China activist Chen Guangcheng to join US think-tank

BBC News

Blind Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng is set to join the Witherspoon Institute, a US think-tank, as a distinguished fellow.
The institute will provide Mr Chen with financial support, reports say.
The high-profile activist was a fellow at New York University from mid-2012 until earlier this year.
He caused a diplomatic flurry last year when he fled house arrest and went to the US embassy in Beijing. 

He was later allowed to go to the US.
The Witherspoon Institute describes itself as "an independent research centre that works to enhance public understanding of the moral foundations of free and democratic societies".
It also says that it is committed to "liberal education and republican government". It is opposed to abortion and same-sex marriage.
"We are taking the responsibility for the financial side and a home really where he can do his work," Luis Tellez, president of the institute, told Reuters news agency in an interview.
Mr Chen would become a distinguished fellow in human rights at the institute, and would also be affiliated with the Catholic University of America and the Lantos Foundation for Human Rights and Justice, Mr Tellez added.
Mr Chen had said in June that his departure from NYU was due to "unrelenting pressure" from Beijing -- something NYU denied.
NYU said at the time that Mr Chen's fellowship had always been expected to last a year at most, to help Mr Chen and his family make the transition to a more permanent position in the US.
Mr Chen arrived in the US in mid-2012.
The self-taught lawyer had campaigned against forced abortions under China's one-child policy, but was jailed for four years in 2006 for disrupting traffic and damaging property.
He was placed under house arrest after his release in 2010, until his high-profile escape in April 2012.

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To Isolate Philippines, China Woos ASEAN

By Carl Thayer

Maritime security in the South China Sea is being shaped by two overlapping and potentially crosscutting developments. 

The first development is the emergence of new tensions between the Philippines and China over Scarborough Shoal dating from late August. 

The second development is the initiation of official consultations on a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC) between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in mid-September.

New Tensions
Ever since the eruption of tensions between China and the Philippines over Scarborough Shoal in April 2012 Beijing has pursued “wedge politics” in an attempt to isolate Manila from other ASEAN states. 

For example, China’s new Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointedly omitted the Philippines from the itinerary of his two trips to the region this year.
In August China and the Philippines became involved in a diplomatic altercation over President Aquino’s attendance at the Tenth China-ASEAN- Expo in Nanning (3-6 September). 

The Philippines had been designated the “country of honor” and official host for this event. 

It was past practice for the host country to be represented by its head of government. 

On 28 August, immediately after President Aquino indicated his intention to attend the Expo China requested that he visit “at a more conducive time.” 

According to Philippine sources, China demanded the Philippines withdraw its arbitration case as a condition for Aquino’s visit. 

This was unacceptable and President Aquino declined to attend.
In the midst of these ructions, new tensions in China-Philippine relations erupted when Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin on September 3 released three aerial photographs of Scarborough Shoal taken on August 31. 

These photographs were taken at low tide and showed what the Philippines claimed were thirty concrete blocks, a concrete platform, two vertical posts and a white buoy lying in Scarborough Shoal. 

Three Chinese Coast Guard ships were also photographed on station in the area.
Gazmin speculated that the concrete blocks “could be a prelude to construction” and were a violation of the 2002 Declaration on Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC). 

Gazmin also stated he was unsure when the blocks were delivered. 

Philippine sources speculated that the blocks could be used to tether Chinese fishing vessels. 

An anonymous Philippine official was quoted as stating, “the concrete pillars and blocks… appeared to have been dropped from an aircraft.”
A day after Gazmin’s testimony, Secretary of Foreign Affairs Alberto del Rosario argued that China had plans to occupy disputed reefs in the South China Sea before the formal conclusion of a COC, and stated that Chinese activity “places the region in jeopardy in terms of peace and stability.” 

Del Rosario concluded that “we intend to file a diplomatic protest” with China.
On September 4, the Philippines Department of National Defense announced that new aerial photographs taken two days earlier revealed a total of 75 concrete blocks in a two-hectare area of Scarborough Shoal. The blocks were estimated at just over half a meter in length, width and height.
Official Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei responded to Philippine accusations by claiming they were “not in accordance with the facts” and that Scarborough Shoal was China’s “inherent territory.”
On September 10, Philippines Navy Vice Admiral Jose Luis Alano raised the rhetorical stakes by noting that government discussions were underway about how to respond to China, including whether or not to remove the blocks. 

