 2012 submission to the United Nations of baselines to demarcate a territorial sea around the islands.
China may also be responding to recent Japanese warnings that it reserves the right to shoot down unmanned drones that pose a threat to Japanese airspace. 

By creating an ADIZ that includes the Senkaku Islands, Beijing may believe it has established a basis for challenging and, if necessary, taking action against Japanese aircraft operating in this zone. 

The ADIZ may also signal a Chinese intention to increase flights in the territorial airspace around the disputed islands as a demonstration of its sovereignty and jurisdictional claim. 

China has only flown an aircraft in the territorial airspace around the island once, in February 2013, when a civilian maritime surveillance Y-12 aircraft entered the airspace.
Beijing may also seek to collect and publish data on the number of times that Chinese jets scramble to intercept Japanese fighters that enter into its ADIZ. 

Japan already publishes data on "intrusions" by Chinese and Russian aircraft; China may see benefits in demonstrating to its domestic audience that the party and military are doing their utmost to defend Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity.
China's action exacerbates tensions in ongoing disputes and creating friction in the region where none or little existed. 

It further increases tension in the territorial row between China and Japan at a time when that bilateral relationship is already severely strained. 

Moreover, it heightens the risk of an accident. 

There is a very large overlap between China's ADIZ and Japan's ADIZ. 

When aircraft from either country fly in this overlapping area, the other side is likely to scramble fighters and intercept the intruder. 

If intercepts are not conducted safely and in accordance with international norms, a collision is possible. Recall that in 2001 a Chinese fighter jet that was conducting aggressive intercepts collided with a US surveillance plane, which resulted in the Chinese pilot's death, the forced landing of the US EP-3 on Hainan island where its 24-member crew was held for 11 days, and a crisis in US-China relations.
China's ADIZ also encompasses portions of Ieodo Island and Jeju Island, which are part of South Korea, and overlaps with the Korean ADIZ in a wide swath that is 20 kilometers wide and 115 km long. 

The South Korean government expressed its regret about the Chinese government's decision. 

The newly announced ADIZ also overlaps with Taiwan's ADIZ, prompting the government in Taipei to issue a statement that included a pledge that Taiwan's armed forces would ensure the safety of the country's airspace, and urged all parties to "avoid actions that could escalate confrontation in the region."
Moreover, China's Aircraft Identification Rules make no distinction between aircraft flying parallel with China's coastline through the ADIZ and those flying toward China's territorial airspace. 

Secretary of State Kerry highlighted this issue in his statement, saying that the US "does not apply its ADIZ procedures to foreign aircraft not intending to enter US national airspace," implying that the US would not recognize China's claimed right to take action against aircraft that are not intending to enter its national airspace. 

Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel stated that the US would not change the way it conducts military operations in the region.
Some Chinese may believe that aggressive intercepts against a Japanese aircraft in air space near the Senkakus would not provoke a US response since Washington is neutral on the issue of sovereignty over the islands. 

Secretary Hagel's statement reaffirming that Article V of the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty applies to the disputed islands is important in this regard and should prevent Chinese miscalculation.
At one fell swoop, Beijing's ADIZ decision has injected new problems into its ties with South Korea, Taiwan and the US, further soured relations with Japan, and frightened smaller nations in Southeast Asia. 

It appears that Xi Jinping, who by all accounts has emerged stronger from the recently held Chinese Communist Party Third Plenum, is willing to fan the flames of nationalism so he can ensure the party's popularity as he tackles economic reform at home.

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Japan Takes Airspace Issue to U.N. Agency

By MARTIN FACKLER

NIIGATA, Japan — Seeking broader international support for opposing China’s claims to airspace over the East China Sea, Japan has asked the United Nations agency that oversees civil aviation to look into whether the newly created Chinese air defense zone could endanger civilian airliners, the Foreign Ministry said Saturday.
The ministry said that it submitted a proposal for the agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, to examine whether China’s move could threaten the order and safety of international aviation in the area. Though the organization can make only nonbinding recommendations, Japan appears to be hoping that the heightened international scrutiny will force China to back off its declared intent to control the airspace with military measures if necessary.
China’s new “air defense identification zone” covers a broad section of sea that includes Japanese islands, and overlaps with a zone claimed by Japan since the late 1960s. 

Japan views the zone, which China declared last week, as a new move to gain control of the Senkaku islands.
China has said its new zone would not affect civilian air traffic, and was aimed instead at stopping Japanese military aircraft from entering airspace that it says rightfully belongs to China. 

