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Showing posts with label Spratly Islands. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Spratly Islands. Show all posts

Friday, 25 October 2013

A Game of Shark and Minnow

Posted on 04:36 by Unknown
By JEFF HIMMELMAN
In a remote corner of the South China Sea, 105 nautical miles from the Philippines, lies a submerged reef the Filipinos call Ayungin.




In most ways it resembles the hundreds of other reefs, islands, rock clusters and cays that collectively are called the Spratly Islands. But Ayungin is different. In the reef’s shallows there sits a forsaken ship, manned by eight Filipino troops whose job is to keep China in check.


Ayungin Shoal lies 105 nautical miles from the Philippines. 
There’s little to commend the spot, apart from its plentiful fish and safe harbor — except that Ayungin sits at the southwestern edge of an area called Reed Bank, which is rumored to contain vast reserves of oil and natural gas. 
And also that it is home to a World War II-era ship called the Sierra Madre, which the Philippine government ran aground on the reef in 1999 and has since maintained as a kind of post-apocalyptic military garrison, the small detachment of Filipino troops stationed there struggling to survive extreme mental and physical desolation. 
Of all places, the scorched shell of the Sierra Madre has become an unlikely battleground in a geopolitical struggle that will shape the future of the South China Sea and, to some extent, the rest of the world.
In early August, after an overnight journey in a fishing boat that had seen better days, we approached Ayungin from the south and came upon two Chinese Coast Guard cutters stationed at either side of the reef. We were a small group: two Westerners and a few Filipinos, led by Mayor Eugenio Bito-onon Jr., whose territory includes most of the Philippine land claims in the South China Sea. 
The Chinese presence at Ayungin had spooked the Philippine Navy out of undertaking its regular run to resupply the troops there, but the Chinese were still letting some fishing boats through. 
We were to behave as any regular fishing vessel with engine trouble or a need for shelter in the shoal would, which meant no radio contact. 
As we throttled down a few miles out and waited to see what the Chinese Coast Guard might do, there was only an eerie quiet.
Bito-onon stood at the prow, nervously eyeing the cutters. 
Visits to his constituents on the island of Pag-asa, farther northwest, take him past Ayungin fairly frequently, and the mayor has had his share of run-ins. 
Last October, he said, a Chinese warship crossed through his convoy twice, at very high speed, nearly severing a towline connecting two boats. 
This past May, as the mayor’s boat neared Ayungin in the middle of the night, a Chinese patrol trained its spotlight on the boat and tailed it for an hour, until it became clear that it wasn’t headed to Ayungin. 
“They are becoming more aggressive,” the mayor said. “We didn’t know if they would ram us.”
We didn’t know if they would ram us, either. 
As we approached, we watched through binoculars and a camera viewfinder to see if the Chinese boats would try to head us off. 
After a few tense moments, it became clear that they were going to stay put and let us pass. 
Soon we were inside the reef, the Sierra Madre directly in front of us. 
As we chugged around to the starboard side, two marines peered down uncertainly from the top of the long boarding ladder. 
The ship’s ancient communications and radar equipment loomed above them, looking as if it could topple over at any time. 
After a series of rapid exchanges with the mayor, the marines motioned for us to throw up our boat’s ropes. Within a minute or two the fishing boat was moored and we were handing up our bags, along with cases of Coca-Cola and Dunkin’ Donuts that naval command had sent along as pasalubong, gifts for the hungry men on board.
From afar, the boat hadn’t looked much different from the Chinese boats that surrounded it. 
But at close range, water flowed freely through holes in the hull.
With the tropical sun blasting down on it, the ship was ravaged by rust. 
Whole sections of the deck were riddled with holes.
Old doors and metal sheets dotted paths where the men walked, to prevent them from plunging into the cavernous tank space below.
It was hard to imagine how such a forsaken place could become a flash point in a geopolitical power struggle.
But before we had much time to think about that, someone pointed out that the Chinese boats had started to move. 
They left their positions to the east and west of the reef and began to converge just off the starboard side, where the reef came closest to the ship.

Chinese Coast Guard cutters patrol within sight of the Sierra Madre.

The mayor and several others stood quietly on deck, watching them as they came. 
The message from the Chinese was unmistakable: We see you, we’ve got our eye on you, we are here.
As the Chinese boats made their half-circle in front of the Sierra Madre, the mayor mimed the act of them filming us. 
“Wave,” he said. “We’re going to be big on YouTube.”

Dangerous Ground
To understand how Ayungin (known to the Western world as Second Thomas Shoal) could become contested ground is to confront, in miniature, both the rise of China and the potential future of U.S. foreign policy. 
It is also to enter into a morass of competing historical, territorial and even moral claims in an area where defining what is true or fair may be no easier than it has proved to be in the Middle East.
The Spratly Islands sprawl over roughly 160,000 square miles in the waters of the coasts of the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei and China — all of whom claim part of the islands.
Since the 18th century, navigators have referred to the Spratlys as “Dangerous Ground” — a term that captures not only the treacherous nature of the area but also the mess that is the current political situation in the South China Sea.
In addition to the Philippines, the governments of China and Vietnam also claim the Spratlys for themselves, and have occupied some of them as a way to stake that claim. 
Malaysia and Brunei make more modest partial claims.
The Chinese base their claims on Xia and Han dynasty records and a 1947 map made by the Kuomintang. The nine-dash line derived from that map pushes up against the coastlines of all the other countries in the area.
The current Philippine claim is based mostly on the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982, which established an Exclusive Economic Zone of 200 nautical miles off the shore of sovereign states.
Why the fuss over “Dangerous Ground”? 
Natural resources are a big piece of it. 
According to current U.S. estimates, the seabed beneath the Spratlys may hold up to 5.4 billion barrels of oil and 55.1 trillion cubic feet of natural gas. 
On top of which, about half of the world’s merchant fleet tonnage and nearly one third of its crude oil pass through these waters each year. 
They also contain some of the richest fisheries in the world.
In 2012, China and the Philippines engaged in a standoff at Scarborough Shoal, after a Philippine warship attempted to expel Chinese fishing boats from the area, which they claimed had been harvesting endangered species within the Philippine EEZ. 
Although the shoal lies well to the north of the Spratlys, it is in many ways Ayungin’s direct precedent.

The Cabbage Strategy
China is currently in disputes with several of its neighbors, and the Chinese have become decidedly more willing to wield a heavy stick. 
There is a growing sense that they have been waiting a long time to flex their muscles and that that time has finally arrived. 
“Nothing in China happens overnight,” Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt, the director of Asia-Pacific programs at the United States Institute of Peace, said.
“Any move you see was planned and prepared for years, if not more. So obviously this maritime issue is very important to China.”
It is also very important to the United States, as Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton made clear at a gathering of the Association of Southeast Nations (Asean) in Hanoi in July 2010. 
Clinton declared that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was a “national interest” of the United States, and that “legitimate claims to maritime space in the South China Sea should be derived solely from legitimate claims to land features,” which could be taken to mean that China’s nine-dash line was illegitimate. The Chinese foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, chafed visibly, left the meeting for an hour and returned only to launch into a long, vituperative speech about the danger of cooperation with outside powers.
President Obama and his representatives have reiterated America’s interest in the region ever since. 
The Americans pointedly refuse to take sides in the sovereignty disputes. 
But China’s behavior as it becomes more powerful, along with freedom of navigation and control over South China Sea shipping lanes, will be among the major global political issues of the 21st century. 
According to the Council on Foreign Relations, of the $5.3 trillion in global trade that transits the South China Sea each year, $1.2 trillion of it touches U.S. ports — and so American foreign policy has begun to shift accordingly.
In a major speech in Singapore last year, Leon Panetta, then the secretary of defense, described the coming pivot in U.S. strategy in precise terms: “While the U.S. will remain a global force for security and stability, we will of necessity rebalance toward the Asia-Pacific region.” 
He referred to the United States as a “Pacific nation,” with a capital “P” and no irony, and then announced a series of changes — most notably that the roughly 50-50 balance of U.S. naval forces between the Pacific and the Atlantic would become 60-40 Pacific by 2020. 
Given the size of the U.S. Navy, this is enormously significant.
In June, the United States helped broker an agreement for both China’s and the Philippines’s ships to leave Scarborough Shoal peacefully, but China never left. 
They eventually blocked access to the shoal and filled in a nest of boats around it to ward off foreign fishermen.
“Since [the standoff], we have begun to take measures to seal and control the areas around the Huangyan Island,” Maj. Gen. Zhang Zhaozhong, of China’s People’s Liberation Army, said in a television interview in May, using the Chinese term for Scarborough. (That there are three different names for the same set of uninhabitable rocks tells you much of what you need to know about the region.)
He described a “cabbage strategy,” which entails surrounding a contested area with so many boats — fishermen, fishing administration ships, marine surveillance ships, navy warships — that “the island is thus wrapped layer by layer like a cabbage.”
There can be no question that the cabbage strategy is in effect now at Ayungin and has been at least since May. 
General Zhang, in his interview several months ago, listed Ayungin in the P.L.A.’s “series of achievements” in the South China Sea. 
He had already put it in the win column, even though eight Filipino marines still live there. 
He also seemed to take some pleasure in the strategy. 
Of taking territory from the Philippines, he said: “We should do more such things in the future. For those small islands, only a few troopers are able to station on each of them, but there is no food or even drinking water there. If we carry out the cabbage strategy, you will not be able to send food and drinking water onto the islands. Without the supply for one or two weeks, the troopers stationed there will leave the islands on their own. Once they have left, they will never be able to come back.”

‘If You Want to Live, Eat’

On the deck of the Sierra Madre, with morning sun slanting off the bright blue water and the crowing of a rooster for a soundtrack, Staff Sgt. Joey Loresto and Sgt. Roy Yanto were improvising. 
Yanto, a soft-spoken 31-year-old, had lost an arrow spearfishing on the shoal the day before. 
Now he had pulled the handle off an old bucket and was banging it straight with a rusty mallet in an attempt to make it into a spear. 
Everything on the Sierra Madre was this way — improvised, repurposed. 
“Others came prepared,” Loresto said of previous detachments that had been briefed about life on the boat before they arrived and knew they would need to fish to supplement their diet. 
“But we were not prepared.”
For the final touches to the arrowhead, Yanto used a hammer and a rusted, machete-like blade.
They made spearfishing guns from a piece of wood, a bolt repurposed as a trigger and two pieces of rubber for propulsion.
In the afternoons, if the weather was good and the tide was low, they would don snorkels and old goggles and swim around the boat.
A successful spearfishing session meant avoiding barracudas and sharks and gathering a basket full of Philippine grouper known as lapu-lapu.
Yanto lived alone at the stern of the boat, in a room with a bed, a mosquito net, an M-16 propped against the wall and nothing but a tarp wrapped around a steel bar to separate him from the sea. 
He also took care of the three fighting cocks on the boat.
They were lashed to various perches at the stern and took great pleasure in crowing at anybody who tried to use the “toilet,” a seatless ceramic bowl suspended over the water by iron pipes and plywood.
Yanto has a wife and a 6-year-old son back in Zamboanga City. 
Like the others, he is able to talk to his family once a week or so, when they call in to one of the two satellite phones that the men take care to keep dry and charged. 
“It’s enough for me,” he said, of the 5 or 10 minutes he gets on the phone with his family. 
“What’s important is that I heard their voice.”
Like Yanto, Loresto was wearing a sleeveless jersey with “MARINES” printed across the front and a section of mesh between the chest and waistline, uniforms for the world’s most exotic basketball team. 
“It’s a lonely place,” Loresto said.
“But we make ourselves busy, always busy.”
When his arrow was complete, Yanto turned to two tubs covered in plastic, which were filled with fish that he had picked off his line the previous night. 
Fishing lines descended at regular intervals from the port side of the boat, with each soldier responsible for his own; they spend hours tending to them. 
Yanto split the fish open, covered them with salt, then laid them out to dry on a plank hanging above the deck. 
“Good for breakfast,” he said, gesturing to the fish he was putting up.

The men depend on fish as their main means of physical survival.

The men depend on fish — fresh, fried, dried — as their main means of physical survival. 
They were all undernourished and losing weight, even though eating and meal prep were the main activities on board, after fishing. 
Asked what meal he missed most from the mainland, Yanto said, “Vegetables,” without hesitation. 
“That’s more important than meat or any other kind of dish.” 
The motto of the boat, spray-painted on the wall near the kitchen, was “Kumain ang gustong mabuhay” — basically: “If you want to live, eat.”
In the long hours between lunch and dinner, most of the men would disappear into their quarters to pass the time. 
Aside from Yanto and the one Navy seaman on board, who occupied an aerie above everybody else, the marines lived in the old officer’s quarters and on the boat’s bridge. 
When the Sierra Madre was first driven up on the shoal in 1999, it was apparently a desired posting: there was less rust, you could sleep wherever you wanted and people played basketball in the vast tank space below deck. (Now that space was filled with standing water and whatever trash the men threw into it.) 
Aside from the quarters, which were themselves full of leaks and rust, there was hardly any place inside the boat to congregate that wasn’t either a health hazard, full of water or open to the elements. 
In bad weather, they gathered in the communications room on the second floor, where Loresto’s DVD player and computer were kept, to watch movies or sing karaoke. (They were all pretty good, but Yanto stood out. He nailed George Michael’s “Careless Whisper,” down to the vividly emotional hand gestures.) 
If they weren’t at the computer, they were just off to the side, in a small, dark workout area that held an exercise bike (extra resistance supplied by pulling a strap with your hands), an ancient bench press and a bunch of Vietnam-era American communications equipment.