Speaking at a Foreign Ministry press conference the following day, Hong Lei restated China’s “undisputed sovereignty” over “Scarborough Shoal and the neighboring sea.”
China released its own photos reportedly taken some time during the second week of September clearly showing rocks and coral jutting from the sea at low tide. 

Chinese sources claimed this was the same area of Scarborough Shoal depicted in photographs taken by the Philippines Air Force. 

As a direct result of this controversy the Philippines recalled its ambassador to China for consultations.

China-ASEAN Consultations
Shortly after the formal installation of Xi Jinping as president and Wang Yi as the new foreign minister back in March, China signaled a subtle change in its relations with Southeast Asia. 

The following month, at the 19th ASEAN-China Senior Officials Consultation, the Chinese side announced its willingness to commence discussions with ASEAN on a COC later in the year.
Two explanations account for China’s demarche. 

First, Chinese leaders reportedly viewed past policy on the South China Sea as counterproductive. They sought to insulate China-ASEAN relations from territorial disputes in the South China Sea. 

Second, China faced a more unified ASEAN. 

In 2013, Brunei assumed the ASEAN Chair and gave priority to initiating discussions with China on a COC. Thailand, as ASEAN’s country coordinator for dialogue relations with China, and Indonesia both began to play more proactive roles.
China responded by dispatching Foreign Minister Wang Yi on two trips to Southeast Asia to sound out his counterparts and to make preparations for the ASEAN-China Summit in October. 

Wang’s first visit in late April/early May included Thailand, Indonesia, Singapore and Brunei; during the second visit in August he took in Malaysia, Thailand, Laos, and Vietnam.
At a press conference in early August, Wang Yi was careful to note that China and ASEAN had only “agreed to hold consultations on moving forward the process on the ‘Code of Conduct in the South China Sea (COC)’ under the framework of implementing the ‘Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC)….’” 

Wang also noted in a pointed reference to the Philippines that, “some parties” held “different ideas…on how to promote the process of COC.”
Significantly, Wang Yi highlighted four reasons for why the COC consultations would be a prolonged process. 

First, he stated that the expectations of unnamed parties for a “quick fix” were “neither realistic nor serious.” Second, Wang noted that no country or countries could impose their will and that consultations would proceed only on the basis of consensus. 

Third, he recalled that in the past outside interference had caused China-ASEAN talks on a COC to bog down. 

Fourth, he cautioned that consultations could only proceed “step-by-step.”
China and ASEAN held their first round of formal consultations on the COC in Suzhou, China from September 14-15. 

This meeting drew up a work plan on the DOC for 2013-14, approved an expert group to assist in developing the COC, and agreed to meet in Thailand in early 2014. 

Immediately after the meeting the China Daily reported, “Manila once again tried to disrupt China-ASEAN consultations. Before the Suzhou meetings, the Philippines again started a war of words with China. It fabricated a story that China had laid some concrete blocks on Huangyan Islands…”

Despite this promising start, it is clear that some major procedural differences will have to be overcome. China insists that consultations on the COC can only take place under the framework of the DOC. 

The 2002 DOC listed five areas for cooperation. 

Only four joint working groups have been set and so far not one project has been approved or funded. ASEAN prefers that the DOC and COC discussions be separated with each proceeding on its own track. Some in ASEAN argue that the COC should be implemented piecemeal, that is, as soon as agreement is reached on one measure it should be implemented immediately.

Moving Forward
The 2002 ASEAN-China DOC calls for the parties “to exercise self-restraint in the conduct of activities that would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability” and to refrain from occupying “presently uninhabited islands, reefs, shoals, cays, and other features and to handle their differences in a constructive manner.” 

The Philippine-China dispute over “blocks or rocks” at Scarborough Shoal is an illustration that positive diplomatic progress on a COC could be set back at any time by any party failing to exercise restraint. 

This applies equally to the Philippines and China.
Nearly a month has passed since the Philippines first raised allegations about new activities at Scarborough Shoal, yet no further information has been forthcoming. 

It is incumbent on the Philippines to provide further details to substantiate its accusations that China violated the 2002 DOC by placing concrete blocks in Scarborough Shoal as a prelude to construction.
The Philippines’ allegations raise more questions than answers. 

Is there any better imagery to determine if the blocks are not rocks, as the Chinese claim? 

Why hasn’t this imagery been released? 