However, China says that all aircraft, including commercial flights, must submit a flight plan before entering the zone.
While the United States military continues to fly into the zone without notifying China, Obama administration officials said Friday that they were advising American airlines to comply with the Chinese requirement in order to ensure their safety.

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Spat over air space lost on ordinary Chinese

By Jamil Anderlini in Beijing

Captured US jets and wrecked U2 spy planes, permanently grounded at the Military Museum of the Chinese People’s Revolution in west Beijing, offer a stark reminder of the brutal history of the 20th century.
Yet current geopolitical tensions, sparked by China’s unilateral declaration of an “air defence identification zone” over much of the East China Sea, appear to be lost on today’s visitors to the vast museum hangers with their detritus of war.
“I don’t know what you’re talking about; I’ve never heard of such a thing,” said Mr Jie, 40, who was visiting the museum on Sunday from nearby Hebei Province, when asked what he thought of China’s new air defence zone, unveiled by China on November 23.
The new zone’s significance may be lost on Mr Jie but it has rattled China’s neighbours as it overlaps with one established by Japan in the 1960s and because it covers the Japanese Senkaku islands.
Two 19-year-old Beijing men at the museum, asking to remain anonymous, said they had heard about the new zone from state media reports but that those reports lacked detail and had not explained much of the background.
“I’m not so sure why we have set this zone up; maybe it has something to do with the Senkaku islands?” one of the young men speculated, correctly.
Their hazy grasp of the facts is understandable. 

In stark contrast to previous rounds of territorial conflict with Japan or smaller neighbours in the South China Sea, China’s tightly-controlled state media have largely airbrushed the issue from the news agenda.
As a consequence, there have been none of the mass outpourings of anti-Japanese or anti-foreign venom that spilled over into large, government-sanctioned street protests late last year after Tokyo bought some of the uninhabited islands from their private Japanese owner.
On Sunday afternoon, the issue of the new air defence zone did not even rank in the top 30 most popular topics on Sina Weibo, the Chinese equivalent of Twitter, which is blocked by China’s “great firewall” censorship regime.
In the sub-category of current affairs, the topic only made it to number seven on the most popular list. Indeed, the most popular topic in the Weibo current affairs sub-category was a series of newly published details about a domestic aircraft crash that happened in 2010.
Chinese netizens’ lukewarm interest in the subject reflects Beijing’s decision to keep the issue for the most part out of the public eye.
Employees of popular online news sites say they received telephone instructions from propaganda authorities ordering them not to publish any reports on the matter apart from short factual pieces issued by centrally-controlled state media.
An explicit ban was issued on any non-sanctioned reports mentioning the US decision to send B-52 bombers through the newly-established zone.
Over the weekend, state media were far more focused on reporting the imminent launch of China’s first moon landing probe and on Friday, China’s foreign ministry spokesman said the new air defence zone “will not cause regional tensions”, according to state media.
On Sunday, the official Xinhua news agency did report that US airlines have, on advice from the US government, agreed to China’s demands to provide all flight information for aircraft passing through the new zone.
But the report did not mention that the major airlines of Japan and South Korea are refusing to provide that information to Beijing, following instructions from their governments.
Analysts say Beijing appears confident the issue will blow over quickly, leaving it in a stronger position than before since many commercial airlines from other countries have agreed to provide flight information and thereby implicitly acknowledge its claims to the disputed territory.
Even on the diplomatic circuit the issue has had a limited airing.
On Friday, as several uniformed officers of the People’s Liberation Army stood shoulder to shoulder with Japanese and American diplomats at a buffet lunch hosted by the Japanese embassy in Beijing to celebrate the birthday of the Japanese Emperor, there was no hint that their countries could be one mid-air collision away from armed conflict.
Meanwhile, back at the Beijing military museum on Sunday, 26-year-old Beijing native Song Guotao made clear that the relative apathy of ordinary Chinese people towards the latest standoff has nothing to do with a more tolerant attitude toward their neighbours.
“This is our territory and Japan is truly a barbaric country,” he said.
Mr Song said he had learnt a lot about the current tensions over the air defence zone thanks to his searches on the internet rather than from state media.

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China looks to redraw Asian airspace

      

By Demetri Sevastopulo in Hong Kong

When China created a controversial “air defence identification zone” last Saturday, it sparked alarm about the rising risk of Sino-Japanese conflict over the Senkaku Islands.
But while the focus has been on the Japanese chain, China also said in the same statement it “will establish other air defence identification zones at the right moment after necessary preparations are completed”, raising the spectre of tensions spreading across the region.

