China says will stamp out Dalai Lama's voice in Tibet

By Ben Blanchard

BEIJING -- China aims to stamp out the voice of exiled Tibetan spiritual leader the Dalai Lama in his restive and remote homeland by ensuring that his "propaganda" is not received by anyone on the internet, television or other means, a top official said.
China has tried, with varying degrees of success, to prevent Tibetans listening to or watching programmes broadcast from outside the country, or accessing any information about the Dalai Lama and the exiled government on the internet.
But many Tibetans are still able to access such news, either via illegal satellite televisions or by skirting Chinese internet restrictions. 

The Dalai Lama's picture and his teachings are also smuggled into Tibet, at great personal risk.
Writing in the ruling Communist Party's influential journal Qiushi, the latest issue of which was received by subscribers on Saturday, Tibet's party chief Chen Quanguo said that the government would ensure only its voice is heard.
"Strike hard against the reactionary propaganda of the splittists from entering Tibet," Chen wrote in the magazine, whose name means "seeking truth".
The government will achieve this by confiscating illegal satellite dishes, increasing monitoring of online content and making sure all telephone and internet users are registered using their real names, he added.
"Work hard to ensure that the voice and image of the party is heard and seen over the vast expanses (of Tibet) ... and that the voice and image of the enemy forces and the Dalai clique are neither seen nor heard," Chen wrote.
China calls the Nobel Peace Prize-winning Dalai Lama a "wolf in sheep's clothing" who seeks to use violent methods to establish an independent Tibet.
The Dalai Lama, who fled to India after a failed uprising in 1959, says he simply wants genuine autonomy for Tibet, and denies espousing violence.
Chen said the party would seek to expose the Dalai Lama's "hypocrisy and deception" and his "reactionary plots".
China has long defended its iron-fisted rule in Tibet, saying the region suffered from dire poverty, brutal exploitation and economic stagnation until 1950, when Communist troops "peacefully liberated" Tibet.
Tensions in China's Tibetan regions are at their highest in years after a spate of self-immolation protests by Tibetans, which have led to an intensified security crackdown.

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Ghost in the Machine

How Chinese netizens are mocking a recent spate of televised confessions. 
BY YIQIN FU

The late Lu Xun, one of China's most influential modern writers, is usually found in textbooks and anthologies. 

But on Oct. 27, Lu made a surprise appearance on the Chinese social web when a user of Sina Weibo, China's Twitter, posted a photo-shopped image showing the literary giant confessing on state-run China Central Television (CCTV) while clad in a prison uniform. 

The subtitle depicts Lu saying, "I did not write any of these essays." 

Many of Lu's works promote critical thinking and political awareness.
The picture, which was retweeted more than 5,000 times, represents one netizen's attempt to mock the growing number of "public confessions" on state media. 

Since August, at least six people accused of wrongdoing have confessed on state television. 

From influential bloggers like Charles Xue to businessmen like British consultant Peter Humphrey, the men -- in prison uniforms, some with their heads shaven -- all admitted to their crimes and apologized, sometimes before their cases went to court.
Many Chinese observers doubt the legitimacy or legal efficacy of these confessions. 

In one widely shared comment, Weibo user Ding Laifeng, a social commentator, wrote, "From now on China can get rid of its court system. Just detain the people you say are guilty for a few days, put them on CCTV, and make them confess."
One day after the Lu Xun satire emerged on Weibo, Li Chengpeng, a blogger and social commentator with over seven million followers, also got in on the act. 

Li tweeted a similar picture with the caption, "I did not see Liu Hezhen getting shot." 

In 1926, Lu wrote a famous essay remembering the death of Liu, a student of Lu's who was shot and killed in a March 1926 protest attempting to petition China's military government. 

Censors promptly deleted Li's tweet.
Lu Xun's "confession" serves to poke fun at the Communist Party's attempt to sway public opinion against the suspects before the law has had its say. 

Chinese netizens often resort to satire to express political opinions, particularly when direct criticism of central authorities is likely to lead to censorship, detention, or even physical harm. 