When were the blocks placed in Scarborough Shoal? 

If, as some analysts argue, the blocks form a haphazard pattern, what is the basis for the conclusion that they are foundations for future construction?
China has been disingenuous in its dismissal of claims made by the Philippines. 

For example, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Hong Lei responded to a question on this issue by stating, “what the Philippine side said is not true.”
This phrasing makes it unclear whether he was denying that China had placed the blocks there in the first place, or denying accusations that China planned construction activities in Scarborough Shoal, or both.
One regional security analyst, for example, has speculated that the concrete blocks were used as ballast by Chinese fishermen and discarded once they reached the fishing grounds at Scarborough Shoal. 

If this is the case, dumping concrete blocks would be an environmental not a security matter. 

China, which has physical control over Scarborough Shoal, should invite the world’s media and marine experts to visit Scarborough Shoal and make their own independent determination.

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Coming Your Way: China's Rotten Apples

One of the plants supplies 27% of the toxic apple juice that China exports to the U.S. and Canada, annually

By Adam Minter

The juice of rotten Chinese apples isn’t something that most American parents would serve to their children. But if a recent report from the Chinese press is accurate, they may very well have been doing so for years without anyone -- including U.S. government inspectors -- knowing it.
The news was broken by the independent-minded 21st Century Business Herald, which sent reporters to a region of the country known for its fruit groves and fruit-juice manufacturers.

They found three of China’s leading juice manufacturers purchasing rotten apples and pears from farmers unable to sell them for direct human consumption. 

Chinese regulators shut down two of the plants, despite failing to find stocks of rotten fruit on the factory premises, and investigations are ongoing. 

Nonetheless, as Quartz reported last week, two of the plants in question receive significant government export subsidies (and one of the plants supplies 27percent of the apple juice that China exports to the U.S. and Canada, annually). 

Under such circumstances, it’s highly unlikely that China’s regulators will move to harm any reputations.
Compared to dead pigs floating down Shanghai waterways and poisonous fake mutton in hot pot restaurants, this may seem like a relatively minor scandal. 

The primary health risk in rotten apples is the persistence of a toxic mold. 

The U.S. Food and Drug Administration is so unconcerned about this possibility that it allows domestic apple processors to establish voluntary controls to monitor the mold. 

China, with its lax food-safety standards, almost certainly pays even less attention to it. 

In 2011, for example, 51 percent of Chinese food processors and packagers failed food safety inspections, according to AsiaInspection, a China-based quality control firm.
This should worry Americans -- especially those who drink apple juice. 

Approximately 85 percent of the apple juice consumed by Americans is imported, with the vast majority -- 367.2 million tons in 2012 -- imported from China. 

According to U.S. Department of Agriculture data collected by Food & Water Watch, a U.S.-based NGO focused on food-safety issues, Chinese apple juice enjoyed a 49.6 percent share of total U.S. consumption in 2011.
In other words: If rotten Chinese apples (and the toxic molds that grow with them) are making their way into Chinese fruit-juice factories (and past Chinese inspectors), then more likely than not they’re making their way into American refrigerators, pantries and bag lunches, too. 

What’s worse, chronically under-funded and under-staffed U.S. food inspectors lack the resources to capture many, if any, of these tainted shipments.
Indeed, according to a May report in the New York Times, the U.S. FDA manages only to inspect 2.3 percent of food shipments imported into the U.S. and 1,000 of the more than 250,000 foreign food plants that export to the U.S. 

In that sense, statistically speaking, it’s almost certain that most Chinese apple juice is never inspected, either in China or the U.S.
For now this doesn’t seem to be much of a concern to most Americans. 

According to Food & Water Watch, between 2003 and 2012, U.S. food imports from China increased from 2.3 billion pounds to 4.1 billion pounds. 

So far, at least, this growth has occurred without a major scandal -- in the U.S. 

But as the list of Chinese food-safety scandals lengthens, the potential for one of them to migrate to U.S. shores grows. 

It's just a matter of time.

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A devious blueprint to empower the party

By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING -- A few days ago, a junior official came to me asking to check the name of an Italian author and the thesis of a book. 

At first I really could not figure out the author, but then from the name of the book I made out the writer. 

The official wanted to apply the argument of the book to the Communist Party. 

He was raving and talking what I thought was nonsense. 