The Senkaku spat has attracted much attention over the past year because of the potential for war between Asia’s two biggest economies.
But China is engaged in a number of equally contentious territorial disputes with Southeast Asian nations – particularly the Philippines and Vietnam – over the resource-rich South China Sea.
Ian Storey, a security expert at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies in Singapore, said the most obvious candidates for any new Chinese air defence zones were the northern part of the South China Sea and the Yellow Sea.
Chinese maps often include a controversial “nine-dash line” that loops the South China Sea, running close to the coasts of Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia, and stretching south to Indonesia.
It first emerged in a 1947 Republic of China map that was later used by the Communist government of Mao Zedong when it came to power in 1949.
While some Chinese scholars say China does not claim the entire South China Sea, the use of the map has sparked concern among Southeast Asian nations.

China last year started issuing passports that included an image of the “nine-dash line”, provoking angry responses from Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines.
Mr Storey said China would probably not create an ADIZ for the whole South China Sea, saying it would be “absolutely outrageous” if they included the whole area inside the “nine-dash line”.
Instead, he said China was more likely to establish a zone in the northern part of the sea, and particularly surrounding Hainan Island.
Hainan hosts the Chinese navy’s South Sea fleet – one of its three naval fleets – and also a new generation of nuclear submarines that are an increasingly important part of China’s naval capabilities in the South China Sea.
But Mr Storey added that creating an ADIZ over even some of the South China Sea would be “unnecessarily provocative” at a time when China is trying to reduce tensions with its Southeast Asian neighbours.

In October, Chinese President Xi Jinping took advantage of the absence of US President Barack Obama at the Apec summit in Indonesia to launch a charm offensive with Southeast Asian countries, including by floating the idea of creating an “Asian infrastructure bank” to promote development in the region.
Chinese Premier Li Keqiang then embarked on a tour of Southeast Asia that was widely seen as an effort to repair relations.
The creation of an ADIZ over the South China Sea would be unlikely to generate the same kind of military response that occurred this week when the US flew B-52 bombers near the Senkaku without alerting China – mainly because, with the exception of Singapore, most Southeast Asian nations have limited air power.
But Gary Li, a senior analyst at IHS maritime, said a Chinese ADIZ in the northern South China Sea would be “very, very sensitive”.
He said it would almost certainly overlap with Vietnam’s ADIZ, which reaches north to about 100km from Hainan Island, and includes the disputed Paracel Islands.
Mr Li said the Yellow Sea was also a contender for a new Chinese ADIZ.
China has repeatedly criticised the US and South Korea for holding joint military exercises in the Yellow Sea, which lies between east China and the Korean peninsula, and particularly so when the US sails its aircraft carriers through the area.
Wu Shicun, president of the National Institute for South China Sea Studies in Hainan, a think-tank that advises the Chinese foreign ministry, said that while China had the right to create new zones, it would take its time.
“We cannot rule out the possibility of setting up new ADIZs, but not in the short term,” said Mr Wu.
“Given the strong reaction from the international community to the East China Sea ADIZ, China will further evaluate when and how to set up new ADIZs. But it will happen sooner or later, since it is related to its national security.”
Shi Yinhong, an international relations expert at Renmin University, agreed that China was unlikely to create a zone in the South China Sea anytime soon, mainly because Beijing does not see the same urgency, but he said that could change if “confrontations in the South China Sea escalate”.
China and Japan had for decades put the Senkaku dispute to the side.
But Beijing reacted angrily last year when Japan bought three of the islands from their private owner, in a move that sparked anti-Japan protests across China.
Mr Li said China probably decided to create an ADIZ – which other countries such as Japan and the US did long ago – because Tokyo has routinely pointed to the number of Chinese incursions into Japan’s zone as a way to rally public support.
“That caused the Chinese side to say we need to get one too. There is a huge PR war here,” said Mr Li.

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China's Latest Territorial Moves Renew Fears In Philippines

by FRANK LANGFITT

U.S. and Philippine navy personnel patrol the seas off a naval base west of Manila in June as part of joint exercises.

China is flexing its muscles these days. 

Over the weekend, it declared a sprawling air defense identification zone that covers disputed islands controlled by Japan. 