A popular cartoonist who calls himself Rebel Pepper captured this fear when he took to Weibo to post a cartoon of a man hanging from CCTV's iconic Beijing headquarters as if in the gallows. 

The accompanying text reads, "Finally I'm on CCTV." 

For many Chinese entangled with the judicial system, the less famous they are, the better.

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China Is About to Crack Down on J.P. Morgan

An aggressive Beijing could be very bad news for the bank -- and lots of other Western businesses operating in China.
BY JAMILA TRINDLE

J.P. Morgan Chase & Co.'s tangled web of legal troubles just got a little knottier.
The bank said Friday that other countries are looking into the firm's hiring of people close to government officials in Asia, which could mean China is investigating the firm's practices. 

If that's the case, J.P. Morgan could be facing a whole new front in its battle to resolve a raft of investigations in the U.S and U.S. companies could be in for greater scrutiny of their China operations.
The bank is already dealing with U.S. authorities looking into whether it violated anti-bribery laws by putting well-connected people on the payroll in exchange for business.

The New York Times reported in August that the inquiry relates to the hiring of two former Chinese employees who are children of powerful executives in Chinese state-owned companies. 

But the involvement of Chinese authorities could mean the bank would face a sprawling, unpredictable investigation.
"It's a scarier prospect in terms of transparency and rule of law being a bit more of a concern in China than here in the United States," said Mike Koehler, assistant professor at Southern Illinois University School of Law.
China has not routinely targeted foreign companies for bribery, but an aggressive investigation of U.K. pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline that included detaining Chinese executives of the company earlier this year has raised concerns China is cracking down. 

The case is not yet resolved, but the drug maker reported last month that sales in China have already dropped by 60 percent.
"This is signaling a new emphasis in going after bribery and it's easier to go after the bribe giver than the bribe taker," said Daniel Chow, professor at Ohio State University College of Law.
Mr. Chow said China's more aggressive stance toward foreign companies is part of a broader crackdown on graft in reaction to a number of high-profile embarrassments involving allegedly corrupt Chinese officials.
Because the Chinese legal system is so opaque and moves quickly, U.S. investigators sometimes fear Chinese authorities will come in and start arresting people before they can collect the evidence required for American cases, according to former U.S. officials who've worked on anti-bribery cases.
"Sometimes as a prosecutor you fear the involvement of the local gendarme because you have no control over them," one of the former officials said.
In contrast, U.S. investigations can often take years to conclude. 

J.P. Morgan said in a regulatory filing Friday that it had received subpoenas and document requests from U.S. regulators about "hiring practices relating to candidates referred by clients, potential clients and government officials." 

The Justice Department is interested in the same practices, the company added.
"Separate inquiries on these or similar topics have been made by other authorities, including authorities in other jurisdictions," the bank said in the filing. 

A spokesman for J.P. Morgan declined to comment on whether China was one of them.
The bank also said that the SEC was interested in the J.P. Morgan's "engagement of consultants in the Asia Pacific region."
The disclosure comes as the bank is also facing legal battles on several other fronts. 

After emerging from the financial crisis seemingly unscathed, J.P. Morgan has faced an onslaught of legal issues over the past several months.
The bank has been trying to wrap up an array of mortgage-related investigations into a grand settlement with the Department of Justice. 

A preliminary agreement had J.P. Morgan paying over $13 billion to the government, but negotiations keep getting snagged. 

Those talks relate to the mortgages the bank bought, sold, and packaged into complex investments before the housing market crashed, as well as the mortgage businesses of two banks that it bought during the financial crisis.
The bank also paid over $1 billion in penalties to the U.S. government earlier this fall to settle allegations related to the "London whale" trading debacle -- large derivatives positions that caught the attention of other traders in early 2012 and ultimately cost the bank over $6 billion. 

What, if anything, J.P. Morgan will have to give to Chinese authorities is very much an open question.

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China's Threat: Japan’s New Attack Force

Japan’s rapid moves to develop an amphibious capability is sending a clear signal on Senkaku islands.