Servicemen Roel Sarucam, Joey Loresto, Charlie Claro, Lionel Pepito, Israel Briguera and Antonio Olayra on the deck of the Sierra Madre.

The Sierra Madre at one time was the U.S.S. Harnett County, built as a tank-landing ship for World War II and then repurposed as a floating helicopter and speedboat hub in the rivers of Vietnam. 
In 1970 the U.S. gave the ship to the South Vietnamese, and in 1976 it was passed on to the Philippines. But nobody had ever taken the time to strip all of the communications gear or even old U.S. logbooks and a fleet guide from 1970.
In good weather, the men socialized outside, under the corrugated-tin roof that sheltered the boat’s small kitchen and living area. 
The “walls” were tarps, repurposed doors, old metal sheets and the backs of storage lockers. 
The “floor” consisted of two large canted metal plates that met in the middle of the boat, suspended above a large void in the deck. 
The plates popped and echoed with deep thuds whenever anybody walked over them. 
Everything was on an incline, so the legs of the peeling-leather couches and tables were sawed to various lengths to square their surfaces. 
A locker at the center, the driest spot on deck, held mostly inoperable electronic equipment and a small television that had a satellite connection but stayed on for only five minutes at a time. 
The men got together in the evenings to watch the Philippine squad make a surprising run in the FIBA Asia basketball tournament, only to be interrupted as the television repeatedly went dark. 
To fix it they had to insert a thin metal wire into a hole in the set and then power the machine off and back on again. 
“Defective,” one of marines said, by way of explanation. 
Loresto smiled and shook his head. “Overuse,” he said.
Loresto was the life of the boat. 
When the men played pusoy dos, a variation of poker, he displayed an impressive and sustained level of exuberance, often plastering the winning card to his forehead, face out, and shouting with laughter. 
He comes from Ipilan, on the island of Palawan. 
He’s 35, with a wife and three children, ages 2, 10 and 12. 
Before this posting, he spent 10 years fighting Islamic extremists in Mindanao, the southernmost island group in the Philippine archipelago. 
Asked whether he preferred combat or the Sierra Madre, Loresto thought for a second and then said, “Combat.”
He also had one of the only real military jobs on the boat, manning the radio and reporting the number and behavior of the boats outside the shoal. 
He was also the one to note and record that a U.S. intelligence plane, a P-3C Orion, tended to fly over the shoal whenever the Chinese made a significant tactical shift.
Loresto regularly updated his “sightings” — a Hainanese fishing vessel there, a Vietnamese one here.
When the Chinese swapped their maritime surveillance boats out for Coast Guard cutters, Loresto took note.
Every four hours, he radioed his reports. 
He didn’t love being there, but he knew why it was necessary. 
“It’s our job to defend our sovereignty,” he said.
One morning, as a Chinese boat circled slowly off the Sierra Madre’s starboard side, Mayor Bito-onon pulled out his computer to deliver a PowerPoint presentation about the various Philippine-held islands in the Spratlys. 
Most of the men had never seen anything like it before, and they gathered eagerly behind the mayor as he sat on a bench and walked them through it. 
Bito-onon was surprised at how little they knew about the struggle that was playing out around them. 
“They are blank, blank,” he told me after the presentation. 
“They don’t even know what’s on the nightly news.”
Other than a couple of jokes about “visiting China without a passport” (i.e., being captured), life at the tip of the gun didn’t feel much like life at the tip of a gun. 
It felt more like the world’s most surreal fishing camp. 
The Chinese boats were always there, but they were a source more of mystery than fear. 
“We don’t know why they’re out there,” Yanto said at one point. 
“Are they looking for us? What is their intention?”
To Bito-onon, the Chinese intentions were clear. 
At breakfast he had said, “They could come take this at any time, and everybody knows it.” 
What would these guys do if that happened? 
He raised both hands, smiled and said, “Surrender.”

Mayor Eugenio Bito-onon Jr. has 288 voting constituents across a domain called the Kalayaan Island Group.

Later, as he sat on the bamboo bench that was his workplace, television-viewing station and bed for five days and nights on the deck of the Sierra Madre, he talked about Ayungin as the staging ground for China’s domination of the Pacific. 
“The Chinese want both the fisheries and the gas. They’re using their fisheries to dominate the area, but the oil is the target.” 
Almost as if on cue, one of the Chinese Coast Guard cutters chased off a fishing boat north of the shoal. 
As the mayor watched, he said that he hoped they wouldn’t do the same to our boat when we tried to leave. “What does that mean for me if they do?” he asked. 
“I can’t even come here or to Pag-asa?” 
Earlier he joked about the headline if the Chinese stopped him: “A Mayor Was Caught in His Own Territory!”

Threadbare Settlements

The official name of the mayor’s domain is the Kalayaan Island Group, which technically encompasses most of the Spratlys but in reality amounts to five islands, two sandbars and two reefs that the Philippines currently controls. 
He has 288 voting constituents, of which about 120 live at any one time on Pag-asa, the only island with a civilian population.

About 120 people live at any one time on Pag-asa, including civilians.

He is a slender, spry man of 57, with a quirky sense of humor that enables him to leaven his criticisms of graft and corruption at the higher levels of the Philippine government with friendly jokes and oblique asides. 
But his frustration with the lack of resources and the lack of political will is obvious. 
The Philippines, he says, has done very little to develop the islands they hold, while Vietnam and Malaysia have turned some of the reefs and islands they occupy into resorts that the Chinese would find much more difficult to justify taking as their own. 
Except for Pag-asa, the Philippines has mustered only the most threadbare of settlements, some even more desolate than Ayungin.
Three days later, we would ride in a small dinghy over the break and up onto the sloped beach of Lawak, 60 nautical miles to the north of the Sierra Madre. 
Like Ayungin, Lawak serves as a strategic gateway to the rich oil and gas reserves of the Reed Bank. 
Unlike Ayungin, Lawak also happens to look like a postcard picture of a deserted-island paradise — a circle of crushed-coral beach enclosing nearly 20 acres of scrub grass, palm trees, a bird sanctuary and a sea-turtle nesting ground.
Second Lt. Robinson Retoriano runs the detachment of 11 worn Filipino troops there. 
Most of the men under his command wear shorts, flip-flops and tank tops, but he led us on a tour of the island in full camouflage, pointing out with pride their recently constructed barracks and a basketball court with a spectator swing made of “drifted things.”

Lawak is a circle of crushed-coral beach enclosing scrub grass, palm trees, 11 worn Filipino troops and one basketball court.

As we sat down in the courtyard, Pfc. Juan Colot, an M-16 slung low off his bony shoulders, whistled to the camp’s domesticated gull, which flew directly into his hands and chirped complacently. 
Retoriano is from Manila, and when we asked what a city boy like him was doing on an island in the middle of the South China Sea, he said, “I’m still wondering myself.”
In some ways, the guys on Lawak were even more isolated than Loresto and Yanto and the others on Ayungin. 
They were not allowed any use of the satellite phones whatsoever, not even for calls from loved ones. 
“It doubles the distance,” Retoriano said. 
To combat the loneliness, Retoriano sometimes gave the marines jobs to do, just to keep them busy. 
In the mornings they got up at 6 to sweep the camp. 
In the afternoons they fixed their hammocks outside, to sleep in the fresh air.
Over the course of a few hours, Retoriano referred to the island as “paradise” several times — which it was, if you focused on its physical beauty and didn’t think of how hard it would be to actually live there. 
And in truth these guys had it better than some of the other detachments — Kota, Parola, Likas, Rizal Reef, Patag — because at least they had ground to live and sleep on.

The settlements on Rizal Reef, Patag and Panata are mostly crude stilted structures over shallow water or small sandbars, with very little room to maneuver and fishing as the sole activity and consolation. 
According to Bito-onon, the troops on Rizal Reef used to tie themselves to empty oil drums when there was particularly bad weather at night, so that if a high sea or an errant piece of ocean debris wiped out the stilts, they’d at least be able to float.
“A lot of Filipino people might not know why we’re fighting for these islands,” Retoriano said as we prepared to leave Lawak. 
“But once you see it, and you’ve stepped on it, you understand. It’s ours.” 
He accompanied us into the water and out to our launch boat, still in full fatigues and big black combat boots, getting drenched up to his chest. 
As he helped me swing up and over the lip of our boat, he said, “I’m glad we didn’t talk much about the sensitive political situation. But if you ask me, I think China is just a big bully.”

‘I’ve Never Seen More White Knuckles’
The Philippines’ best hope for resisting China currently resides inside a set of glassy offices in the heart of the K Street power corridor in Washington. 
There, Paul Reichler, a lawyer at Foley Hoag who specializes in international territorial disputes, serves as the lead attorney for the Philippines in its arbitration case over their claims in the South China Sea. 
Initiated in January, the case seeks to invalidate China’s nine-dash line and establish that the territorial rights be governed by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which both China and the Philippines have signed and ratified. 
The subtleties of the case revolve around E.E.Z.’s and continental shelves, without expressly resolving sovereignty issues. 
China has refused to participate, but the Philippines has proceeded anyway.
The key element, as far as the Sierra Madre is concerned, is that the case is growing to reflect the new reality on the water. 
“Ayungin will be part of the case now, now that the Chinese have virtually occupied it,” Reichler told me. 
He was hoping that the tribunal would define Ayungin as a “submerged feature.” 
A submerged feature, he explained, is considered part of the seabed and belongs to whoever owns the continental shelf underneath it, not to whoever happens to be occupying it. 
“The fact that somebody physically occupies it doesn’t give them any rights,” he said.
This took a second to sink in. 
Historically, the physical presence of troops on the Sierra Madre had been a vital part of the Filipino strategy; currently their presence was the only thing stopping a complete Chinese takeover there. 
Wasn’t that against the Philippines’ own interests? 
“No,” Reichler said. 
“Not if we’re not occupying it.” 
What he meant was that the Philippines wants to nullify any claim to a submerged feature based on who has control above the water — which applies beyond Ayungin to Mischief Reef and others, which the Chinese currently occupy. 
Surely this is a strong legal strategy, calibrated for an international tribunal. 
But if this is the strategy, you couldn’t help wondering what those guys were still doing out there, getting choked off a little bit more each day, while the legal process sought to make them irrelevant.
Mischief, a submerged reef similar to Ayungin and roughly 20 miles to its west, makes for an instructive example. 
It used to belong to the Philippines, but in 1994 the Chinese took advantage of a lull in Filipino maritime patrols caused by a passing typhoon and rapidly erected a stilted structure that they then made clear they were not going to leave. 
Slowly they turned it into a military outpost, over the repeated protests of the Filipinos, and now it serves as a safe harbor for the Chinese ships that patrol Ayungin and other areas.
What China has done with Mischief, Scarborough and now with Ayungin is what the journalist Robert Haddick described, writing in Foreign Policy, as “salami slicing” or “the slow accumulation of actions, none of which is a casus belli, but which add up over time to a major strategic change.” 
Huang Jing, the director of the Center on Asia and Globalization at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy in Singapore, noted that in all of these conflicts — Scarborough, Ayungin — China insists on sending its civilian maritime force, which is theoretically unarmed. 
This has a powerful double significance: first, that the Chinese don’t want to start a war, even though in many ways they are playing the aggressor; and second, that they view any matter in the South China Sea as an internal affair. 
As Huang put it: “What China is doing is putting both hands behind its back and using its big belly to push you out, to dare you to hit first. And this has been quite effective.”

In bringing their complaints to arbitration, the Philippines has used the only real lever it has: to try to occupy the moral high ground and focus international attention on the issue. 
In response, China has tried to isolate the Philippines — discouraging President Benigno S. Aquino III from attending the China-Asean Expo in Nanning last month and continuing to steer the Asean agenda away from a final agreement on a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea. (One former U.S. official told me, “So far, China has been able to split Asean the way you would split a cord of wood.”) 
China has stated that they view the overlapping claims as bilateral issues, to be negotiated between China and each individual claimant one at a time, a strategy that maximizes what China can extract from each party.
While an arbitration outcome unfavorable to the Chinese — which could be decided as early as March 2015 — would create some public-perception problems for them, China is unlikely to be deterred, in part because there is no enforcement mechanism.
“Let’s be honest,” Stephanie Kleine-Ahlbrandt says, “China has essentially studied how the U.S. has conducted its hegemony, and they’re saying, ‘We have to respect some court case?’ They say that the United States blatantly violates international law when it’s in its interest. China sees this as what first-class powers do.” (Multiple requests for comment from the Chinese government went unanswered.)
The official U.S. position, articulated by Secretaries Clinton and Kerry, has been that the U.S. will not take sides in disputes over sovereignty. 
As the assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Daniel R. Russel, told me, “Our primary interest is in maintaining peace, security and stability that allows for economic growth and avoids tension or conflict.” 
Basically, we’re staying out of it. 
But the U.S. has stepped up its joint operations with the Philippines, including a recent mock amphibious landing not far from Scarborough Shoal. 
There has also been talk of increasing U.S. troop rotations into some of its former bases.
“I think we want to find a way to restrain China and reassure the Philippines without getting ourselves into a shooting war,” James Steinberg, the former deputy secretary of state under Hillary Clinton, told me. 
“We have a broad interest in China behaving responsibly. But sovereignty over the Spratly Islands is not our dispute. We need to find a way to be engaged without being in the middle.” 
Kurt Campbell, a former assistant secretary of state with the Obama administration, put it more bluntly: “Maritime territorial disputes are the hardest problem, bar none, that diplomats are currently facing in Asia. On all of these issues, no country has any flexibility. I’ve never seen more white knuckles.”
According to Huang Jing: “Everyone in this region is playing a double game. Ten years ago, the United States was absolutely dominant in the region — economically, politically, militarily. People only had one yardstick to measure their national interest and their foreign policy, and the name of that yardstick was U.S.A. Now there are two yardsticks. On the political one, it’s still the U.S., but on the economic one, it is China.”
The United States does not have the unlimited leverage that it once did, and so for the time being it is allowing the Chinese to slice their salami all the way up onto the shallows of Ayungin.