I tried to calm him down, but he then grew even more agitated trying to explain the deep connections between these two old civilizations, China and Italy, that went well beyond the love for spaghetti or fireworks.
I pretended to understand and agree, but actually could not quite get it. 

He calmed down and left on my table two typewritten pages with some blurred red stamps on them. 

The pages were a more lucid presentation of what he was talking about and even more bizarre than I figured. It is unlikely that anybody will pay attention to this, yet to add to the many thoughts circulating on the Internet nowadays, I figured I would translate it, adapt it, and just for fun offer it to readers patient enough to follow me. 

The missive follows ...

*** 

The predicament of President Xi Jinping is quite understandable. 

After the difficulties he faced in carrying out the broad economic and political reforms he had in mind early this year, and because he had to eradicate the influence of former Chongqing party chief Bo Xilai, Xi had to move fast to concentrate power and don the neo-Maoist mantle of his enemy, Bo. 

Therefore he could only use the tools he had available: Mao's old techniques of launching a propaganda campaign for the unification of thought and mobilizing the people against the party's middle ranks. 

The president is doing this through his ongoing campaign for self-criticism and his emphasis on control of the media.
To concentrate power, Xi had also to show he was in the middle and not leaning too much on the right. Therefore he had to clamp down on high-flying dissident financier Wang Gongquan in order to better strike down the top echelons of people still supporting Bo.
This I all understand: it is old-school Chinese Communist Party and necessary at this moment, as it was after the Tiananmen protests in 1989 or the Falun gong movement in 1999. 

But party history also shows that these tools cannot be used for a long time, and after a while they tend to backfire. 

To unify thoughts in the short term gives power to the center, but in the medium and long term makes the center blind and management at the grassroots ineffective. 

Everybody will be afraid to report the truth out of fear of offending their superiors, and everybody will stop taking initiatives in ruling their areas since they are scared of being criticized for deviating from the center.
Soon, the country will fall apart from the periphery and the center will not be informed; and the leaders will realize this when it is too late. 

This happened during Mao's times, but then China was closed and the impact of these mistakes could be digested over a long period of time. 

Now China is open and similar mistakes could be much harder to digest and could produce deep cracks in the society and party.
China needs a change of the political system and it must look at Western democracies for inspiration, just as it looked at the West when it imported Marxism as its main theory for the communist revolution or took from the West when it started Deng Xiaoping's reforms. 

However, the party has to be clear that western democracy is not an absolute democracy. 

It is a system built to find peaceful compromises and agreements between different interest groups and different agendas for running a country.
Power struggle is inherent in any power structure, but a different political system can resolve a power struggle in a peaceful or not peaceful manner. 

Western democracies have managed to solve their power struggle issues in a peaceful manner that ultimately better preserves the losing party (who most times do not end up in prison) and the system, because the power struggle does not affect the system but only the interested parties.
Therefore we think that although these present measures are necessary, the center should think about the medium and long term, as described in the Italian novel The Leopard by Tomasi di Lampedusa. 

To enhance the power of the center and of the party in China, everything has to change -- in order to change nothing. 

The Italian writer described the behavior of the Sicilian aristocracy around 1861, when Garibaldi liberated the south of Italy and gave it to the Piedmont to rule. 

The Sicilian aristocrats, who a few years before sided with the king of Naples in cracking down on the liberals, later turned into supporters of liberal Garibaldi in order to retain their power and continue accruing their riches.
Our [the Communist] party perhaps ought to do the same with a medium- and long-term plan.
After the end of this mass campaign and the launch of the long-promised economic reforms, which will reduce the power and money of the state-owned enterprises, the president should consider two moves.
In the medium term, he should consider a cultural campaign centered on China being a normal country in the world, and thus adhering to generally accepted international practices. 

China cannot be isolated with its "Chinese characteristics" any longer, as it is part of a global environment, and neither can it impose its "Chinese characteristics" on the whole world. 

China has to adapt by absorbing foreign ideas and contributing ideas to the world. 

This is a path already shown by thinkers like Zhao Tingyang and Ge Zhaoguang, who are both very Chinese and can be very international. 

This cultural campaign is the only real guarantee that a neo-Maoist campaign a la Bo Xilai will cut less and less ice in the country.
In the long term, there should be open elections between two candidates selected by the party but voted on by the whole population, who then will have a sense of belonging. 

The rest of the world will also take part and feel they are inside China, and thus de facto supportive of its political system. 