And it has sent its lone aircraft carrier for first-time trials in the South China Sea, where Beijing has territorial feuds with other neighbors, including Vietnam, Brunei and the Philippines.
None of this was making China any friends in Manila, where the Chinese government is particularly unpopular these days.
"It only tends to confirm and reinforce the fears and worries of many people in the region," says Jay Batongbacal, a University of the Philippines law professor, who has spent a decade and a half studying territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 

"Right now, I think they are seen more as a bully, because of the actions that they've taken."
Among those actions was last year's takeover of a disputed and potentially strategic shoal in the South China Sea that had been under Philippine control.
It started when Philippine authorities tried to arrest Chinese they accused of illegally fishing inside the shoal, which is really a shallow, triangle-shaped reef with a small opening at one end. 

China sent marine surveillance ships to block action by a Philippine navy frigate.
"One of the measures that they put in place was to string a line across the mouth of that entrance," says Batongbacal, "because if any vessel tries to cross that line, it will get entangled in the propellers."
The Chinese effectively sealed off the reef from Philippine fishermen and took control of Scarborough Shoal without firing a shot.
The shoal, rich in fish, is about 140 miles from the Philippine mainland and more than 500 miles from China. At high tide, only five rocks stick up out of the water, but Philippine officials worry China might one day declare them Chinese territory.
Batongbacal says in the worst-case scenario — from the Philippine perspective — China could turn the shoal into a safe harbor for Chinese government vessels and a way to extend its influence and power in the region.
"Right now, it's clear that their motivation is that they want to vindicate their claim to the entire South China Sea," Batongbacal says.
A huge amount of trade and oil passes through the South China Sea, which China has claimed since the 1940s. Back then, though, it was militarily too weak to do anything about it. 

Today, China is the world's No. 2 economy and a rapidly rising military power.
Dindo Manhit, president of Stratbase Research Institute, a strategic think tank in Manila, says China now wants to ensure it has a major say in what happens in the South China Sea. 

Like all economic powers, Manhit says, China wants to spread its influence.
"At the end of the day, any economic influence needs to be protected by either strong military or political influence," Manhit says. 

"I think that's where it's coming from."
Chito Santa Romana, who spent nearly four decades living in China where he served as the bureau chief for ABC News, thinks it also comes from a desire to restore China, which means "Middle Kingdom" in Mandarin, to what it sees as its rightful place as a respected global player.
"I would attribute it to what I call the resurgence of the 'Middle Kingdom Complex,' " says Santa Romana, who works in Manila with a think tank, trying to forge understanding on the South China Sea dispute between the two countries. 

"The 'China Dream' that the Chinese talk about, they want to recover the glory that was lost when they were a pre-eminent power."
The U.S. has dominated East Asia militarily for decades, ensuring the peace and security that allowed the region's economies to grow so rapidly. 

The Philippines hopes America will back it up if its dispute with China turns violent, but some worry Washington's deep and complex ties with Beijing will win out in the end.
"We just hope and expect that the U.S. remembers us really as the true ally here," says Manhit, "because some people are saying that in a conflict between China and the Philippines, the U.S. will choose China because of the economic relationship."
Jay Batongbacal, the University of the Philippines law professor, says turning its back on a longtime ally with whom it has a mutual defense treaty would have serious implications for America and its other diplomatic relationships. 

Most people in the Philippines are hoping it never comes to that.

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China, Australia spat over Air Defence Identification Zone highlights 'troubled relations' in region

China's decision to establish an ADIZ is unhelpful, disturbing and cannot be ignored.

By Catherine McGrath
Japanese Maritime Defence Force Murasame Class destroyer JMSDF Murasame (left) and US Navy Arleigh Burke Class destroyer USS Preble sail in company with HMAS Sydney as the three warships participate in officer of the watch manoeuvres in the Pacific Ocean during the lead-up to Exercise Pacific Bond 2013

There is no doubting this is an important week in the rocky history of relations in north Asia and tensions over the disputed islands in the East China Sea.
The turning point came last week when China announced it was establishing an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ), with Japan and the United States quick to react.
Then came Australia. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop called in the Chinese Ambassador for a dressing down and Beijing responded by calling Australia's behaviour irresponsible and mistaken.
Australia's language on China is getting tougher under this Government but arguably so are the strategic circumstances it is dealing with.
From Australia's perspective, China's decision to establish an ADIZ is unhelpful, disturbing and cannot be ignored.

The spat comes at a crucial time because tensions in the East China Sea are as high as any moment in the post-cold war era.
"China is not pleased," Professor Jingdong Yuan, a pro-China activist from the University of Sydney, said.
Professor Yuan believes Australia's decision to call in the Chinese Ambassador was a step too far and that by taking this position Australia can no longer be seen as impartial.
But as far as Australia is concerned China should understand that the timing of its decision is going to be questioned.
Australian Strategic Policy Institute executive director Peter Jennings believes Australia had to say something.
"The application of the ADIZ has not been helpful and is a diplomatic misstep on the part of Chinese," he said. 