Beneath a Ceiling of Clouds
The first rains of the typhoon came after dark, howling sideways across the deck of the Sierra Madre. 
We’d been hearing about the storm for a couple of days over the radio, tracking its course as it made landfall on Luzon and then turned west toward the South China Sea.
Under the supervision of Second Lt. Charlie Claro, the 29-year-old commander of the outpost, the men drilled holes in the boards with hand-cranks and pulled old, bent, rusted nails out of stray pieces of wood, hammered them straight, then reused them.
A couple of wooden doors were added to the walls of the living area, and additional tarps went into place.
A ceiling of clouds had lowered and blackened, and the wind began battering parts of the ship’s deck.
Rain poured into the laundry room through the ceiling, drenching everything. 
A rooster took shelter in a dry corner.
By nightfall, the wind had intensified into a gale. 
We gathered in the living area to listen to it, more awed than scared. 
Lieutenant Claro surfaced every so often to make sure that his improvements were holding. 
The rest of the marines stayed inside, singing karaoke. 
Later, they watched the FIBA Asia finals, the Philippines vs. Iran. 
Miraculously, the satellite held for most of the game. 
It felt as if the wind might rip the roof off from above our heads, but the marines were in good cheer. 
A victory for the underdog Philippine squad would have made for a nice David and Goliath moment in a David and Goliath kind of story, but the Iranians appeared to be about nine inches taller at every position and were just too much for the Filipinos. 
At halftime the marines went out to check on whether their fishing lines were surviving the storm, then straggled off to bed.
The next two days passed with wind and rain and long hours with nothing to do. 
Yanto and Loresto led a tour of the cavernous, foul tank space below decks, where old fluorescent light bays hung overhead on dangerously rusted cables.
We started to be able to identify individual marines by their footfalls. 
Jokes that weren’t funny doubled us over. 
At one point, Pfc. Michael Navata walked in from checking his fishing line and said: “Cards. To pass the time.” 
We played hours of pusoy dos, making fun of one another, volume levels rising every time Loresto stuck the two of diamonds on his forehead. 
The slow, steady backbeat of bad weather and desolation fell away for a while, and it felt as if we could have been in Loresto’s living room in Ipilan. 
Yanto sat to my left, coaching me out of charity, his nonverbal instruction registering levels of depth and intelligence that language hadn’t made available to us. 
For a moment we could see them as they really were, these marines: men who were serving their country in an extreme and unrelenting and even somewhat humiliating situation and trying bravely to make the best of it.
On the afternoon of the second bad day, the sun came out. 
Yanto promptly went spearfishing. 
One by one, the other marines stripped down and jumped in. 
This turned into most of us taking turns leaping off the high starboard side of the Sierra Madre, about halfway up the deck, down into the light blue water below. 
You had to pick your way barefoot up to the rusted lip and then, with everybody watching, try to forget that you were on a devastated ancient boat run aground on a reef in the shark-infested South China Sea and just jump. 
It was maybe a 30-foot drop, which took a half-second longer than you expected it to, but the water was warm and clear. 
We splashed around on our backs like otters. 
The storm had passed, and we were safe. 
Lieutenant Claro led a small group in a swim around our fishing boat, which he pronounced seaworthy, but then proceeded to chuckle about for several minutes. 
It was so woeful looking. 
After five days on the Sierra Madre, it was also a reminder of the real world, of how we had gotten there, and of the fact that we’d be leaving soon while these guys had to stay behind and eat to live.

Flying Past the Death Star
A month or so later, I spoke with a U.S. pilot with extensive combat experience and knowledge of Special Forces operations. 
I wanted to know what the American foreign-policy pivot looked like from the inside, and he was willing to tell me only if I didn’t name him. 
“The Chinese are more aggressive because we’re not around,” he said. 
His most recent training would seem to reflect the American rebalancing to the Pacific theater: more counter-Chinese-technology operations, more engagement over water, island-hopping campaigns. 
He said that the joint operations with the Philippines were “a show of presence: Hey, we’re [expletive] sailing through the South China Sea, look at us. And you can’t do a thing about it.” 
But then he paused. “It’s funny, because China’s not that far from doing that off the California coast.”
Whatever America’s pivot might be, there’s no denying that Southeast Asia, and the South Pacific, is historically where United States foreign policy — and too many young men sent out to enforce it — has gone to die. 
For now, the course is a diplomatic one: the Philippines pursues its arbitration, the Asean states apply pressure for a binding code of conduct in the South China Sea, and the United States counsels patience (within reason) and the peaceful resolution of disputes. 
As it turns out, this somewhat scattershot approach may actually be starting to work. 
The Chinese leadership has undertaken a new charm offensive of late, visiting the capitals of some Asean countries (notably not the Philippines) and signaling that it might be willing to soften its positions on adopting a code of conduct and multilateral negotiations.
At the East Asia Summit meetings in Brunei two weeks ago (which John Kerry attended in place of President Obama because of the government shutdown), Kerry pushed for a quick implementation of a binding code of conduct. 
“That’s sort of a new thing,” Ricky Carandang, the secretary of communications for the Philippines, told me when we spoke after the meetings. 
“He said, ‘We welcome a code of conduct, we welcome legal processes and we think these things should happen faster.’ That’s different from saying, ‘Hey, let’s do what we can to avoid tension, and we’re not picking sides here.’ ” 
But Carandang also noted that Obama’s absence in Brunei had allowed the Chinese to loom larger. 
If he fails to show up to the next meeting, or the administration fails to follow up on some of its promises, the Southeast Asian nations will have cause to wonder about our resolve. (Obama is said to be mulling a trip to Asia in the spring.)
Nobody is questioning China’s resolve. 
The day after we left Ayungin, we arrived at the island of Pag-asa, the mayor’s home base and the place for which he has the grandest plans — a resort, a commercial fishery, a sheltered port. 
As we pulled in, we saw several large Chinese fishing boats a couple of miles off the island. 
Aerial photos would later confirm that they were cutting coral from the reef, which is often done to harvest giant clams and other rare species. 
Nobody on Pag-asa, with its broken boats, low-slung civilian buildings and quiet Air Force base, could do anything about it. 
There was recently a food shortage because the last two Filipino naval resupply vessels haven’t been able to make the trip because of inclement weather. 
After a night there, rather than getting back on our fishing boat for a 30-hour journey, we were happy to board a Philippine naval plane and begin the trip home.
We sped down the bumpy, grass-covered runway and lifted off, looking down on the ragtag island.
Just 12 nautical miles from Pag-asa and its airstrip lies Subi Reef, one of the more developed Chinese settlements in the South China Sea.
Anchored just outside the reef were about 20 enormous Chinese fishing boats, along with 50 or so smaller sampans busily working.
At the southwest corner sat a complex of concrete multistory structures, including a large-domed radar station, a helipad and a dormitory.
It’s easy to make China out as the villain in all of this. 
Most Western narratives do, even though several U.S. government officials assured me that there weren’t truly any “good guys” in these territorial disputes. 
One benefit of China’s political system, whatever its problems, is its farsightedness, its ability to stomach intense upheaval in the present in order to achieve a long-term goal.
Subi was a result of this commitment. 
After spending a few days on Pag-asa, where everything is free but nothing works quite like it’s supposed to, it was hard not to see Subi reef as the Death Star.
An hour later, we flew over Lawak, where we’d met Lieutenant Retoriano. 
Soon after, the pilot asked Ashley Gilbertson, the photographer on our trip, to put his headset on. 
We were due north of Ayungin, and our pilot had radioed the guys on the Sierra Madre to see how they were doing. 
Loresto answered the call, and when he heard that we were on the plane, he asked to speak with us. Gilbertson put on the headset and smiled as broadly as he’d smiled since the night Loresto fleeced us at pusoy dos during the typhoon. 
The weather was good, Loresto said; they were going spearfishing that afternoon. Didn’t we want to come down and join them? 
There was animated talk about karaoke, and then Loresto signed off. 
It was obviously the last time that we would ever talk to him, or maybe that any Filipino would ever be at that radio post to talk to anybody like us.
The entire world has an interest in the South China Sea, but China has nearly 1.4 billion mouths and a growing appetite for nationalism to feed, which is a kind of pressure that no other country can understand. What will happen will happen, whatever the letter of the Asean code of conduct or however the arbitration turns out. 
Loresto and Yanto, meanwhile, still abide on the Sierra Madre, fishing for their subsistence and watching the surf to see what wave the Chinese will choose to ride in on.
“You’ve got the wrong science-fiction movie,” one former highly placed U.S. official later told me, when I described what we saw at Subi, and what it might mean for the guys on Ayungin. 
“It’s not the Death Star. It’s actually the Borg from ‘Star Trek’: ‘You will be assimilated. Resistance is futile.’ ” 
The scholar Huang Jing put it another, more organic way. “The Chinese expand like a forest, very slowly,” he said. 
“But once they get there, they never leave.”
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Posted in Ayungin Shoal, Cabbage Strategy, Chinese aggression, code of conduct, East Sea, Kalayaan island group, Philippines, Reed Bank, salami slicing, Scarborough Shoal, Second Thomas Shoal, Sierra Madre, Spratly Islands | No comments

Historical Fiction: China’s South China Sea Claims

Posted on 02:04 by Unknown
China uses folklore, myths, and legends, as well as pseudohistory, to bolster greater territorial and maritime claims. Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region.
By Mohan Malik