By Trefor Moss

When US President Barack Obama cancelled his trip to Asia in early October, America’s regional allies wondered whether America, just like its president, was becoming fatally weakened by Washington’s systemic failures – whether one day soon it might no longer have the power or the energy to get things done on the world stage.
Japan’s leaders may have shared those concerns, but if so they didn’t let on. 

Even as Washington tied itself up in knots, the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee (SCC) – the “2+2” comprising the countries’ foreign and defense ministers – was announcing a potentially far-reaching revamp of the Japan-U.S. alliance. 

As part of their new vision, the Japanese military will shoulder a greater share of the joint security burden, something the U.S. government – and some Japanese conservatives – have wanted to happen for a very long time.
Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe is a leading proponent of the more active Japan that is emerging. 

Speaking to The Wall Street Journal this week, Abe asserted the view that “Japan is expected to exert leadership … in the field of security in the Asia-Pacific,” and warned China that the outcome would not be peaceful if it should try to change the status quo by force – even as Japan scrambled fighter aircraft on three consecutive days in response to Chinese activity.
Against this worrying backdrop, the Japan Self-Defense Force (JSDF) and the Japan Coast Guard (JCG) have both been enhancing their capabilities with a view to protecting the country’s maritime interests. 

Abe may not have initiated this process, but he is doing what he can to accelerate it, having handed the Ministry of Defense (MoD) its first budget increase in over a decade at the start of the year.
Most eye-catching of all – especially in light of Japan’s disagreements with China – has been Tokyo’s emphasis on the JSDF’s amphibious capabilities. 

The news this week that the MoD is prepping a major amphibious landing drill that began on November 1 was a restatement of this ambition, and the exercise will be the latest in a long series of moves designed to equip the JSDF with a credible amphibious deterrent.

Dry run: A Maritime Self-Defense Force hovercraft lands on a California beach during a joint drill between the Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. Marines on June 24.

Walk Before You Can Run (Up Any Beaches)
If Japan is to assume a greater share of the regional security burden, then the JSDF needs to acquire the capability to manage the country’s territorial disputes independently, without U.S. forces. 

It can already operate independently in most respects, and it already possesses most elements of an amphibious capability, notably three Osumi-class landing ship tanks (LSTs) alongside six landing craft air cushions (LCACs) and a mix of smaller landing craft, and now also the Hyuga- and Izumo-class helicopter destroyers to supply the necessary air lift. 

However, a ship-to-shore capability has always been the missing piece of the puzzle. 

Beach-storming was taboo for the JSDF – something deemed too aggressive for the country’s pacifist constitution.
Changes in the political wind have now made amphibious operations seem more palatable to Japanese decision-makers. 

However, the scale of the upcoming drill – which the MoD says will involve 34,000 personnel – should not be confused with the size of the amphibious force Japan is currently assembling. 

The new Amphibious Preparatory Unit – as the MoD is calling its L-plate marines, at least for now – will be a relatively small team: a specialist unit of the Ground Self-Defense Force (GSDF), rather than a fully fledged Marine Corps. 

It will have 700 men initially, expanding to 3,000 over time.
The unit’s job will be to respond “to attacks on remote islets,” as the MoD’s 2014 budget request explains. There is only one group of remote islets that Japan really has in mind: the Senkaku islands, whose ownership it disputes with China. 

While Japan also has territorial disputes with Russia and South Korea, those islands are not under Japanese control, and it is extremely hard to imagine Tokyo dispatching troops in a bid to capture them. 

The Senkaku islands, on the other hand, are under Japanese control, and this enables Tokyo to frame an amphibious landing as a defensive operation designed to protect or to recapture the Senkaku in response to Chinese aggression.
Japan’s marines, in other words, will be the first in the world tasked exclusively with defending one specific, tiny and uninhabited location.
There are three parts to the process of building this new deterrent: teaching the new marines how to be marines, equipping the unit with the right capabilities, and, more broadly, reconfiguring the JSDF and JCG’s posture in southwest Japan.
By all accounts, the learning part is proceeding rapidly. 

The November exercise will build on other amphibious drills the GSDF has undertaken, including participation since 2005 in the regular “Iron Fist” exercises in the U.S. 