To have a vote before the cultural campaign would only lead to the election of a nationalist demagogue. 

Bo Xilai was not a real leftist; he only leaned on the left because he understood it would help him get popular approval and support from old party veterans. 

The cultural campaign therefore cannot be short or hasty.
Now is surely not the time, but the president should consider announcing soon his plans for the future. 

Many in China are very uncertain about the direction of the country, and despite easy sympathies with the new left, the real "decision-makers" -- the people able to make money, the ones able produce the necessary new ideas, and many honest officials -- are worried that reforms may stall and lead back to a Maoist path. 

If they do not feel reassured, they could flee abroad or stop working, both things that will hamper our growth and development, and thus all our ambitions to become a great country.
Conversely, these steps would insure our party's hold on power, which is our ultimate goal.

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US concerned at Turkey's pick of Chinese missiles

US soldiers stand near a Patriot missile system at a Turkish military base in Gaziantep on February 5, 2013

Washington (AFP) — The United States Monday reacted with alarm to news that Turkey has chosen a Chinese company, slapped with US sanctions, to build its first long-range air defense and anti-missile system.
China Precision Machinery Export-Import Corp (CPMIEC) beat out competition from a US partnership of Raytheon and Lockheed Martin, Russia's Rosoboronexport, and the Italian-French consortium Eurosamrs in the tender, worth $4 billion according to Turkish media.
Turkey is a key regional ally to the United States, and currently has US-built Patriot missile systems deployed on its border to deter incoming attacks from Syria.
CPMIEC has been hit by a series of US sanctions over the past decade, accused of selling arms and missile technology to Iran and Pakistan, meaning that all US groups and individuals are barred from doing business with it.
The United States has "conveyed our serious concerns about the Turkish government's contract discussions with a US-sanctioned company for a missile defense system that will not be interoperable with NATO systems or collective defense capabilities," State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki said.
"Our discussions will continue," she told reporters.
An official statement from Ankara last week said Turkey had "decided to begin talks with the CPMIEC company of the People's Republic of China for the joint production of the systems and its missiles in Turkey."
Turkey wants to build its own long-range air defense and anti-missile architecture to counter both enemy aircraft and missiles.
In January, NATO began deploying Patriot missile system batteries to help protect Turkey from any spillover of the conflict in neighboring Syria.
The Patriot missiles, effective against aircraft and short-range missiles, were provided by the United States, Germany and the Netherlands.

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Mao Tse-tung's 'Little Red Book' will be reprinted in China

   

The reprinting of the "Little Red Book" is the harbinger of a revival of Maoist philosophy in China.
By Husna Haq

The 'Little Red Book' of quotations from Mao Tse-tung is being reprinted in China in November. A controversial political manifesto is being republished in China and some observers say it represents a revival of old political ideology in modern China.
Communist leader Mao Tse-tung’s “Quotations from Chairman Mao,” better known as “Little Red Book,” is being republished in China in November, decades after Maoism faded in the communist nation.
The move marks the 120th anniversary of Mao’s birth. 

But it also signals a slightly more ominous development: Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s embrace of Maoist philosophy.
According to the UK’s Guardian, “The re-emergence of ‘Quotations from Chairman Mao’... comes amid an official revival of the era's rhetoric. China's leader, Xi Jinping, has embraced Maoist terminology and concepts launching a "mass line rectification campaign" and this week even presiding over a televised self-criticism session.”
Some have likened China’s mass line rectification campaign – an attempt to disavow corruption and reinforce the Communist Party’s ties with the masses – to Mao’s “mass line” campaigns to purge the party of corrupt leaders.
The founding father of the People’s Republic of China, Mao transformed the nation into a single-party socialist state. 

According to historians, he was also responsible for the deaths of some 40 to 70 million Chinese through starvation, forced labor, and executions.
A follower of Marxist and Leninist ideology, Mao was widely influential in China. 

The 1966 “Quotations from Chairman Mao,” a book of select sayings from Mao’s speeches, became required reading in China as well as one of the most printed books in history. 