"They should not be surprised that countries like Japan, US and Australia have made comments that they are going too far.
"It doesn't mean Australia is taking sides.
"Saying nothing would not be conducive to managing a set of troubled relations in the region," Mr Jennings said.
"The move by China was unhelpful and came at the wrong time. It has created a new tension which no one needs right now. Lower key strategies would have been more useful to adopt at this time." 

Foreign Minister Julie Bishop talked of the need to invigorate the Australian-Japan relationship

China watching Australia's relationship with 'closest friend' Japan
China is also concerned about Australia's growing closeness to Japan under the leadership of Prime Minister Tony Abbott.
While Labor was in power, relations with Japan took a back seat to a focus on growing ties with China, even though Japan and Australia share a very close strategic and defence relationship.
The Abbott Government has made it clear it wants to strengthen ties with Japan it believes have been left behind in recent years.
It is a delicate repositioning because of existing regional tensions and the Abbott Government emphasises the move will no be at the expense of China.
At the East Asia Summit meeting in Brunei in October, Mr Abbott, after his meeting with Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, described Japan as Australia's "closest friend in Asia".
Immediately China started to take notice.
Foreign Minister Julie Bishop is due shortly to travel to China. 

She has already been to Tokyo.
In a Canberra speech in early November, Ms Bishop talked of the need to invigorate the Australian-Japan relationship but emphasized that would not take anything from the relationship with China.
"The relationship with Japan has not had sufficient recognition in recent years as much of the rest of the world shifted focus to China and the extraordinary size and speed of its growth," Ms Bishop said.
"Of course China's rise must be and will be embraced; it is in every nation's interest for China to become even more than it is today.
"However, Australia's friendship with a rising China does not come at the expense of close and longstanding friendships."
There is nothing in these statements for China to complain about, but it is watching Australia to see how this develops.
Australia meantime hopes China understands reinvigorating ties with Japan should not be seen as threatening.

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Japan, South Korean military planes defy China's new defense zone

BY TETSUSHI KAJIMOTO AND JU-MIN PARK

Japanese and South Korean military aircraft flew through disputed air space over the East China Sea without informing China, officials said on Thursday, challenging a new Chinese air defense zone that has increased regional tensions and sparked concerns of an unintended clash.
The move came after Tokyo's close ally Washington defied China's demand that airplanes flying through its unilaterally announced zone identify themselves to Chinese authorities, flying two unarmed B-52 bombers over the islands on Tuesday without informing Beijing.
Tensions have ratcheted up since Beijing's weekend announcement of the zone that includes the skies over islands at the heart of a feud between Japan and China, and its demand that planes flying in the area first notify Chinese authorities.
Japan and the United States have sharply criticized the move, which some experts said was aimed not only at chipping away at Tokyo's control of the Senkaku islands, but also at challenging U.S. dominance in the region.
The United States does not take a position on the sovereignty of the islands but recognizes Tokyo's administrative control and has assured Japan that the U.S.-Japan security pact covers them.
The developments are expected to dominate U.S. Vice President Joe Biden's visit to Japan, China and South Korea next week.
Also on Thursday, China rejected South Korea's demand for the repeal of the zone, but appeared to soften its demand that commercial aircraft tell its military authorities of any plans to transit the area. 

Japan's two biggest airlines have already begun defying that order.
"The East China Sea Air Defence Identification zone is not aimed at normal international flights. We hope that relevant countries' airlines can proactively cooperate, so there is more order and safety for flights," China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Qin Gang told reporters.
Japan's Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga said naval ships and patrol planes have been operating in the East China Sea and would continue to do so.
"They are carrying out surveillance activity as before in the East China Sea, including the zone," Suga told a news conference, adding there has been no particular response from China. 

"We are not going to change this (activity) out of consideration to China," he added.

BEIJING REJECTS SEOUL'S DEMAND
A South Korean official also said a navy reconnaissance plane had flown over a submerged rock in the area claimed by both Beijing and Seoul, and that the flights would continue.
The Ieodo rock is controlled by South Korea, which maintains a maritime research station built on it.

Asked about the South Korean flight, Chinese spokesman Qin only said that Beijing was aware of it.
South Korea's reaction to Beijing's weekend declaration has been somewhat muted, reflecting its efforts to forge closer ties with China.
On Thursday, however, Seoul's vice defence minister told a senior Chinese military official that the move to impose the new rules created military tension in the region and called on Beijing to rectify the zone
"The Chinese reaction was that they will not be accepting the (South) Korean side's demand," Defence Ministry spokesman Kim Min-seok told reporters after talks between Vice Defence Minister Baek Seung-joo and Wang Guanzhong, the deputy chief of general staff of the Chinese People's Liberation Army.