The Spratly Islands—not so long ago known primarily as a rich fishing ground—have turned into an international flashpoint as Chinese leaders insist with increasing truculence that the islands, rocks, and reefs have been, in the words of Wen Jiabao, “China’s historical territory since ancient times.”
Normally, the overlapping territorial claims to sovereignty and maritime boundaries ought to be resolved through a combination of customary international law, adjudication before the International Court of Justice or the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, or arbitration under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 
While China has ratified UNCLOS, the treaty by and large rejects “historically based” claims, which are precisely the type Beijing periodically asserts. 
On September 4, 2012, China’s foreign minister, Yang Jiechi, told US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton that there is “plenty of historical and jurisprudence evidence to show that China has sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters.”
As far as the “jurisprudence evidence” is concerned, the vast majority of international legal experts have concluded that China’s claim to historic title over the South China Sea, implying full sovereign authority and consent for other states to transit, is invalid. 
The historical evidence, if anything, is even less persuasive. 
There are several contradictions in China’s use of history to justify its claims to islands and reefs in the South China Sea, not least of which is its polemical assertion of parallels with imperialist expansion by the United States and European powers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. 
Justifying China’s attempts to expand its maritime frontiers by claiming islands and reefs far from its shores, Jia Qingguo, professor at Beijing University’s School of International Studies, argues that China is merely following the example set by the West. 
“The United States has Guam in Asia which is very far away from the US and the French have islands in the South Pacific, so it is nothing new,” Jia told AFP recently.
China’s claim to the Spratlys on the basis of history runs aground on the fact that the region’s past empires did not exercise sovereignty. 
In pre-modern Asia, empires were characterized by undefined, unprotected, and often changing frontiers. The notion of suzerainty prevailed. 
Unlike a nation-state, the frontiers of Chinese empires were neither carefully drawn nor policed but were more like circles or zones, tapering off from the center of civilization to the undefined periphery of alien barbarians. 
More importantly, in its territorial disputes with neighboring India, Burma, and Vietnam, Beijing always took the position that its land boundaries were never defined, demarcated, and delimited. 
But now, when it comes to islands, shoals, and reefs in the South China Sea, Beijing claims otherwise. 
In other words, China’s claim that its land boundaries were historically never defined and delimited stands in sharp contrast with the stance that China’s maritime boundaries were always clearly defined and delimited. Herein lies a basic contradiction in the Chinese stand on land and maritime boundaries which is untenable. 
Actually, it is the mid-twentieth-century attempts to convert the undefined frontiers of ancient civilizations and kingdoms enjoying suzerainty into clearly defined, delimited, and demarcated boundaries of modern nation-states exercising sovereignty that lie at the center of China’s territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries. 
Put simply, sovereignty is a post-imperial notion ascribed to nation-states, not ancient empires.
China’s present borders largely reflect the frontiers established during the spectacular episode of eighteenth-century Qing (Manchu) expansionism, which over time hardened into fixed national boundaries following the imposition of the Westphalian nation-state system over Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Official Chinese history today often distorts this complex history, however, claiming that Mongols, Tibetans, Manchus, and Hans were all Chinese, when in fact the Great Wall was built by the Chinese dynasties to keep out the northern Mongol and Manchu tribes that repeatedly overran Han China; the wall actually represented the Han Chinese empire’s outer security perimeter. 
While most historians see the onslaught of the Mongol hordes led by Genghis Khan in the early 1200s as an apocalyptic event that threatened the very survival of ancient civilizations in India, Persia, and other nations (China chief among them), the Chinese have consciously promoted the myth that he was actually “Chinese,” and therefore all areas that the Mongols (the Yuan dynasty) had once occupied or conquered (such as Tibet and much of Central and Inner Asia) belong to China.
China’s claims on Taiwan and in the South China Sea are also based on the grounds that both were parts of the Manchu empire. (Actually, in the Manchu or Qing dynasty maps, it is Hainan Island, not the Paracel and Spratly Islands, that is depicted as China’s southern-most border.) 
In this version of history, any territory conquered by “Chinese” in the past remains immutably so, no matter when the conquest may have occurred.
Such writing and rewriting of history from a nationalistic perspective to promote national unity and regime legitimacy has been accorded the highest priority by China’s rulers, both Nationalists and Communists. 
The Chinese Communist Party leadership consciously conducts itself as the heir to China’s imperial legacy, often employing the symbolism and rhetoric of empire. 
From primary-school textbooks to television historical dramas, the state-controlled information system has force-fed generations of Chinese a diet of imperial China’s grandeur. 
As the Australian Sinologist Geremie Barmé points out, “For decades Chinese education and propaganda have emphasized the role of history in the fate of the Chinese nation-state... While Marxism-Leninism and Mao Thought have been abandoned in all but name, the role of history in China’s future remains steadfast.” So much so that history has been refined as an instrument of statecraft (also known as “cartographic aggression”) by state-controlled research institutions, media, and education bodies.
China uses folklore, myths, and legends, as well as pseudohistory, to bolster greater territorial and maritime claims. 
Chinese textbooks preach the notion of the Middle Kingdom as being the oldest and most advanced civilization that was at the very center of the universe, surrounded by lesser, partially Sinicized states in East and Southeast Asia that must constantly bow and pay their respects. 
China’s version of history often deliberately blurs the distinction between what was no more than hegemonic influence, tributary relationships, suzerainty, and actual control. 
Subscribing to the notion that those who have mastered the past control their present and chart their own futures, Beijing has always placed a very high value on “the history card” (often a revisionist interpretation of history) in its diplomatic efforts to achieve foreign policy objectives, especially to extract territorial and diplomatic concessions from other countries. 
Almost every contiguous state has, at one time or another, felt the force of Chinese arms—Mongolia, Tibet, Burma, Korea, Russia, India, Vietnam, the Philippines, and Taiwan—and been a subject of China’s revisionist history. 
As Martin Jacques notes in When China Rules the World, “Imperial Sinocentrism shapes and underpins modern Chinese nationalism.”
If the idea of national sovereignty goes back to seventeenth-century Europe and the system that originated with the Treaty of Westphalia, the idea of maritime sovereignty is largely a mid-twentieth-century American concoction China has seized upon to extend its maritime frontiers. 
As Jacques notes, “The idea of maritime sovereignty is a relatively recent invention, dating from 1945 when the United States declared that it intended to exercise sovereignty over its territorial waters.” 
In fact, the UN’s Law of the Sea agreement represented the most prominent international effort to apply the land-based notion of sovereignty to the maritime domain worldwide—although, importantly, it rejects the idea of justification by historical right. 
Thus although Beijing claims around eighty percent of the South China Sea as its “historic waters” (and is now seeking to elevate this claim to a “core interest” akin with its claims on Taiwan and Tibet), China has, historically speaking, about as much right to claim the South China Sea as Mexico has to claim the Gulf of Mexico for its exclusive use, or Iran the Persian Gulf, or India the Indian Ocean.
Ancient empires either won control over territories through aggression, annexation, or assimilation or lost them to rivals who possessed superior firepower or statecraft. 
Territorial expansion and contraction was the norm, determined by the strength or weakness of a kingdom or empire. 
The very idea of “sacred lands” is ahistorical because control of territory was based on who grabbed or stole what last from whom. 
The frontiers of the Qin, Han, Tang, Song, and Ming dynasties waxed and waned throughout history. 
A strong and powerful imperial China, much like czarist Russia, was expansionist in Inner Asia and Indochina as opportunity arose and strength allowed. 
The gradual expansion over the centuries under the non-Chinese Mongol and Manchu dynasties extended imperial China’s control over Tibet and parts of Central Asia (now Xinjiang), Taiwan, and Southeast Asia. Modern China is, in fact, an “empire-state” masquerading as a nation-state.
If China’s claims are justified on the basis of history, then so are the historical claims of Vietnamese and Filipinos based on their histories. 
Students of Asian history know, for instance, that Malay peoples related to today’s Filipinos have a better claim to Taiwan than Beijing does. 
Taiwan was originally settled by people of Malay-Polynesian descent—ancestors of the present-day aborigine groups—who populated the low-lying coastal plains. 
In the words of noted Asia-watcher Philip Bowring, writing last year in the South China Morning Post, “The fact that China has a long record of written history does not invalidate other nations’ histories as illustrated by artifacts, language, lineage and genetic affinities, the evidence of trade and travel.” 
Unless one subscribes to the notion of Chinese exceptionalism, imperial China’s “historical claims” are as valid as those of other kingdoms and empires in Southeast and South Asia. 
China laying claim to the Mongol and Manchu empires’ colonial possessions would be equivalent to India laying claim to Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Malaysia (Srivijaya), Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka on the grounds that they were all parts of either the Maurya, Chola, or the Moghul and the British Indian empires.
China’s claims in the South China Sea are also a major shift from its longstanding geopolitical orientation to continental power. 
In claiming a strong maritime tradition, China makes much of the early-fifteenth-century expeditions of Zheng He to the Indian Ocean and Africa. 
But, as Bowring points out, “Chinese were actually latecomers to navigation beyond coastal waters. For centuries, the masters of the oceans were the Malayo-Polynesian peoples who colonized much of the world, from Taiwan to New Zealand and Hawaii to the south and east, and to Madagascar in the west. Bronze vessels were being traded with Palawan, just south of Scarborough, at the time of Confucius. When Chinese Buddhist pilgrims like Faxian went to Sri Lanka and India in the fifth century, they went in ships owned and operated by Malay peoples. Ships from what is now the Philippines traded with Funan, a state in what is now southern Vietnam, a thousand years before the Yuan dynasty.”
And finally, China’s so-called “historic claims” to the South China Sea are actually not “centuries old.” 
They only go back to 1947, when Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government drew the so-called “eleven-dash line” on Chinese maps of the South China Sea, enclosing the Spratly Islands and other chains that the ruling Kuomintang party declared were now under Chinese sovereignty. 
Chiang himself, saying he saw German fascism as a model for China, was fascinated by the Nazi concept of an expanded Lebensraum (“living space”) for the Chinese nation. 
He did not have the opportunity to be expansionist himself because the Japanese put him on the defensive, but cartographers of the nationalist regime drew the U-shape of eleven dashes in an attempt to enlarge China’s “living space” in the South China Sea. 

































First map with the so-called “eleven-dash line” fabricated in 1947 by the Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist government. 

Following the victory of the Chinese Communist Party in the civil war in 1949, the People’s Republic of China adopted this cartographic coup, revising Chiang’s notion into a “nine-dash line” after erasing two dashes in the Gulf of Tonkin in 1953.
Since the end of the Second World War, China has been redrawing its maps, redefining borders, manufacturing historical evidence, using force to create new territorial realities, renaming islands, and seeking to impose its version of history on the waters of the region. 
The passage of domestic legislation in 1992, “Law on the Territorial Waters and Their Contiguous Areas,” which claimed four-fifths of the South China Sea, was followed by armed skirmishes with the Philippines and Vietnamese navies throughout the 1990s. 
More recently, the dispatch of large numbers of Chinese fishing boats and maritime surveillance vessels to the disputed waters in what is tantamount to a “people’s war on the high seas” has further heightened tensions. 
To quote commentator Sujit Dutta, “China’s unmitigated irredentism [is] based on the theory that the periphery must be occupied in order to secure the core. [This] is an essentially imperial notion that was internalized by the Chinese nationalists—both Kuomintang and Communist. The current regime’s attempts to reach its imagined geographical frontiers often with little historical basis have had and continue to have highly destabilizing strategic consequences.”
One reason Southeast Asians find it difficult to accept Chinese territorial claims is that they carry with them an assertion of Han racial superiority over other Asian races and empires. 
Says Jay Batongbacal of the University of the Philippines law school: “Intuitively, acceptance of the nine-dash line is a corresponding denial of the very identity and history of the ancestors of the Vietnamese, Filipinos, and Malays; it is practically a modern revival of China’s denigration of non-Chinese as ‘barbarians’ not entitled to equal respect and dignity as peoples.”
Empires and kingdoms never exercised sovereignty. 
If historical claims had any validity then Mongolia could claim all of Asia simply because it once conquered the lands of the continent. 
There is absolutely no historical basis to support either of the dash-line claims, especially considering that the territories of Chinese empires were never as carefully delimited as nation-states, but rather existed as zones of influence tapering away from a civilized center. 
This is the position contemporary China took starting in the 1960s, while negotiating its land boundaries with several of its neighboring countries. 
But this is not the position it takes today in the cartographic, diplomatic, and low-intensity military skirmishes to define its maritime borders. 
The continued reinterpretation of history to advance contemporary political, territorial, and maritime claims, coupled with the Communist leadership’s ability to turn “nationalistic eruptions” on and off like a tap during moments of tension with the United States, Japan, South Korea, India, Vietnam, and the Philippines, makes it difficult for Beijing to reassure neighbors that its “peaceful rise” is wholly peaceful. 
Since there are six claimants to various atolls, islands, rocks, and oil deposits in the South China Sea, the Spratly Islands disputes are, by definition, multilateral disputes requiring international arbitration. 
But Beijing has insisted that these disputes are bilateral in order to place its opponents between the anvil of its revisionist history and the hammer of its growing military power.
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Posted in Chinese aggression, Chinese cartographic aggression, East Sea, Great Han Chauvinism, Han hegemony, historical fiction, maritime sovereignty, paracel islands, Spratly Islands, Treaty of Westphalia, UNCLOS | No comments

Monday, 21 October 2013

Philippines and Vietnam in the South China Sea

Posted on 05:49 by Unknown
Of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the South China Sea – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988
By Lucio Blanco Pitlo III and Amruta Karambelkar