More significantly, the JSDF sent an amphibious task force across the Pacific to take part in the “Dawn Blitz” exercise in July, in what was regarded as a breakthrough demonstration of the JSDF’s fast-improving amphibious knowhow. 

According to Grant Newsham, a former U.S. Marine Liaison Officer to the GSDF, what the Japanese military did at Dawn Blitz was nothing short of “historic,” not just as a demonstration of amphibious landings, but as a sign of the GSDF and the Maritime Self-Defense Force’s newfound ability to work together – joint operations being a traditional blind spot for the Japanese military, but a must for amphibious missions.
Bilateral bonds: Ground Self-Defense Force troops train with the U.S. Marines on Guam last September to 'recapture' an isolated island that's hypothetically fallen into enemy hands.

Caveat Emptor
The MoD’s 2014 budget request clearly states its procurement objectives in terms of equipping the new marine unit. 

Unsurprisingly, given the central role the U.S. Marine Corp (USMC) have assumed in training their Japanese counterparts, the Japanese unit is following the USMC playbook.
The ship-to-shore gap will be filled with amphibious assault vehicles – small numbers of test AAVs are already being acquired – and the MoD is studying the MV-22 Osprey with a view to initiating procurement in 2015. 

Not mentioned in the budget request is the F-35B, the STOVL version of the US’s new frontline fighter aircraft, which the US Marines will operate (Japan is currently procuring only the conventional F-35A). 

The ability to operate fast jets from Okinawa means that the Japanese marines may not require F-35Bs as air cover, given that their sole focus will be the Senkaku, but in time a requirement for a marine-specific fighter may emerge.
However, while following the USMC’s well-worn procurement path may be the easiest option, it will not yield the best results, according to critics of U.S. Marine procurement from within the USMC itself. 

David Fuquea, an associate professor at the U.S. Navy War College, regards the Osprey as “the most revolutionary platform for amphibious operations since the helicopter,” and strongly encourages the JSDF to buy it. 

However, he says the JSDF should part ways with the U.S. Marines when it comes to the AAV – which he dismisses as World War II technology – and he instead advises Japan to buy highly mobile, tougher vehicles as well as mobile artillery which can be transported, along with the marines themselves, by the Osprey.
Fuquea’s argument is compelling given Japan’s single objective of holding or capturing the Senkaku. 

The JSDF will need to get boots on the ground as quickly as possible in the event of a conflict – something the Osprey delivers – but the marines then need the right equipment to hold their position once they get there. And if their task is to dislodge Chinese forces that have already landed, Fuquea warns that slow-moving AAVs are unlikely to survive as they lumber towards the beach: he says Japan needs more high-speed landing craft and armored vehicles that are more survivable than AAVs if they are to succeed.

An MV-22B Osprey assigned to Marine Medium Tiltrotor Squadron (VMM) 266 (Reinforced), 26th Marine Expeditionary Unit, prepares to takeoff during flight operations aboard the USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), while sailing off the coast of Onslow Beach, N.C., Jan. 29, 2013.

Looking South
The new marine unit looks set to be based in Sasebo, in western Kyushu, but that is not the nearest of locations for a unit with its attention trained only on the Senkaku.
The JSDF is currently reinforcing elsewhere in Okinawa Prefecture, of which the Senkaku are a part. 

The GSDF is deploying a new “coastal observation unit” to Yonaguni island – the nearest point to the Senkaku at the end of the Ryukyu chain – and is reportedly looking at the option of deploying anti-ship missiles to nearby Ishigaki (though this has not been confirmed by the MoD). 

It is not hard to imagine some marine units moving south to one of these locations at some point in the future, to put the Senkaku within easier reach.
In the meantime, the Coast Guard unit based in Ishigaki is also receiving investment – and personal encouragement from Shinzo Abe – as a 600-man Senkaku patrol unit is established there. 

This new JCG unit will be the civilian equivalent of the new marine regiment – an outfit tasked solely with monitoring and protecting the Senkaku from China.
So while budget cuts and political gridlock may indeed undermine the ability of the U.S. to intervene in regional disputes, Japan is sending a very clear signal to China: it plans to hold onto the Senkaku islands, with or without American help.