Asked if China would heed Japanese calls to revoke the air defence zone, China's Defence Ministry spokesman Yang Yujun said Tokyo had implemented its own zone in 1969 and blamed it for raising tensions with its double standards.
Japan says it only requires planes headed for its territorial air space to notify authorities, not those merely transiting through its air defence identification zone.

In the ongoing war of words, the policy panel of Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's Liberal Democratic Party approved a resolution on Thursday demanding China rescind the new air defence zone, saying the unilateral move reflected "unreasonable expansionism". 

But the resolution dropped a more inflammatory reference to "premodern and imperialist expansionism" contained in an earlier draft.

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Paper Tiger

China's move to establish air defense zone backfires

By Simon Denyer

BEIJING — It was designed as a forceful response to Japanese assertiveness, and a robust declaration of China’s maritime claims. 

But Beijing’s creation of an air defense zone may have backfired, experts said, after eliciting a strong joint response by the United States and Japan.
Instead of strengthening China’s position, the air defense zone has unsettled and united its neighbors. 

It provided Washington with a perfect opportunity to reassure its Asian allies that it remains committed to maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region.
On Saturday, Beijing said any noncommercial aircraft entering a broad zone over the East China Sea should first identify themselves, and it warned ominously that failure to do so could provoke “defensive emergency measures” by its armed forces. 

The statement heightened an already tense standoff with Japan over several tiny disputed islets in the East China Sea.
But the United States called China’s bluff by sending two warplanes into the zone Tuesday, and Beijing’s response was muted. 

The Defense Ministry merely said it had identified and monitored the planes, while the Foreign Ministry stressed that the zone was purely defensive and offered to strengthen communications with other regional players to maintain peace and security.
“We hope relevant countries do not make too much of a fuss about it, panic and read too much into it,” spokesman Qin Gang said.
Paul Haenle, director of the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy in Beijing, said the mild reaction was surprising. 

“It is almost as though they hadn’t anticipated the U.S. response and didn’t know what to do,” he said.
In Chinese eyes, the standoff began last September, when Tokyo purchased three of the Senkaku islands from a private Japanese landowner. 

In response, Beijing stepped up its own claims to the rocky landmasses, increasing sea patrols and pressing Japan to accept that the territory is disputed.
Japan, like numerous other countries, already has its own air defense identification zone. 

The country increasingly has used the zone as an excuse to warn or intercept Chinese planes in the area, according to military experts in Beijing. 

In September, Japan threatened to shoot down Chinese drones flying over the disputed islands; China warned that downing the drones would constitute an act of war.
The Chinese military had been considering establishing its own air defense zone for some time, and this increased tension may have tipped the balance, experts said.
“Japan has been acting more and more confrontational with regards to the Senkaku islands, so China had to roll out its own measures to balance it out,” said Zhou Yongsheng of the Center for Japanese Studies at the University of International Relations in Beijing. 

“Whenever Chinese aircraft entered Japan’s zone, they would dispatch fighter jets to intercept us, which put us in a very passive position.”
Popular sentiment within Japan and China has also become increasingly hostile toward the other country. Rising nationalism in China is now coupled with genuine concern about the intentions of a more nationalist Japanese government under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. 

His government has raised military spending since coming to power last December.
Zhu Feng, professor of international studies at Peking University, said China had established the air zone to “curb the arrogance of the Abe administration.” 

Zhao Chu, a military affairs columnist, said China was responding to Japan’s more aggressive enforcement of its own zone.
“But the primary cause is that China needs a stronger foreign policy at present because an appeal for that has been gathering momentum in Chinese society for over a decade,” Zhao said. 

“It’s a hawkish voice that now dominates Chinese society.”
Beijing’s actions appear to fit into a recent pattern, experts said. 

Reluctant to be seen as the initial provocateur, China tends to respond forcefully to any provocations from others and to use those provocations to advance its own claims even more strongly.
But China may have overplayed its hand with Saturday’s relatively aggressive Defense Ministry announcement, which appeared to blindside regional neighbors as well as Washington, experts said.
Two cabinet secretaries, Secretary of State John F. Kerry and Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, both made strong statements criticizing the move. 