Among the claimants and littoral states of the South China Sea (SCS), the Philippines and Vietnam have been the most vocal in expressing their alarm and concern over growing Chinese assertiveness in this strategic and resource-rich regional commons.
Because of their power asymmetry vis-à-vis China, which has the most extensive claims to the SCS, Manila and Hanoi have been supporters of the U.S. pivot to Asia, to balance against Beijing’s growing maritime power projection, while also using diplomatic outreach to cultivate as many supporters as possible.
The Philippines has been bolstering its defense and maritime law enforcement with the help of the U.S. and Japan.
Vietnam is meanwhile relying on its traditional partners – India and Russia – as additional cushions against possible excesses of China’s rise to power in the region.
Both countries are also seeking support from ASEAN.
The SCS dispute took a notable turn when Philippines went to UN arbitration to challenge China’s nine-dashed line.
The claimants had to that point sought to manage the dispute through regional mechanisms and bilateral talks. Not surprisingly, then, Manila’s move has irked Beijing, which has been insistent on not internationalizing the dispute.
While it may be premature to assess Manila’s strategy at this stage, it is interesting to examine the factors that led to parallels, as well as variances, in the strategies taken by Manila and Hanoi via-à-vis China’s increasing assertiveness in the SCS.
Vietnam’s strategies are shaped by its history, economy and geographical proximity with China.
Vietnam’s economy is highly reliant on its trade and investments with China and this dependency limits Vietnam’s actions.
Yet of all the disputants, it is Vietnam that has lost the most ground to China in the SCS – the Paracels in 1974 and part of the Spratlys (Johnson South Reef and Fiery Cross Reef) in 1988.
Hence, Hanoi has many axes to grind against China in the SCS.
Both countries have also contested offshore blocks each has awarded to foreign energy players and have traded accusations of arrests and harassment of their fishermen.
However, alongside these clashes are positive milestones such as the demarcation of their common land boundary, establishment of a joint fishing zone in Tonkin Gulf and more recently the creation of a fishery hotline that could greatly aid in mitigating “incidents” at sea arising from overlapping fishing grounds.
As two socialist countries with a history of competition and cooperation (they were Cold War and Vietnam War allies), many channels, official and semi-official, including Party-to-Party talks, have served as platforms to ensure that tensions are kept at manageable levels and not allowed to affect other aspects of bilateral relations, notably trade and investment.
In fact, just recently, the two countries signed 12 agreements to enhance bilateral cooperation in the areas of trade, infrastructure, energy and maritime affairs, and set up a working group to look into joint exploration in SCS.
This status quo would seem to be an achievement of Chinese diplomacy, mitigating conflict with Vietnam at a time when Beijing is embroiled in another dispute with the Philippines, likewise over the SCS.
When it comes to Vietnam, China would seem to have employed the right strategy at the right time.
Bilateral relations therefore appear unhindered despite the territorial and maritime disputes, giving Vietnam little motivation to do what the Philippines has done, and challenge Beijing’s claims before an international body.
Of course, Vietnam has continued to raise the SCS in ASEAN forums.
It is also trying to improve relations with the U.S., and is consulting with the Philippines on mutual concerns. Although Vietnam has shown some support for Manila’s move to arbitrate, this backing is unlikely to graduate to a united Hanoi-Manila front versus Beijing.
Again, Hanoi is constrained in its options for dealing with Beijing, and cannot afford a bold stand, save for fiery rhetoric.
It will continue to express its dissatisfaction with China through the likes of the ASEAN Regional Forum, which serves as an international outlet given the participation of extra regional powers.
Meanwhile, like other ASEAN countries, and especially those with SCS claims, Vietnam will watch closely the outcome of Manila’s arbitration bid and may reshape its strategies accordingly.
Given Manila’s legal challenge, it can be argued that the Chinese leadership may be more willing to compromise with Hanoi just to isolate Manila and prevent the creation of a united front against Beijing’s sweeping SCS claims.
The Philippines’ SCS strategy, meanwhile, is motivated by a perceived Chinese westward push at its expense.
Despite long administering the largest features in the Spratlys, Manila’s military capabilities are limited.
The occupation of Mischief Reef came about two years after the removal of the U.S. bases, and marked the point at which the much talked-about “China threat” became a reality.
Since then, Beijing has intensified its fortifications and naval presence in the area.
As a militarily disadvantaged state, Manila’s fallback rested on its 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty with the U.S..
But warming Sino-U.S. relations, especially on the economic front, may put limits on what Manila can expect from its traditional ally.
The fear that a Sino-U.S. understanding on the SCS, wherein Washington tacitly acquiesces to Beijing consolidating its position in the semi-enclosed sea, may also become an emerging consideration, making it imperative for the Philippines to diversify its security partners to give it more room for independent action. Nonetheless, the U.S. remains important to the Philippines for trade and security, despite the ups and downs in relations.
Manila closed the U.S. bases in Subic and Clark in 1991 but allowed U.S. forces to come back in 1999 through the Visiting Forces Agreement, and has since been a major ally in the war against terrorism.
Manila is a natural partner in Washington’s rebalancing strategy.
The Philippines is also strengthening ties with Japan, which has its own disputes with China, in the East China Sea.
 This power web can help the Philippines absorb retaliatory measures from China, and as such may have emboldened Manila to take a stand against Beijing.
It might therefore be said that power arrangements and alignments dictate the strategies of Vietnam and the Philippines.
Moreover, in contrast to Vietnam, the Philippines does not have a large trade and investment dependency with China, as the U.S. and Japan are still its primary primary trade and aid partners.
True, Sino-Philippine economic ties have been growing, and certainly the Philippines felt the effects of China’s decision to curb banana imports and block tourism.
However, the comparatively low level of economic engagement means that Chinese economic sanctions are not enough to make Manila bend, at least for now.
For instance, the Philippines has been able to offset the loss of the Chinese market for its bananas by exporting to the U.S.
Nevertheless, the rise of China and relative decline of the U.S. will continue to cast a long shadow over the SCS.
Although some ASEAN countries have welcomed the U.S. rebalancing, most have developed deep economic ties with China over the years.
The SCS thus has the potential to become a divisive issue within the regional grouping.
This creates the impression among some Philippine leaders that ASEAN may no longer be a reliable or effective forum for engaging China on the SCS issue.
Countries that have traditional and unresolved disputes with China, like Japan and India, may extend some support to smaller SCS claimants, but their commitment when push comes to shove remains to be seen.
The SCS has strategic, security, economic and political importance for both the Philippines and Vietnam. Both countries see their claimed SCS areas as vital elements of national security, important trade channels, traditional fishing grounds and a source of indigenous offshore energy resources, not to mention as integral components of their territory.
However, particular historical, economic and politico-security considerations have prompted the two countries to develop divergent SCS strategies, especially in terms of dealing with China.
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Posted in ASEAN, Chinese aggression, East Sea, paracel islands, Philippines, pivot to Asia, Spratly Islands, vietnam | No comments

Saturday, 19 October 2013

Relations with South-East Asia: Being there

Posted on 07:05 by Unknown
With the superpower otherwise engaged, China makes hay in South-East Asia
The Economist

HUNDREDS of thousands lined the streets of Vietnam’s capital on October 13th as Li Keqiang, China’s prime minister, arrived for a three-day visit. 
They were not there for him, though. 
It was a state funeral for Vo Nguyen Giap, a legendary general, second only to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam’s pantheon of national heroes. 
Indeed, many Vietnamese found the timing of Mr Li’s arrival rather offensive and thought that he should have postponed it to avoid intruding on their grief. 
“Disrespectful” and “arrogant” were two adjectives used. 
“Typical” was another.
Unperturbed, Mr Li (pictured above, left) was able to portray his meeting with his Vietnamese counterpart, Nguyen Tan Dung (above, right), as a “breakthrough”. 
It capped a fortnight of high-level Chinese diplomacy in South-East Asia, intended to repair ties frayed in recent years by China’s extensive and disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea.
Xi Jinping, China’s president and leader of the Communist Party, visited Indonesia, Malaysia and the summit of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation forum (APEC). 
Mr Li attended a summit in Brunei with leaders of the ten-member Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and went on to Thailand. 
That Barack Obama was due at both APEC and ASEAN, but withdrew because of the budget stand-off in Washington, gave the Chinese leaders’ tours even more prominence.
Vietnam is the ASEAN country where suspicion of China is strongest. 
After centuries of animosity and a brief, bloody war in 1979, a territorial dispute still simmers, the most extensive of the four China has with ASEAN members in the South China Sea (the others being Brunei, Malaysia and the Philippines). 
Not only do both China and Vietnam claim the Spratly Islands to the south, but Vietnam regards itself as having been illegitimately evicted from the Paracel islands to the north, when China seized them in 1974 from the dying regime of the former South Vietnam. 
Confrontations over fishing and oil and gas exploration are frequent.
Yet in June, during a visit to China by Vietnam’s president, Truong Tan Sang, the two countries signed a new “strategic partnership”. 
China is Vietnam’s largest trading partner—not even counting a flourishing illegal trade over the border—as it is for ASEAN as a whole. 
Mr Li’s breakthrough was to go further in parking the territorial dispute so that it does not get in the way of other business. 
He even agreed to a “maritime co-operation” work group.
In China, this helped smother unpleasant memories of 2010, when, at a meeting in Hanoi, Hillary Clinton, America’s secretary of state at the time, waded into the South China Sea dispute, declaring an American “national interest” in it. 
China blames American interference for emboldening Vietnam and the Philippines to stand up to it over the sea. 
Now China Daily, an official newspaper, has quoted a Chinese analyst: “Hanoi has already realised that it is unrealistic to count on Washington to give public support to its claims on some islands.”
That analysis is a stretch. 
But Mr Li’s tour, like Mr Xi’s, was a reminder of how big a regional power China has become, and of how absent Mr Obama was. 
Everywhere they displayed their economic clout. 
In Thailand, for example, Mr Li delighted the government by offering help in two areas of self-inflicted economic harm, by agreeing to buy more rice and rubber. 
Mr Xi had already floated the idea of a Chinese-led “Asian infrastructure bank” to help meet one of the region’s most pressing needs. 
In Brunei, Mr Li had earlier proposed a new treaty with ASEAN, to realise his vision of a “diamond decade” in its relations with China.

Not that alluring
If this was a charm offensive, however, one ASEAN country still gets the offence without the charm. 
China is incensed that the Philippines is challenging its ill-explained, expansive claim in the South China Sea at the international tribunal of the United Nations’ law of the sea. 
It suits China to try to isolate the Philippines. 
Vietnamese scholars, however, say their government is fully aware of this—and has not ruled out joining the Philippines’ legal action.
A few weeks of diplomatic activity have not changed the fundamental reality—that South-East Asia looks to China as its main trading partner and America as the prime guarantor of its security. 
They have, however, heightened a perception that power in the region is shifting. 
A commentary in the Jakarta Post, an English-language newspaper in Indonesia, argued bluntly that “it is China, not the United States, who is the leader of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century.” 
Pointing to Mr Obama’s no-show and the government shutdown, it concluded that his “much touted ‘pivot’ to Asia feels more like a pirouette with an overemphasis on military engagement.”
The Chinese press is happy to foster the impression of a power shift, taking the argument beyond South-East Asia.
Its official news agency, Xinhua, published a commentary calling for a “de-Americanised world”.
It argued that, with the possibility of a sovereign default by the superpower, “such alarming days when the destinies of others are in the hands of a hypocritical nation have to be terminated.”
That notion attracts some sympathy in South-East Asia but few would want an American-led international order to give way to one dominated by China. 
Some Vietnamese officials thought the criticism of the timing of Mr Li’s visit to Hanoi was unfair. 
After all, he was there in time to offer condolences at a time of national grief. 
But it is not just in Vietnam that many are prepared to think the worst of Chinese motives.
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Posted in APEC, Chinese diplomacy, East Sea, paracel islands, Philippines, Southeast Asia, Spratly Islands, strategic partnership, vietnam | No comments

Monday, 14 October 2013

San Francisco Treaty and the South China Sea

Posted on 05:26 by Unknown
By Masahiro Matsumura

OSAKA – Territorial and maritime disputes among China and several Southeast Asian countries are roiling the South China Sea region with little prospect of resolution anytime soon.
The current uneasy status quo may be tenable so long as the parties embrace serious confidence-building measures through multilateral forums while maintaining effective deterrence vis-a-vis China and a commitment not to use offensive force.
Naturally China is eager to exclude interference by extraregional great powers, particularly the United States, preferring bilateral negotiations with weaker regional claimants that it can more easily dominate. 
Extraregional powers, however, cite the United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea — specifically, the freedom of navigation and the right of innocent passage — to justify their involvement.
Given that the South China Sea disputes stem from overlapping claims to “exclusive economic zones” — not open ocean — the U.N. convention is not entirely relevant.
But another international agreement does provide some guidance for settling these disputes: the San Francisco Peace Treaty, which entered into force in 1952 and officially ended World War II in the Asia-Pacific region.
Under the treaty, Japan renounced its sovereignty claims over the Spratly and the Paracel Islands but did not reassign them to any single country. 
As a result, these islands remain legally under the collective custody of the treaty’s 48 other parties — including two claimants to the islands, the Philippines and Vietnam.
China — then in the third year of Mao Zedong’s rule — was not even invited to participate in the peace conference. 
Although Mao’s communists had clearly won the civil war and secured control of China, the conference organizers disagreed about which government — Mao’s People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Beijing or Chiang Kai-shek’s Republic of China (ROC) in Taipei — truly represented China. 
As a result, the PRC denies that it is legally bound by the treaty.
But the treaty applies to the PRC indirectly through the ROC-Japan bilateral peace treaty of 1952, which was signed just hours before the San Francisco Treaty and reaffirmed its terms — especially Japan’s renunciation of Taiwan.
Indeed, the San Francisco Treaty required that the ROC-Japan treaty be consistent with it, thereby preventing Japan from assigning in its treaty with the ROC any additional right or title to any country other than the parties to the San Francisco Treaty.
As a result, Japan is unable to recognize Taiwan as part of PRC sovereign territory.
To be sure, the San Francisco Treaty, per se, is not legally binding for the PRC. 
But for Japan, the PRC has clearly succeeded the ROC in Taiwan, as demonstrated by the 1972 Japan-PRC Joint Communique, on the basis of the bilateral Treaty of Peace and Friendship that was concluded six years later. 
When Japan shifted its diplomatic recognition from the ROC to the PRC, it recognized the latter as the “sole legal government of China.”
Given that Japan was not recognizing China as a new state — international recognition of the Chinese state had existed without interruption since the ROC government emerged in 1912 — the PRC effectively accepted the rights and obligations of the previous government.
Moreover, Japan did not recognize Taiwan as part of China on the grounds that doing so would infringe on its obligations under the San Francisco Treaty. 
While Japan fully “understood” and “respected” the PRC’s declaration that Taiwan was an “inalienable” part of its territory, it did not recognize the claim in accordance with international law. 
The two countries simply agreed to disagree over Taiwan’s legal status.
In other words, Japan renounced Taiwan without reassigning it.
To date, China has been silent about the implications of the San Francisco Treaty with regard to its claims in the South China Sea. 
This may simply reflect a dearth of international legal expertise in this field or the state of China’s segmented, stove-piped policy communities.
It could also stem from concerns that using the treaty’s legal reasoning, which conflicts with China’s stance on Taiwan, to resolve today’s territorial disputes would undermine its credibility and position.
If left unchecked, China may use the South China Sea disputes to gain effective hegemony over weaker claimants. 
All parties to the disputes, including China, can cite geographic and historical connections to the islands to back their claims, but none of them has solid legal title under the San Francisco Treaty.
The U.S. and other extra-regional powers should take advantage of this fact, invoking their latent collective custody of the Spratly and the Paracel Islands in accordance with the San Francisco Treaty, and internationalize separate bilateral diplomatic processes between China and regional claimants.
The treaty’s parties could even hold a conference to deliberate on the matter. 
Given that it would exclude China, such a discussion alone would be a game changer.
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Posted in Chinese aggression, East Sea, freedom of navigation, japan, paracel islands, San Francisco Treaty, Spratly Islands, UNCLOS | No comments

Sunday, 22 September 2013

Quan hệ Trung Quốc - Philippines rơi tự do và dấu hiệu lạ ở Biển Đông

Posted on 23:47 by Unknown
Hồng Thủy

75 khối bê tông Trung Quốc đổ móng công sự ngoài Scarborough bị phát hiện hôm 2/9, theo Bộ Quốc phòng Philippines.
Hạm đội Nam Hải, Trung Quốc đổ bộ, tổ chức chào cờ bất hợp pháp tại bãi ngầm James phía Nam quần đảo Trường Sa, chỉ cách bờ biển Malaysia 80 km.