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All in the Family

How a Chinese local government forced a teacher to help evict her parents.
BY LIZ CARTER

In what will surely make for years of awkward dinner table conversation, the government of a suburban area of Fuzhou, the capital of coastal Fujian province, tried to force local schoolteacher Lin Xin to assist authorities in demolishing her parents' home, according to an Oct. 28 report in the popular local paper Beijing News. 

Lin refused, but the consequences were disastrous. 

Authorities cancelled her classes for 50 days, Lin (briefly) lost her job, and her marriage ended in divorce.
The news first went national on Sina Weibo, China's Twitter. 

On Oct. 27, Weibo user and social commentator named Ding Laifeng posted a notice dated Aug. 13 that Lin claimed she had received from the local government. 

It required that Lin and her husband, also a teacher, report to a nearby town to "assist in the demolition." 

It's unclear exactly why authorities were so eager to have Lin's parents out of their home. 

According to China News Service, a Chinese state-owned news agency, the home was 4,000 square feet and illegally built, but no information about the development plans, revenues, or compensation for the residents was available. (A person who answered the phone at the local government office hung up after being told a reporter was on the line.)
Perhaps unbelievably, the coercive tactic does not appear unique. 

Some Weibo users reported in online debates about this story that authorities had approached them or their families in similar ways. 

Mainstream Chinese media also reported that a teacher in the inland city of Changsha received a notice on Oct. 25 from local authorities telling her to convince her grandmother to move. 

Like Lin's notice, this one described the order as a professional "transfer" to a division of the government in charge of evictions and demolition, making compliance a job requirement. (Local governments, which oversee both local education bureaus and divisions in charge of evictions and demolition, have the authority to approve such transfers.)
The story resonated on Weibo because the forced demolition of homes to make way for private developments is a sensitive issue in China. 

According to official figures, local governments in China depend on land sales for the majority of their income; income from such sales totaled $438 billion in 2012. 

Local authorities often profit from private development by appropriating residents' land and selling it to real estate developers. 

The authorities then assist developers in evicting uncooperative residents from old buildings. 

Residents who hold out against developers are known as "nail households" for their tenacity.
Lin tried to fight the good fight. 

The Beijing News says that she refused to help with the demolition, claiming she lacked authority to tell her parents what to do with their home. 

But pressure mounted as she continued to resist. 

On Sept. 9, the principal at Lin's school told her that she should no longer come to work. 

By Sept. 18, Lin's marriage was over: In order to ensure that Lin's husband, a schoolteacher named Zhang Xingfa, would not also lose his job, the two divorced. 

In an interview with the Beijing News, Lin said that she and her husband were doing their best not to let the situation affect their two-year-old child.
The news that a forced demolition had split up a married couple with a young child went viral on Weibo, as users shared Ding's Oct. 27 post over 5,000 times. 

Many remarked that the government's tactic resembled a throwback to a darker period in China's history. One user wrote that "it is a little reminiscent of the Cultural Revolution," the period from 1966 to 1976 when Chinese authorities encouraged people to report their family members for ideological crimes. 

Others called the move "inhumane."
While some raged, others expressed resignation. 

"This happens all over China. It's very common," wrote one Weibo user. 

At least it's not hordes of scorpions, which one Chinese developer allegedly used to scare uncooperative tenants out of their homes in Jul. 2011. 

It's also not a kidnapping: On Sept. 24 in Shanghai, a group of men abducted an elderly couple and held them in a courtyard while developers demolished their home, with all of their belongings still inside. 

"This is the smallest of losses," another Weibo user wrote of Lin's experience. 

"The alternative is that people might be hurt or killed."
The China Youth Daily, a major Communist Party paper, reported that after her story went viral online, Lin's school informed her that she could return to work on Oct. 30. 

That's good news -- but the paper also noted that on Oct. 15, Lin's parents' home was torn down.

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Crash a symbol of China reform struggle

By Francesco Sisci

BEIJING -- It was as if a bomb exploded in Saint Peter's Square before a conclave or there was detonation in front of the White House before the presidential inauguration. 