Vice President Biden will also convey the administration’s concerns when he meets separately with the leaders of Japan, China and South Korea on a week-long trip to Asia starting Sunday, officials said.
Under President Obama, the United States has announced a “strategic rebalancing” — or pivot — toward Asia, a move that many in China see as an attempt to encircle and contain its rise. 

But when Obama, distracted by the federal government shutdown, failed to attend two important summits in Asia last month,doubts surfaced about the depth of the U.S. commitment. 

Biden will try to reassure the leaders of Japan and South Korea during his trip, but this week’s events may already have done the job for him.
Hagel called his Japanese counterpart, Itsunori Onodera, on Wednesday, described China's move as “a potentially destabilizing unilateral action” and commended the Japanese government “for exercising appropriate restraint,” spokesman Carl Woog said in a statement.
Acting on instructions from their government, Japan’s two biggest commercial airlines announced they would not relay plans to fly through the Chinese zone, while Onodera told reporters Wednesday that Japanese Self-Defense Forces jets would continue to operate in the East China Sea, without reporting their flight plans to Beijing.
“This announcement and quick U.S. response have clarified the U.S.’s siding with Japan much more than the past,” said Mathieu Duchatel of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute in Beijing. 

“So there is some degree of miscalculation” by China.

Japan has voiced concern for years about what it sees as China’s increasing maritime aggression, but in recent days those concerns have been echoed by Taiwan and South Korea. 

The anger from South Korea is particularly notable, because Seoul, under President Park Geun-hye, has drawn closer with Beijing while sparring with Japan over historical issues.
On Wednesday, South Korea’s foreign minister, Yun Byung-se, said in a speech that China’s announcement had “made already tricky regional situations even more difficult to deal with.”
In the past few months, China had been working hard to reassure many of its Asian neighbors that its rise not only did not threaten them, but would actually be to their benefit. 

China’s leaders made successful visits to Malaysia, Indonesia and Vietnam and offered billions of dollars in trade and investment. 

Now, those reassurances may look less convincing.
“This will inject a large dose of anxiety and uncertainty into countries in the region about China’s rise,” said Haenle of the Carnegie-Tsinghua institute.
The episode also appears to underline China’s sometimes confusing foreign and strategic policy stance, with the armed forces often adopting more hawkish positions than the Foreign Ministry. 

That, said Haenle, was precisely why President Xi Jinping announced earlier this month that he would establish a new high-level committee to better coordinate national security policy.

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Flight of the B-52s

Joint patrols of the Senkakus would send a stronger message.
The Wall Street Journal

A U.S. Air Force B-52 Stratofortess is being refueled by a KC-135 Stratotanker 

Full credit to the Obama Administration for showing solidarity with Japan as it seeks to defend itself against China's aggression over the Senkaku Islands. 

On Tuesday a pair of B-52s flew unannounced—and unchallenged—through an "air defense identification zone" covering the islands that was unilaterally declared by Beijing late last week. 

Maybe President Obama's pivot to Asia means something after all.
The flight of bombers comes after more than a year of Beijing brinksmanship with Tokyo over the uninhabited Japanese islets, which is designed to change the status quo on the sea and in the air around them. In its response to the flight, the Chinese Foreign Ministry backed down somewhat, saying "we will in accordance with different situations take corresponding reactions." 

But the real test of the air defense zone will come in the next few days or weeks when the People's Liberation Army uses it to challenge Japanese forces as they patrol the Senkakus.
The U.S. can help to deter an armed clash by making more concrete its treaty obligation to assist Japan in defending the islands. 

The best ways to do that are joint sea and air patrols with Japanese forces. 

If Beijing challenges those patrols, it would be taking on both countries at once—a security trip-wire similar to the stationing of U.S. forces on the Korean Peninsula.
This could lead to an eruption of Chinese anger, and the U.S. might pay a short-term price in economic and diplomatic retaliation. 

Washington could pre-empt that to some extent by cancelling next week's visit of Vice President Joe Biden to Beijing. 

But allowing China's aggression to succeed means running a high risk of future conflict, accidental or intentional.
It isn't clear why Chinese leaders are acting belligerently. 

One theory is that they feel their rising economic and military power entitles them to restore the tributary system by which their imperial predecessors dominated East Asia. 

Others think their lack of domestic political legitimacy makes them eager to stir up nationalist sentiment. Maybe it's some combination of the two.
In any case they miscalculated this week by assuming their intimidation would succeed. 

As long as Beijing continues its bullying, the aim of U.S. policy should be to make sure that China's provocations are met with further demonstrations of solidarity and resolve.