Trong khi cộng đồng quốc tế đang đổ dồn sự chú ý vào Syria thì hòa bình ở châu Á trong suốt 3 thập kỷ vẫn từ từ trượt dốc. 
Với những diễn biến gần đây trên Biển Đông có vẻ như là dấu hiệu cho thấy một tương lai kém ổn định hơn trong khu vực, Michael Mazza, một nhà nghiên cứu chính sách đối ngoại - quốc phòng thuộc Viện Doanh nghiệp Mỹ nhận xét.
Mối quan hệ Trung Quốc - Philippines đang trong tình trạng rơi tự do. 
Cuối tháng 8 Bắc Kinh đã yêu cầu Tổng thống Philippines Aquino hủy bỏ một chuyến đi dự hội chợ Trung Quốc - ASEAN thường niên tại Nam Ninh, Quảng Tây mặc dù Philippines là "khách mời danh dự" năm 2013.
Đầu tháng này, Bộ Quốc phòng Philippines công bố bằng chứng cho thấy Trung Quốc đang chuẩn bị bỏ móng công sự ngoài bãi cạn Scarborough.
Nếu bằng chứng của Bộ Quốc phòng Philippines là đúng nó sẽ đánh dấu một hành động của Bắc Kinh vi phạm trắng trợn Tuyên bố về ứng xử của các bên trên Biển Đông (DOC) mà Trung Quốc đã ký với ASEAN năm 2002, Manila sau đó đã triệu hồi Đại sứ tại Trung Quốc về nước để tham vấn tình hình.
Trung Quốc không phải bên duy nhất đang cố tình xây dựng bất hợp pháp trên vùng lãnh thổ tranh chấp ở Biển Đông. Đài Loan gần đây cũng cho thấy những hoạt động tương tự.
Quan hệ giữa Đài Loan với Philippines cũng trở nên căng thẳng trong năm nay sau vụ Philippines bắn chết ngư dân Đài Loan xâm nhập vùng biển Philippines đánh bắt trái phép.
Trong khi đó Đài Bắc đã công bố kế hoạch xây dựng bất hợp pháp một cầu cảng mới trên đảo Ba Bình, Trường Sa (mà Đài Loan chiếm đóng bất hợp pháp của Việt Nam) để cung cấp nơi neo đậu cho các tàu khu trục hải quân.
Đồng thời Đài Loan còn đang lên kế hoạch tài chính nâng cấp một đường băng xây dựng bất hợp pháp trên đảo Ba Bình cũng như việc tìm cách đẩy mạnh hoạt động các dự án (thăm dò, khai thác trái phép) năng lượng ở Trường Sa.
Một dấu hiệu bất thường đáng chú ý hơn nữa ở Biển Đông, gần đây nhất vào cuối tháng 8 Malaysia đã cho thấy một sự chia rẽ mới ở Biển Đông khi đưa ra cách tiếp cận của riêng họ đối với Trung Quốc.
Trong một cuộc phỏng vấn, Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng Malaysia nói rằng: "Chỉ vì bạn có kẻ thù, điều đó không có nghĩa kẻ thù của bạn cũng là kẻ thù của tôi" và cho rằng các cuộc tuần tra bất hợp pháp của Trung Quốc trong vùng lãnh thổ tranh chấp không phải "mối đe dọa đáng chú ý".
Đây là một động thái bất ngờ bởi các tàu hải quân Trung Quốc đã áp sát bờ biển Malaysia chỉ cách 80 km khi đổ bộ bất hợp pháp lên bãi ngầm James phía Nam quần đảo Trường Sa chỉ mới vài tháng trước.
Theo Michael Mazza điều này cho thấy ASEAN khó có thể hình thành một mặt trận thống nhất về các vấn đề hàng hải nên Trung Quốc thừa cơ tiếp tục trì hoãn tiến trình đàm phán ký kết bộ Quy tắc ứng xử của các bên trên Biển Đông (COC), một thỏa thuận sẽ ngăn chặn Bắc Kinh cố tình thay đổi hiện trạng trong vùng biển tranh chấp theo hướng có lợi cho mình.
Hạm đội Nam Hải, Trung Quốc đổ bộ, tổ chức chào cờ bất hợp pháp tại bãi ngầm James phía Nam quần đảo Trường Sa, chỉ cách bờ biển Malaysia 80 km.
Hơn nữa, trong lúc Mỹ còn đang cố gắng để tái khẳng định sự hiện diện của mình trong khu vực Biển Đông thông qua đàm phán với Manila để thiết lập sự hiện diện quân sự của Mỹ tại Philippines, Bắc Kinh đã nhìn thấy thời cơ tranh thủ lấn tới trong tham vọng bành trướng lãnh thổ trên Biển Đông hiện nay.
Người Trung Quốc có thể đang nghĩ rằng họ sẽ lợi dụng lúc tranh tối tranh sáng khi Mỹ còn chưa kịp quay trở lại Biển Đông để chiếm những gì có thể chiếm, làm những gì có thể làm.
Trung Quốc đã cho thấy sự bành trướng sức mạnh cơ bắp ở Biển Đông sớm hơn nhiều so với thời điểm chính quyền Obama công bố xoay trục chiến lược sang châu Á - Thái Bình Dương, sự chậm chạp của Mỹ trong cách tiếp cận với việc xoay trục chiến lược có thể khuyến khích Bắc Kinh có những hành động mà trục chiến lược của Mỹ muốn ngăn chặn.
Khi tình hình Syria đã ngày càng trở nên rõ ràng, các câu hỏi hóc búa về địa chính trị hiếm khi phát triển đơn giản.
Biển Đông đã trải qua một mùa hè "nóng bỏng" và đáng lo ngại, và tình hình Biển Đông sẽ còn diễn biến phức tạp và tiếp tục "nóng" khi đã bước sang mùa thu.
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Posted in Chinese aggression, East Sea, Malaysia, Philippines, Scarborough Shoal, Spratly Islands, Trường Sa | No comments
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  • Code 204
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  • Comite de Apoyo al Tibet
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  • Command: Modern Air/Naval Operations
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  • Croesus of Lydia
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  • cyber espionage campaign
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  • Decrypt Weibo
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  • democracy
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  • denunciations
  • depression
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  • Deutsche Bank
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  • DF-31A
  • Dharamsala
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  • Dining for Dignity
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  • Diru
  • disanzhe
  • disappearance
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  • discrimination
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  • Doan Van Vuon
  • doctored picture
  • doctors
  • Document No. 9
  • dogfight
  • dollar-denominated debt
  • domestic turmoil
  • Dongguan
  • Dorje Draktsel
  • drinking water
  • Driru
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  • drone technology
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  • drones
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  • due diligence
  • Dumex
  • duty free shops
  • dysfunctional America
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  • dysprosium
  • E-2C Hawkeye
  • e-commerce site
  • earthquakes
  • East Asia
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  • East Asian Summit
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  • East Turkestan Islamic Movement
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  • EB-5 visa
  • eBay
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  • economics professor
  • economy
  • editor in chief
  • education
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  • eight-year probe
  • electric irons
  • Elephant Hunting
  • embezzlement
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  • emigration
  • Empire of Lies: The Truth About China in the XXI Century
  • Employing Land-Based Anti-Ship Missiles in the Western Pacific
  • Empress Dowager Cixi: The Concubine Who Launched Modern China
  • Empress in the Palace
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  • endemic corruption
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  • Energias de Portugal
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  • English name
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  • exoplanets
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  • extravagant lifestyles
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  • Ezra F. Vogel
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  • fabricated facts
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  • Falun Gong
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  • FDA
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  • Feitian Moutai
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  • forced evictions
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  • foreign business
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  • foreign news bureaus
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  • foreign press
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  • foreign reporting
  • foreign-exchange reserves
  • forgeries
  • Framework Agreement on Increased Rotational Presence and Enhanced Defense Cooperation
  • Frank Wolf
  • fraud
  • free markets
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  • freedom
  • Freedom House
  • freedom of expression
  • freedom of navigation
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  • freedom of religion
  • Freedom on the Net
  • FreeWeibo
  • French
  • Friedrich A. Hayek
  • fruit-juice manufacturers
  • Fujian
  • Fuling
  • Fullmark Consultants
  • Fundacion Casa del Tibet
  • Futenma Base
  • Fuzhou
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  • Galkynysh
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  • garbage
  • gas masks
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  • gastrointestinal bleeding
  • gay rights activist
  • Gazprom
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  • General Political Department
  • genocide
  • genocide charges
  • genuine universal suffrage
  • George Macartney
  • George Osborne
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  • German-designed engines
  • ghettoization
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  • giant bronze tribute
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  • Gion district
  • GitHub
  • GlaxoSmithKline
  • GlaxoSmithKline Plc
  • Global Hawks
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  • Global Slavery Index
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  • glow-in-the-dark pork
  • Golden Passport
  • Goldman Sachs
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  • GONGO
  • google
  • Google Inc
  • google.com.hk
  • governance
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  • government surveillance
  • Grace Geng
  • Great Firewall
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  • Great Han Chauvinism
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  • Greatfire
  • GreatFire.org
  • Greece
  • greed
  • group confessions
  • GSK
  • Gu Kailai
  • guangdong
  • Guangzhou
  • Guangzhou National Sex Culture Festival
  • guanxi
  • guanyao
  • Guidebook for Civilised Tourism
  • Guo Feixiong
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  • gutter oil
  • Guy Sorman
  • H-6K
  • H.I.V. infections
  • hacking attacks
  • Halloween decorations
  • Hamas
  • Han hegemony
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  • harassment
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  • hardball tactics
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  • Heathrow Airport
  • heavy environmental damage
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  • hydroelectric power
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  • IBM
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  • ideological rectification
  • idioms
  • Ieodo
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  • imminent collapse
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  • independent judiciary
  • india
  • India-China border
  • Indian press
  • indictment
  • indiscriminate killing
  • inefficiency
  • infant formula
  • influence peddling
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  • Information Technology Agreement
  • inhumane persecutions
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  • Inner Mongolia
  • innovation
  • INS Vikramaditya
  • INS Vikrant
  • INS Viraat
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  • instant messaging apps
  • Intercontinental Hotel
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  • interest rates
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  • International Campaign for Tibet
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  • International Court Of Justice
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  • international law
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  • international politics
  • International POPs Elimination Network
  • international relations issue
  • international ridicule
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  • International Space Station
  • international trade
  • internet
  • internet access
  • Internet censorship
  • Internet control
  • Internet crackdown
  • Internet freedom
  • Internet idioms
  • internet monitors
  • internet opinion analysts
  • internet rumours
  • internet thought police
  • Interpol
  • intimidation
  • investigative stories
  • investment bankers
  • investors
  • iPhone
  • iPhone app
  • IQAir
  • irreparable environmental harm
  • irresponsible spending
  • Irvine Shipbuilders
  • Isa Yusuf Alptekin
  • Islamic Jihad
  • Israel
  • Israeli security official
  • Itsunori Onodera
  • J-11
  • J-11B
  • J-15
  • J-31 Falcon Hawk
  • J.P. Morgan
  • Jakarta
  • James Murdoch
  • japan
  • Japan Air Self-Defense Force
  • Japan Airlines
  • Japan Airlines Co.
  • Japan Bank of International Cooperation
  • Japan-China war
  • Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee
  • Japan’s Civil Aviation Bureau
  • Japan's lower house
  • Japanese airlines
  • Japanese carmakers
  • Japanese lawmakers
  • Japanese manufacturers
  • Japon
  • Jasmine Revolution
  • JF-17
  • Ji Jianye
  • Ji Yingnan
  • Jia
  • Jia Zhangke
  • Jiang Zemin
  • Jiangsu
  • Jiangyin
  • Jiaxing
  • jihadis
  • Jim Chanos
  • Jimmy Kimmel
  • Jimmy Kimmel Live!
  • Jimmy Lai
  • Jīn Píng Méi
  • Jin Xide
  • jinü
  • JL-2 missile strike
  • jobs
  • Joe Biden
  • John Kerry
  • joint patrols
  • jokes
  • Jonathan Greenert
  • journalists
  • JP Morgan
  • JPMorgan Chase
  • JPMorgan Chase & Co.
  • Julie Bishop
  • Julie Keith
  • Jung Chang
  • Junheng Li
  • Justin Trudeau
  • Kalayaan island group
  • Karicare
  • Kashagan oil field
  • Kashgar
  • Kazakhstan
  • Kempinski Hotel
  • Kepler telescope
  • keyword censorship
  • kidney failure
  • kids
  • kill everyone in China
  • Kmart store
  • kowtow
  • KPMG
  • Kun Huang
  • Kunming
  • Kyoto
  • Kyrgyz workers
  • Kyrgyzstan
  • L-3
  • labor costs
  • labor force
  • labor violations
  • Labrang Monastery
  • lack of coordination
  • lack of transparency
  • LACM
  • Ladakh
  • Lake Beijing
  • land seizures
  • land shortages
  • land-based anti-ship cruise missiles
  • lanthanum
  • Lanzhou New Area
  • Laos
  • lax environmental controls
  • lax food-safety standards
  • layoffs
  • LDOZ
  • lead
  • leadership role
  • leading space polluter
  • Lee Teng-hui
  • Leed International Education Group
  • left-over woman
  • legal warfare
  • legitimacy
  • Lei Zhengfu
  • Leninist corporatism
  • letter of remorse
  • LG Group
  • LG U+
  • LGFV
  • Li Jianli
  • Li Keqiang
  • Li Peng
  • liaison
  • Liang Chao
  • Lianwo 连我
  • Liaoning
  • lies
  • life sentence
  • life-size female dolls
  • Lijia Zhang
  • Lily Chang
  • Lin Xin
  • Line
  • Line application
  • Line of Actual Control
  • line-cutting
  • littering
  • Little Red Book
  • Liu Tienan
  • Liu Xia
  • Liu Xianbin
  • Liu Xiaobo
  • Liu Yazhou
  • Liverpool
  • Lloyds Registry Canada
  • local government debt
  • local government financing vehicles
  • Lockheed Martin
  • locusts
  • lonely Chinese male
  • long-range land attack cruise missile
  • long-range missile defense system
  • Lost in Thailand
  • loudness
  • Louis Vuitton
  • love lives
  • low Earth orbit
  • low-quality tourists
  • loyalty
  • Lu Xun
  • Lunar Defense Obliteration Zone
  • lung cancer
  • Luo Yang
  • lust
  • luxury
  • luxury brands
  • luxury goods
  • luxury goods industry
  • luxury watches
  • LVMH
  • mafia state
  • magnetic powders
  • mainland Chinese
  • mainland dogs
  • Malawi
  • Malaysia
  • malware
  • Mandiant
  • Mao Tse-tung
  • Mao Zedong
  • Mao's Great Famine
  • Maoism
  • Maoist restoration
  • Maoist techniques
  • Maotai
  • map application
  • marine archaeology
  • maritime disputes
  • maritime security cooperation
  • maritime sovereignty
  • Mark Stokes
  • market reforms
  • market stabilization
  • Masanjia Labor Camp
  • mass line
  • mass line rectification campaign
  • mass shootings
  • massive disaster
  • massive online censorship
  • Mattel
  • Matthew Winkler
  • Mauritania
  • Mead Johnson
  • media independence
  • media self-censorship
  • media warfare
  • medical conflicts
  • medical research
  • medicines
  • mega-dams
  • Meiji Holdings
  • Mekong
  • Mekong River
  • melamine
  • Melissa Chan
  • mercury
  • Mersey river
  • Michael A. Turton
  • Michael Forsythe
  • microbloggers
  • microblogging
  • Mid-Autumn Festival
  • Middle East oil
  • Middle School Number Eight
  • Mig-29K
  • migrant worker
  • migrant workers
  • Mike Forsythe
  • military alliance
  • military dominance
  • military occupation
  • milk powder products
  • minimum deterrent military capacity
  • mining industry
  • minyao
  • miracle cure
  • mirror sites
  • mirrored version
  • misallocation of capital
  • misogyny
  • missile defense system
  • missiles
  • mixed marriages
  • mob boss
  • modern slavery
  • modernization strategy
  • MolyCorp Inc.
  • monopoly on rumors
  • mooncakes
  • moral victory