More than a billion copies of the “Little Red Book” were printed during China’s Cultural Revolution, making it the second-most printed book in the world after the Bible, according to some sources.
The book fell from favor as China embarked on a path of reform, but the book – and, perhaps, the ideology it represents – is returning.
In addition to original content, the republished book will include previously unpublished sayings of Mao, as well as rectify distorted quotes and quotes wrongly attributed to him.
Its publishers say they have no political motivations in republishing “Quotations,” but some see it as a revival of Maoist ideology.
Daniel Leese, author of “Mao Cult” and an expert on China’s Cultural Revolution at the University of Freiburg in Germany, told the Guardian the book was a “trial balloon” from Maoist sympathizers. 

“If they hadn’t seen how the general tone towards the Maoist heritage had changed, I don’t think they would have dared,” he said. 

“This is party internal politics popping up in the public sphere.”
Echoed political scientist Zhang Ming, “[Chinese leader] Xi believes in Maoism. He wants to completely revive Mao’s policy and he has already started it.”
Those who agree with Ming say the “Little Red Book” is a first step.

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China Detains Professor Over His Activities in Japan

By JANE PERLEZ

BEIJING — A Chinese professor who specializes in Japanese affairs appears to have been detained by the Chinese government since late July and is being questioned about his activities in Japan, according to Chinese academics and Japanese media reports.
The apparent arrest of the professor, Zhu Jianrong, possibly on espionage charges, after he returned to Shanghai from Japan comes as relations between China and Japan have hit their lowest point in decades, and it has sent tremors of fear through the small community of Japan experts in China and other academics.
A group of Chinese scholars in Japan, the Society of Chinese Professors in Japan, said Monday that they were almost certain Mr. Zhu was being held and was “currently responding to questioning.” 

The society, which Mr. Zhu helped found, described the professor as “very active” in his role as “a bridge between China and Japan.”
The Chinese government declined to confirm the arrest but strongly hinted that he had been taken into custody.
In a statement, the Foreign Ministry said: “Zhu Jianrong is a Chinese citizen. China is a country ruled by law, and will protect the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese citizens. While at the same time, all Chinese citizens should abide by the law.”
There were some suggestions that Mr. Zhu met with Chinese military officials this year, and that the Chinese authorities were suspicious of these contacts and his subsequent use of the information.
The Japan Times wrote in a Sept. 29 editorial that China was looking into these meetings and whether they constituted illegal collection of information.
A professor of international relations in Beijing, who declined to be named because of the sensitivity of the case, said he believed Mr. Zhu had been detained on charges of espionage based on his interviews with Chinese military officials.
The case of Mr. Zhu, who often appeared on Japanese television discussing the soured relations between China and Japan, follows a pattern.
In 2009, a former deputy director of the Institute of Japanese Studies at the Chinese Academy of Sciences, Jin Xide, was imprisoned for 14 years on charges of selling Chinese state secrets to Japan and South Korea, according to the Japan Times.
The newspaper also reported that Su Ling, chief editor of Xinhua Shibao, a Chinese-language newspaper published in Japan, has been missing since he came to Beijing from Japan in May.
The disappearance of Mr. Zhu would further fracture the “quasi cold war relationship” between China and Japan, setting off fears among Chinese academics and visitors to Japan that they could be susceptible to similar treatment, said Willy Lam, adjunct professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong’s Center for Chinese Studies.
“These folks are not famous people,” said Mr. Lam, who has worked in Japan. 

“Inevitably it will affect people-to-people exchanges, popular diplomacy and people-level diplomacy between the two countries.”
A scholar on the diplomacy between China and Japan, Mr. Zhu often appeared on Japanese television publicly presenting China’s position on the issues that divided the two countries, academics in both countries said.
In those appearances, Mr. Zhu was quite resolute in defending China’s case on the bitter dispute over Japan's Senkaku islands in the East China Sea.
That dispute involves daily close-in patrols by naval vessels of China and Japan, and air sorties sent by both sides. 

China most recently was reported to have sent a drone over the area.
In his television arguments, Mr. Zhu did not appear to be deferential to the Japanese point of view, said a Japanese academic who declined to be named.
Mr. Zhu married a Japanese researcher in the 1980s, and moved to Japan in 1986, where he worked at the Toyo Gakuen University, not far from Tokyo.
The Society of Chinese Professors expressed concern for Mr. Zhu, saying it hoped he would “return to normal life as soon as possible.” 

The group praised him for trying to improve the relationship between the two countries. 

Mr. Zhu was chairman of the group for nine years
The case has frightened the Chinese academic community in Japan. 

A member of the group, when contacted by telephone, said in worried tones that it was impossible to talk about the matter.

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