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China overplayed its hand on the Senkaku islands

By David Pilling

About a year ago, I was in the office of Albert del Rosario, the foreign minister of the Philippines. 

What, I asked, would Manila say if Shinzo Abe, then running for prime minister of Japan, carried out his pledge to amend the pacifist constitution and “rearm”? (In fact, Japan is already fully armed, but its constitution bars use of force except in self-defence.) 

I fully expected him to reply that this would be a regrettable move. 

Not only would it be enormously provocative to China but memories of the country’s invasion of the Philippines were surely just as raw in Manila as they were in Beijing and Seoul. 

Not a bit of it, he said. 

“We would welcome that very much. We are looking for balancing factors in the region and Japan could be a significant balancing factor.”
Those remarks, echoed by Indonesia’s foreign minister, came back to me this week as China and Japan squared off dangerously over Japan's Senkaku islands in the East China Sea. 

At the weekend, Beijing took many by surprise when it announced the creation of an “air defence identification zone” covering the Senkaku islands.

There is nothing unusual about establishing such a zone. Many countries have them, including Japan and the US. 

Yet the move is provocative because China’s zone overlaps Japan’s. 

From now on, Beijing says, aircraft entering the zone will have to identify themselves to Chinese authorities or face unspecified “emergency defence measures”.
Mr Abe denounced the move, which he said had no legitimacy. 

Washington, too, has strongly objected. 

It sent two B52 bombers across the zone – without telling Beijing in advance – to underline its displeasure. 

Japan’s two main civilian airlines initially complied with the order but, under pressure from Tokyo, resumed flying across the zone on Wednesday without informing Chinese authorities.
China’s aim appears to be to change the facts on the ground – or, in this case, in the air. 

Its new zone challenges Japan’s longstanding de facto control of the islands, which it incorporated into its territory in 1895. 

In the short term, Beijing hopes to force Japan to admit that sovereignty over the islands is in dispute, something it refuses to acknowledge. 

In the longer run, China may seek to drive a wedge between Japan and the US. 

Although Washington takes no position on the islands’ sovereignty, it says they fall under the remit of the US-Japan security treaty. 

That implies it would come to Japan’s aid if the islands were attacked. 

Yet China cannot be the only country to wonder whether Washington would really risk American lives to defend a few barren rocks.
On the face of it, this is a good fight for Beijing to pick. 

One might advise it to do exactly the same as a way of ratcheting up pressure on Japan and advertising its regional ambitions. 

After all, one might argue, there is little love lost for Japan in the region.

Washington is desperate for Seoul and Tokyo to get along. Instead, they are barely on speaking terms. 

Park Geun-hye, the president, has refused to meet Mr Abe until he has developed a “more sincere” attitude towards Japanese history. 

She instead made a high-profile visit to Beijing.
Yet other Asian countries, even ones that suffered at the hands of Japan’s Imperial Army, do not harbour the same bitterness. 

Many of the region’s nations, including the Philippines, Vietnam and India, have become increasingly wary of a rising China as it becomes more assertive about its territorial claims. 

They have encouraged the US to “pivot” back to the region. 

And many of them have edged closer diplomatically to Japan, an important – in some cases, the most important – investor in their economies. 

In an unprecedented diplomatic charm offensive, Mr Abe has visited all 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in his first year in office. 

Japanese companies, backed by the government, have sharply stepped up their presence in Indonesia, the Philippines and Myanmar. 

The latter, until recently firmly in China’s orbit, has slipped out of its diplomatic grasp as it opens up to the west.
The hedging against China is not just commercial. 

Many countries in the region, including the Philippines and Vietnam, are stepping up military co-operation with the US. 

Japan has supplied ships to Manila to patrol waters disputed with China, and is in discussion with Hanoi to do the same. 

Even South Korea has objected strongly to China’s new exclusion zone. 

China’s lack of soft power was on display in the days after Typhoon Haiyan ripped through the Philippines. 

The US sent the USS George Washington, Japan sent 1,000 self-defence troops and plenty of money. China’s initial contribution, a mere $100,000, was widely condemned as petty and mean-spirited.
One could argue that, as China’s economy grows, it is only natural that its regional footprint will also expand, not always to the liking of its neighbours. 

After all, as long ago as the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, the US declared Latin America off-limits to European powers. 

Yet Beijing may be overplaying its hand. 

In Japan, China’s action may make it easier for Mr Abe to scrap a self-imposed ban on collective self-defence or even eventually to ditch the pacifist constitution. 

Whether regional leaders like his nationalistic sentiments or not, many of them will be hoping he does not blink.

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