This is the situation now in China, where a car crashed in Tiananmen Square on Monday at noon, before a Party Plenum that is expected to announce extraordinary reforms.
A vehicle caught fire, killing three occupants of the car and two bystanders and wounding dozens of policemen and passing tourists. 

Several hours after the event, it was still unknown if it was an accident or an attack. 

Some witnesses said they heard a blast, but it could have just been the noise of the car slamming against a heavy metal guard-rail at the edge of the square. 

Others reported that the vehicle rode close to the curb for many yards. 

The popular Global Daily newspaper wrote it was a suicide car-bomb of Uyghur terrorists, but why three passengers in a suicide car-bomb rather than just one?
In any case, the event is unprecedented in Chinese history, and if it was a planned action, it seems to symbolize all the drama of the far-reaching economic reform agenda being pushed by President Xi Jinping. State media reported on Tuesday a Politburo announcement that the Communist Party will hold a key four-day meeting in Beijing from November 9-12, a much-anticipated event that could serve as the venue for the announcement of reforms.
The reforms should eventually cripple the large and inefficient state-owned enterprises (SOEs) that pollute and distort the market, and instead provide fairer conditions for the private enterprises that have been driving national development for decades, but are officially only Cinderellas at the court of the Chinese state.
Tiananmen is indeed a symbolic and sacred place for the People's Republic of China. 

The square was designed by Mao Zedong, who wanted a larger space than the Red Square in Moscow. 

It was to be the setting of huge mass gatherings held to show off with the Soviets. 

Here in 1966, the Great Helmsman launched the Cultural Revolution before millions of young Red Guards drawn together from every corner of the country. 

Here, Mao's reign effectively ended 10 years later, when thousands flooded the streets to mark the death of premier Zhou Enlai in a gesture of defiance against the Cultural Revolution.
Here again in 1989 students demanding democracy rose up, and still here in 2000 activists from the outlawed Falun Gong sect attempted to set themselves on fire. 

Since 1989, gatherings in the square have been prohibited, and since 2000 in every corner there are fire extinguishers and plainclothes policemen ready to take action against any act of protest. 

But you could not predict someone driving into a guard-rail.
Starting tomorrow, security will be doubled and new preventive measures introduced. 

But the fact remains that total control is impossible. 

Even without considering political protests, it is impossible to avert the actions of a madman when you are surrounded by about 1.4 billion Chinese citizens.
Paradoxically, only greater openness and transparency will lead, if not to prevention, at least to better post-incident management. 

Awkward hours of official silence and difficulty in communicating -- as happened in this case -- make it very difficult to understand what occurred and believe the official story, whatever it is. 

There is also the symbolism to keep in mind. 

After 30 years of reforms that were at first timidly introduced to promote private enterprise, Xi is preparing to pass revolutionary changes.
Granting equal access to the market for inefficient state-owned enterprises and more efficient private companies means condemning the state-owned enterprises to a smaller role. 

Xi has said that SOEs will lose the privileges of the various monopolies they now hold; their special access to credit will dwindle and more competition will be introduced in many sectors.
This step is crucial to ensure that China's growth continues to be rapid in the coming decades and doesn't get bogged down around 2020, when a Soviet-style meltdown of the economy could otherwise become inevitable. 

However, the reforms are already creating legions of enemies for Xi. 

Many state officials, large and small, rightly fear in a reduction in their power and their sinecures.
For months, opponents have been waving the ideological banner of Maoism and raising the specter of a few private entrepreneurs preying on those who remain at the bottom of the social ladder of development. 

This opposition openly trumpets its legitimacy and strength, obstructing the reforms. 

So Xi must use the banner of Maoism in order to take it away from his enemies, to placate and muzzle public opposition, and to avoid a coalition of forces from grouping against the reforms in progress.
The car on fire in Tiananmen becomes a real or accidental gesture of protest against the reforms, and it is the symbol of the many and great difficulties that Xi has met and will meet in changing the country's deep economic and political structure.
In China, leaders could be preparing possibly for years of hard political struggle. 

If Xi succeeds in creating a strong private sector-based economy within 10 years, the country could have a fully convertible currency (as should be announced in the Plenum) and then also some form of political democracy. 