  • Morgan Stanley
  • Mount Fuji
  • Mowa
  • Mowa Village
  • multinationals
  • multiple-unit ownership
  • Munk School of Global Affairs
  • murder
  • Murong Xuecun
  • Museum of Contemporary Art
  • mutual suspicion
  • MV-22 Osprey
  • Nagchu
  • names
  • Nanjing
  • NASA
  • National Arts Centre orchestra
  • National Broadband Network
  • National Court
  • National Day
  • National Endowment for Democracy
  • national habit
  • national holiday
  • National Intelligence Council
  • National Museum of China
  • National Museum of the Philippines
  • national security
  • National Shipbuilding Procurement Strategy
  • NATO
  • natural gas
  • naval exercise
  • naval secrets
  • Nazi Germany
  • Nazi-era Germany
  • neo-Maoist rhetoric
  • nepotism
  • Nestle
  • New Century Global Centre
  • New Citizens Movement
  • New Citizens' Movement
  • New Citizens’ Movement
  • New Horizon Capital
  • new reserve currency
  • new rich
  • new type of great-power relations
  • New York Times
  • news distributor
  • news terminals
  • news war
  • Next Media Animation
  • Ni Yulan
  • Niger
  • Nigerians
  • Nike
  • Nikki Aaron
  • nine haves
  • nine-dash line maritime grab
  • Ningguo
  • No Exit From Pakistan: America’s Troubled Relationship With Islamabad
  • No. 8 Middle School
  • Nobel Peace Prize
  • Nomura Holdings Inc.
  • North Korea
  • nose-picking
  • nouveau riche
  • Novatek
  • novel
  • nuclear “countervalue” strategy
  • nuclear attacks
  • nuclear option
  • nuclear strikes
  • nuclear submarines
  • nuclear war
  • nuclear-armed missile submarines
  • Nutricia
  • Nyoma air strip
  • obligations
  • OECD
  • official rumors
  • oil deals
  • one-child policy
  • online dissent
  • online rumor-mongering
  • online rumors
  • OPEC
  • Open Constitution Initiative
  • OpenDoor
  • Operation Aurora
  • Operation Beebus
  • oppression
  • oppressive occupier
  • orbital debris
  • Ordos
  • organ donations
  • organ harvesting from prisoners
  • organ transplants
  • organised prostitution
  • outlandish names
  • outrage
  • overcapacity
  • overseas agricultural project
  • P-3C Orion
  • P-8 Poseidon
  • Pacific Defense Quadrangle
  • Pacific operational geography
  • paintings
  • Pakistan
  • Palestinian terror groups
  • Panchen Lama
  • paper tiger
  • paracel islands
  • paranoid authoritarian government
  • Park Geun-hye
  • party discipline and purity
  • Party Plenum
  • Party's Third Plenum
  • patients’ anger
  • Patriot air defense systems
  • patriotism
  • patriotism campaign
  • Paul Mooney
  • Paul Reichler
  • payment defaults
  • pedophilia
  • Peel Group
  • Peel Holdings
  • peinü
  • Peking
  • Peking University
  • Peking University Cancer Hospital
  • Peng Ming
  • Periplaneta americana
  • Perry Link
  • persecution
  • personal liberty
  • pet food
  • Peter Humphrey
  • Pfizer
  • Pfizer Inc.
  • Phiblex
  • Philippines
  • Photoshop
  • Phuket International Airport
  • physical abuses
  • physical assaults
  • pig trotters
  • Ping An
  • PISA
  • pivot to Asia
  • pivot to Eurasia
  • PLA Navy
  • PLA's National Defence University
  • placebo effect
  • PM 2.5
  • PM2.5
  • poison jerky treats
  • poisonous baby milk
  • police interference
  • police state
  • political corruption
  • political education sessions
  • political freedom
  • political persecution
  • political prisoners
  • political reform
  • political struggle sessions
  • political trust
  • political warfare
  • pollution
  • Poly International Auction company
  • poor behaviour
  • population growth
  • Portland
  • Portugal
  • positivist science
  • potential brides
  • power
  • power struggle
  • Powerful Sex Shop
  • Pranab Mukherjee
  • PRC’s candidacy
  • premature deaths
  • premodern and imperialist expansionism
  • press event
  • press freedom
  • price fixing
  • price-fixing accusations
  • prices
  • princeling
  • Princeton University Press
  • prisoner of conscience
  • pro-democracy manifesto
  • Probe International
  • professional body double
  • profitable industry
  • Program for International Student Assessment
  • Program of International Student Assessment
  • Project 2049 Institute
  • Project Seascape
  • propaganda
  • property bubble
  • property bubbles
  • prostitution
  • protest
  • protests
  • pseudoscience
  • psychological warfare
  • public apology
  • public money
  • public opinion
  • public opinion analysts
  • public skepticism
  • publishing houses
  • Pudong
  • puffer fish
  • qi
  • Qi Baishi
  • Qiao Shi
  • Qihoo 360 Technology Co. Ltd.
  • Qing Dynasty
  • Qing Quentin Huang
  • Qiu Xiaolong
  • quad tiltrotor
  • quantitative easing
  • Quotations from Chairman Mao
  • race
  • Ramada Plaza
  • RAND Corporation
  • rare earth elements
  • Raytheon
  • RCMP
  • re-education
  • re-education through labor
  • Reagan National Defense Forum
  • real estate prices
  • real-estate investments
  • real-name registration
  • Reaper
  • Rebiya Kadeer
  • reckless government spending
  • recklessness
  • reconciliation
  • recovery efforts
  • Red Cross Society of China
  • Red Guards
  • red restoration
  • Reed Bank
  • reeducation through labor
  • reform struggle
  • refurbished Soviet-era vessel
  • regional A2/AD alliance
  • regional security
  • regional security architecture
  • regional stability
  • regional status quo
  • Rei Mizuna
  • rejection of orthodoxy
  • relief effort
  • relief supplies
  • religious repression
  • Ren Zhiqiang
  • RenRen
  • replica
  • reporting
  • repression
  • repressive Web controls
  • reproductive health
  • repugnance
  • residency visa
  • resistance to China
  • resolution
  • resource scarcity
  • responsible state
  • restorative surgery
  • Reuters
  • Reuters Chinese website
  • reverse engineering
  • Revolution to Riches
  • rich Chinese offenders
  • rights activists
  • rising costs
  • rising labor costs
  • risk of conflict
  • rivalry
  • river pollution
  • river systems
  • rivers
  • Rob Hutton
  • Robert Ford
  • Robert Menendez
  • Rosneft
  • rotten apples
  • RQ-4 Global Hawk
  • rule of law
  • rumormongers
  • Rupert Murdoch
  • Russell Hsiao
  • Russia
  • Russian defense technology
  • ruthless tyranny
  • sabotage
  • Sakashima Islands
  • salami slicing
  • Salween
  • Sam Wa
  • Sam Wa Resources Holdings
  • Samsung
  • San Francisco Treaty
  • San Leandro
  • Sao Tome and Principe
  • Sarah Cook
  • SARS epidemic
  • satire
  • scam artists
  • Scarborough Shoal
  • schoolgirl
  • schoolteacher
  • SCO
  • sculpture
  • sea row
  • Sears
  • SEC
  • second island chain
  • Second Thomas Shoal
  • second-class citizens
  • secret salvage
  • secure communications systems
  • security
  • security balance
  • security codes
  • security diamond
  • Security of Information Act
  • security strategy
  • security ties
  • self-castration
  • self-censorship
  • self-criticism
  • self-criticism sessions
  • self-immolation
  • self-immolation protests
  • Senkaku Islands
  • Sensitive Reconnaissance Operations
  • Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome
  • sewers
  • sex
  • sex classes
  • sex education
  • sex education courses
  • sex product industry
  • sex scandals
  • sex toys
  • sex workers
  • sexual contact
  • sexual revolution
  • shadow banking
  • Shai Oster
  • Shandong
  • Shanghai
  • Shanghai Cooperation Organization
  • shao guan xian shi
  • shengnü
  • Shenyang
  • Shenzhou space capsule
  • Shi Tao
  • Shichung
  • Shinzo Abe
  • shipwrecks
  • short sellers
  • short-selling
  • shouting
  • show trials
  • shrinking leverage
  • Sichuan
  • Sierra Madre
  • silence
  • Silk Road Economic Belt
  • Silvercorp Metals
  • Sina Weibo
  • Sina Weibo tweets
  • Sino-American conflict
  • Sino-India relations
  • Sino-Indian border
  • Sino-Indian relations
  • Sino-Vietnamese War
  • Sinopec
  • Skynet
  • slaughterhouses
  • small-stick diplomacy
  • smear campaigns
  • smog
  • smog-related cancer
  • social dysfunction
  • social media
  • social media crackdown
  • social media monitoring
  • social morality
  • society
  • Socotra Rock
  • soft power
  • soft-power contest
  • soft-power failure
  • Sora Aoi
  • South China Mall
  • South China Sea ADIZ
  • South Korea
  • South-North Water Diversion project
  • South-to-North Diversion
  • Southeast Asia
  • Southeast Asian pressure
  • Southern European
  • sovereignty
  • space debris
  • space program
  • space science
  • Spain
  • Spain-China relations
  • Spain’s national court
  • spam attacks
  • Spanish court
  • Spanish criminal court
  • Spanish justice
  • Spanish National Court
  • spas
  • spearphishing
  • spending spree
  • spiritual civilization
  • spitter
  • spitting
  • spoiling of the negotiations
  • Spoiling Tibet: China and Resource Nationalism on the Roof of the World
  • Spratly Islands
  • spurious claim
  • stability
  • Starbucks
  • Starbucks latte
  • state capitalism
  • state decadence
  • State Information Office
  • statism
  • Stella Shiu
  • Stephen Cassidy
  • Stephen M. Walt
  • Steven Schwankert
  • strategic bomber
  • strategic partnership
  • strategic quadrangle
  • strategy of harassment
  • street food
  • street vendor’s execution
  • struggle session
  • study sessions
  • Su Ling
  • Su-27
  • Su-33
  • Su-35
  • submarine
  • subpoena
  • substitute criminals
  • suburbia
  • suicide bombers
  • suicides
  • Sunday trading rules
  • superblock
  • Supertyphoon Haiyan
  • supply and demand
  • surrogacy agencies
  • surrogates
  • surveillance
  • surveillance cameras
  • surveillance systems
  • sustainable fishing practices
  • sustainable growth
  • sweeping crackdown on dissent
  • Swiss watchmakers
  • Symantec
  • symbolism
  • taboo
  • taboo topic
  • tailings pond
  • taiwan
  • Tang Shuangning
  • Tang Xiaoning
  • Tank Man
  • Taobao
  • taste for luxury
  • tax evasion
  • tax on second home
  • tea kettles
  • teenage romance
  • teenager
  • teenagers
  • telecom network equipment
  • televised confession
  • televised confessions
  • televised public pre-trial confessions
  • television drama series
  • terra nullius
  • territorial dispute
  • territorial sovereignty
  • territorial tensions
  • terrorism
  • terrorist funding
  • test of wills
  • testimony
  • Thailand
  • Thames Water
  • the final solution of the Chinese question
  • The Long Shadow of Chinese Censorship: How Chinese Media Restrictions Affect News Outlets around the World
  • The Media Kowtow
  • The Network
  • The New York Times
  • The Plum in the Golden Vase
  • The Silent Contest
  • the Tibet House Foundation
  • The Vagina Monologues
  • theft of intellectual property
  • thefts
  • Theodore H. Moran
  • Third Plenum
  • Thomson Reuters
  • thorium
  • threats
  • Three Gorges Corporation
  • Thubten Wangchen
  • Ti-Anna Wang
  • Tiananmen Massacre
  • Tiananmen Square
  • Tiananmen Square attack
  • Tiananmen Square crash
  • Tianducheng
  • Tianjin
  • Tibet
  • Tibet Action Institute
  • Tibet flag
  • Tibet genocide case
  • Tibet Support Committee
  • Tibet's cultural dilution
  • Tibetan exile groups
  • Tibetan National Congress
  • Tibetan plateau
  • Tibetan Support Committee
  • Tibetans
  • Tiger Woman on Wall Street
  • time stamp
  • TiSA
  • toddler
  • Tom Clancy
  • Tombstone: The Untold Story of Mao's Great Famine
  • Tony Abbott
  • top schools
  • Toronto
  • torture
  • total fertility rate
  • totalitarian China
  • totalitarianism
  • tourism
  • toxic air pollution
  • toxic legacy
  • toxic smog
  • toxic substances
  • toy safety
  • TPP
  • trade balance
  • Trade in Services Agreement
  • tradition
  • traffic accident
  • train ride
  • Trans-Pacific Partnership
  • Transparency International
  • trash
  • trashy habits
  • Treasury bonds
  • Treasury securities
  • Treaty of Westphalia
  • Trojan Horse
  • Trojan Moudoor
  • Trojan Naid
  • Trottergate
  • Trường Sa
  • tuhao
  • Turkey
  • Turkmenistan
  • Type 092 Xia-class nuclear powered submarine
  • Typhoon Fitow
  • Typhoon Haiyan
  • tyranny
  • U.N. hearing
  • U.N. resolutions
  • U.S. capitulation
  • U.S. cities
  • U.S. citizenship
  • U.S. congressional panel
  • U.S. Consulate in Chengdu
  • U.S. Director of National Intelligence
  • U.S. dominance
  • U.S. Embassy
  • U.S. fertility clinics
  • U.S. food safety protests
  • U.S. government debt
  • U.S. government shutdown
  • U.S. journalists
  • U.S. media firms
  • U.S. senators
  • U.S. Treasury
  • U.S. Treasury bonds
  • U.S. West Coast
  • U.S. women
  • U.S.-China Business Council
  • U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission
  • U.S.-China Economic Security Review Commission
  • U.S.-Japan Security Treaty
  • UAV
  • Uighur democracy movement
  • Uighurs
  • UK
  • UK infrastructure
  • UK Trade and Industry
  • Ukraine
  • Ullens Center for Contemporary Art
  • UN Committee on the Rights of the Child
  • UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
  • UN Human Rights Council
  • UN human rights review
  • UN sanctions
  • unbridled materialism
  • uncivilized Chinese tourists
  • UNCLOS
  • underground organ sales
  • unemployment
  • unencrypted version
  • Unit 61398
  • united front
  • United Nations arbitration process
  • United Nations Human Rights Council
  • United Nations International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea
  • universal competence
  • universal jurisdiction
  • universal justice principle
  • Universal Periodic Review
  • University of Chicago
  • University of Toronto’s Citizen Lab
  • unmanned arms race
  • unpaid meals
  • unreasonable expansionism
  • unruly behaviour
  • unsophisticated marketing
  • urban management officials
  • urbanism
  • urbanization
  • urinating in swimming pools
  • Urumqi
  • US
  • US anti-terrorism laws
  • US Congress
  • US Food and Drug Administration
  • US government debt
  • US government intelligence adviser
  • US journalists
  • US military preeminence
  • US think-tank
  • US Treasurys
  • US war with China
  • US-China Economic and Security Review Commission
  • US-Japan Security Treaty
  • USA
  • Usmen Hasan
  • USS George Washington
  • Uyghur Human Rights Project
  • Uyghurs
  • Uzi Shaya
  • Vancouver
  • Venice Film Festival
  • very troublesome human rights record
  • veteran Beijing protester
  • vice-mayor
  • video
  • video surveillance technologies
  • vietnam
  • Vietnam’s Communist Party
  • Vietnamese brides
  • Vietnamese-Indian summit
  • villainess
  • Vincent Wu
  • vineyards
  • virginity
  • virgins’ blood
  • visa regulations
  • visa rules
  • visa terrorism
  • vital waterways
  • Voho
  • Voltaire Gazmin
  • wage increases
  • Walk Free Foundation
  • Wall Street Journal
  • Walter Slocombe
  • Wanda
  • Wang Bingzhang
  • Wang Gongquan
  • Wang Hun
  • Wang Jianlin
  • Wang Keping
  • Wang Lijun
  • Wang Xiuying
  • Wang Zhiwen
  • Wangluo
  • war
  • war crimes
  • war games
  • Warner Technology and Investment Corp.
  • warp-speed engine
  • Washington D.C.
  • Washington Post
  • Washington’s muddled response
  • wasting food
  • water
  • water shortages
  • water supply
  • water usage
  • wave of repression
  • wealth migrations
  • wealthy Chinese
  • Web censorship
  • WeChat
  • wedge politics
  • weibo
  • Wellesley College
  • Wen Jiabao
  • Wen Jiabao family empire
  • Wen Ruchun
  • Wen Yunsong
  • Wenchuan quake
  • Wenzhou
  • West Philippine Sea
  • Western businesses
  • western constitutional ­democracy
  • Western culture
  • Western media
  • Western monikers
  • Western news organizations
  • White House
  • Wikimania
  • Wikipedia China
  • Wing Loong
  • wireless network
  • Witherspoon Institute
  • work ethos
  • working-age population
  • World Uyghur Congress
  • world waters
  • world's biggest building
  • world’s leading executioner
  • world’s leading superpower
  • worsening cycle of repression
  • worst online oppressors
  • WTO
  • Wu Dong
  • wumao
  • Wyeth
  • Wyndham Hotel Group
  • Xi Jinping
  • Xi Jinping's family wealth
  • Xia Junfeng
  • Xia Yeliang
  • Xiahe
  • xiaojie
  • xiaosan
  • Ximen Qing
  • Xinhua
  • Xinjiang
  • Xinjiang independence
  • Xinjiang mosque
  • Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps
  • Xu Beihong
  • Xu Ming
  • Xu Qiya
  • Xu Zhiyong
  • Xue Manzi
  • Yahoo
  • Yamazaki Mazak
  • Yang Jisheng
  • Yang Luchuan
  • Yang Zhong
  • Yangzhong
  • Yantian
  • young love
  • Yu Hua
  • Yu Jianming
  • Yunnan
  • Yunnan Tin
  • Yuyao
  • Zambia
  • zaolian
  • Zhang Daqian
  • Zhang Shuguang
  • Zhang Xixi
  • Zhang Xuezhong
  • Zhang Yuhong
  • Zhejiang
  • Zhen Huan
  • Zheng He
  • Zhu Jianrong
  • Zhu Ruifeng
  • Zhu Xingliang
  • Zipingpu dam
  • Zoomlion Heavy Industry Science Technology Co.
  • Zubr landing craft
  • 人艰不拆
  • 喜大普奔
  • 成语
  • 温如春
  • 茉莉花革命
  • 金瓶梅