In that case, development could continue at a rapid pace for more than half a century.

If Xi instead is defeated, the Soviet-style path of implosion is already drawn politically and economically.

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A Lonely Passion: China’s Followers of Friedrich A. Hayek

By DIDI KIRSTEN TATLOW

As quixotic causes go, working in China to spread the ideas of Friedrich A. Hayek, the Austrian-born liberal economist and philosopher of freedom, is up there.
Hayek believed that economic planning by the state leads to a loss of individual liberty, and that a private economy run by people whose rights are protected and enlarged by good laws delivers the best life.
‘‘There is some distance between Hayek and the current realities’’ in China, Gao Quanxi, a prominent Chinese Hayekian and law professor at Beihang University in Beijing, said in an interview this week.
Mr. Gao was probably choosing his words carefully. 

The gap is enormous, as he explained last Friday in a talk at the Unirule Institute of Economics, a think tank in Beijing.
Present were members of the Hayek Association, an informal group of dozens of Chinese scholars that is not registered — cannot register, several members said, probably because of government opposition that would make it too difficult or expensive, though they didn’t spell that out.
In his talk, titled ‘‘Reconsidering Hayek’s Theoretical Legacy,’’ Mr. Gao did not mince words: China is less free now than 10 years ago, at the end of the Jiang Zemin era. 

There is no ‘‘free market of ideas’’ in universities.

Publishing on topics the authorities disapprove of has become more difficult. 

The state is on the march.
‘‘Today we’re in a new planned economy,’’ a ‘‘politically left, economically right’’ setup that does not guarantee individual protections and offers no sense of security, he said.
Yes, China had introduced some measure of a private economy. 

But, ‘‘we have all these state-owned companies. What do they represent?’’ he asked. 

‘‘At the end of the day, what are they?’’
Capitalism, several participants said, functions in China according to the unwritten rules created by the power holders, not by good laws, as Hayek urged.
‘‘Communism has failed. Socialism has failed. What we have here is statism. And Hayek really opposed that. So how should we understand Hayek in the context of today’s China?’’ asked Mr. Gao.
In August, the association held its ninth annual meeting, in Tianjin, to consider that. 

Next year will mark its 10th anniversary, and members hope to meet overseas for the first time, in Taiwan or Hawaii. 

‘‘We’ve met in lots of places in China and thought we’d meet overseas for a change,’’ said Mr. Gao.
The meeting did not advertise itself as a Hayek Association event, but topics included the core issues of economic and personal liberty.
‘‘We didn’t ask people to write anything down,’’ said Feng Xingyuan, deputy director of Unirule and an association member. 

‘‘We asked them to talk. We’re just a group of scholars.’’
As always in China, there’s more intellectual and social ferment, including in the ranks of the ruling Communist Party, than the outside world realizes.
According to one participant, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of political sensitivities, a district-level party secretary in a city he declined to name recently distributed copies of Hayek’s classic, ‘‘The Road to Serfdom,’’ to his colleagues to study. 

The book warns that with state economic control comes tyranny; the foundations of liberty are a free economy and individualism.
What is the government’s attitude to all this?
‘‘They maintain an attitude of silence. But they may use parts of it on a practical level,’’ said Mr. Gao. 

He cited the 1990s, when the government privatized many state-owned companies. 

But that agenda has run out of steam, he said, and must be reprised, though he was skeptical it would happen soon. 

Political change to enhance the personal liberties Hayek urged was especially unlikely, he said. 

‘‘Perhaps in five or 10 years.’’
Many economists, scholars and politicians believe that China is facing deep challenges to its economic model, that it needs to shift from a fixed investment-fueled economy, where the hand of the state is heavy, to one with more private enterprise and market forces.
For the Hayekians, it’s all pretty obvious.

What China needs is more of the medicine Hayek prescribed. 

‘‘China is at a point where it needs to listen to Hayek,’’ said Mr. Gao.
‘‘People need to do things on their own again, with their individual energies,’’ Mr. Gao said. 

‘‘We need a true people’s economy. We can’t do things through force anymore.’’

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