Blog Archive

  • ▼  2013 (499)
    • ▼  December (79)
      • Time To Get Tough With China
      • The US Waffles on China’s Air Defense Zone
      • China Declares Lunar Defense Obliteration Zone
      • Lonely Chinese Men Are Looking to Vietnam for Love
      • Joe Biden: The Bull in the China Shop
      • The Thorny Challenge of Covering China
      • Bank Charted Business Linked to China Hiring
      • ‘China’s planned ADIZ over West Phl Sea to trigger...
      • Impending Japan-China war has the makings of a Cla...
      • U.S. senators to Chinese ambassador: Senkakus unde...
      • Horse urine a profitable industry in China
      • Our Kind of Traitor
      • Dark matter
      • China meets its own worst enemy
      • A Leader in Mao’s Cultural Revolution Faces His Past
      • Decades After the Cultural Revolution, a Rare Lett...
      • The Meaning of China’s Crackdown on the Foreign Press
      • China’s labor camps close, but grim detention cond...
      • U.S. Media Firms Stymied in China
      • Julie Bishop stands firm in diplomatic spat with C...
      • Debate on Air Zones Continues in South Korea
      • China: the must-visit destination for cash-seeking...
      • China pulls out of UN process over territorial dis...
      • China Toddler Beaten and Killed By Schoolgirl in E...
      • China Pressures U.S. Journalists, Prompting Warnin...
      • Japan Passes Resolution Urging China to Scrap ADIZ
      • China's Threat: South Korea Plans to Expand Defens...
      • How to Answer China's Aggression
      • U.S., China Signal Retreat From Standoff Over Air-...
      • ADIZ stirs fears for South China Sea
      • Daughters of activists imprisoned in China call on...
      • New York Times and Bloomberg facing expulsion from...
      • China's ADIZ Challenges the Pacific Defense Quadra...
      • Forget Japan: China’s ADIZ Threatens Taiwan
      • Hack Tibet
      • Homosexuality ‘Against Spiritual Civilization,’ Ch...
      • Fighting Joe Biden vs. kowtowing David Cameron—a l...
      • Hong Kong people dislike mainland Chinese more tha...
      • Salesman David Cameron makes up to China
      • A South China Sea ADIZ: China’s Next Move
      • China needs to change view of Tibet
      • Biden Faults China on Foreign Press Crackdown
      • Kowtowing Cameron comes under fire in China
      • China stands to lose in island spat
      • Japan caught in dilemma over China air defence zone
      • Joe Biden mum on airspace tensions after meeting w...
      • Biden Visit Leaves Tokyo Worried About American Mu...
      • Island spat dulls appeal of China as production ba...
      • China is Cheating the World Student Rankings System
      • U.S. Raises Concerns About South Korea Deal With C...
      • U.S. Senators Say South Korea Should Not Hire Chin...
      • We Need to Stop Letting China Cheat on Internation...
      • If China's Airspace Grab Turns Violent, Here's How...
      • Tibetan immolations: Desperation as world looks away
      • Biden Condemns China Air Zone
      • China's 'UK Is No Big Power' Snub To Cameron
      • Blonde Ambition: How Xinhua Used A Foreign “Report...
      • Safeguarding the Seas
      • China’s Hubris on the High Seas
      • My Dinner With Alptekin
      • In the East China Sea, a Far Bigger Test of Power ...
      • Xi Jinping’s Rise Came With New Attention to Dispu...
      • The Hijacking of Chinese Patriotism
      • China is treading on thin ice in the Pacific
      • UK protests after China bars Bloomberg reporter fr...
      • China air zone divides US and its allies
      • U.S. Split With Japan on China Zone Puts Carriers ...
      • China’s creeping ‘cabbage’ strategy
      • China pushing to change order
      • David Cameron will be China's strongest advocate i...
      • RCMP arrest Chinese man for attempt to give naval ...
      • China’s Aggressive Expansionism Hits Archaeology
      • China's ADIZ undermines regional stability
      • Japan Takes Airspace Issue to U.N. Agency
      • Spat over air space lost on ordinary Chinese
      • Britain wins little reward from China in retreat o...
      • Barack Obama Throws Japan Under Bus – Capitulates ...
      • China’s gradual expansion in the East China Sea po...
      • China’s Limited Influence
    • ►  November (181)
    • ►  October (178)
    • ►  September (61)
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